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Adolescents face the task of forming an identity; they need to decide what 
profession to follow, to choose in which values to believe, to make up their 
minds on how to relate with important others in their lives, and to accept 
themselves the way they are. Although originally part of a broader theory of 
lifespan development (Erikson, 1980), identity soon became an independent 
concept. Relevant theory and research accentuate the role of problem-solving 
and decision-making variables in the formation of identity. This dissertation 
suggests an alternative process that goes beyond problem solving and 
decision making. Emotions play a central role in this process.  
 
Commitments and their Characteristics 
As Erikson (1959) himself admitted, identity was not defined specifically 
enough in his writings. Therefore, different researchers have focused on 
different aspects of identity and have come up with different 
operationalisations thereof. For instance, van Hoof (1998) focused on the 
structural integration of identity, while Blasi and Milton (1991) looked at the 
subjective sense of self. The most popular of these operationalisations, having 
led to more than 500 publications by the end of the last decade (Waterman, 
1999), is the identity status paradigm (Marcia, 1966).   
Following Marcia, identity is reflected on the ways individuals commit 
themselves in important areas in their lives. Originally, these areas were 
philosophy of life (religion and politics) and future occupation (Marcia, 1966). 
Later, Rogow, Marcia, and Slugoski (1983) suggested that other personally 
relevant areas should be studied as well. Examples of such areas are 
standards of sexual behaviour (Marcia & Friedman, 1970), family- career 
priorities (Archer, 1989), friendship and dating (Grotevant & Adams, 1984), 
parents and personal characteristics (Bosma, 1985).  
In his original publication, Marcia (1966) referred to one main 
characteristic of commitments, namely their strength. He defined it as “the 
degree of personal investment” (p. 551) of the individuals in their beliefs or 
decisions. Typically, this is measured by means of items such as “Are you 
satisfied with your commitment?” (Bosma, 1985) and “My commitment gives 
me self-confidence” (Meeus, 1996). Later, Bosma (1985) suggested that the 
content of the commitments, referring to the beliefs or decisions themselves, 
is also important (also Kroger, 2003).  
 
Formation of Commitments  
In the identity status paradigm, commitments are formed following “a period 
of engagement in choosing among alternatives” (Marcia, 1966, p. 551), the so-
called exploration. The precise meaning of exploration is equivocal. Meilman 
(1979) defined it as “the process of rethinking one’s position” (p. 230), and 
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Bosma (1985) concluded that it includes the “active orientation to other 
persons… and an attempt to come to a new commitment” (p. 140). In these 
definitions, exploration functions in breadth and aims at forming new 
commitments. Following Meeus, Iedema, and Maassen (2002), exploration 
functions in depth and aims at maintaining and validating existing 
commitments. Luyckx, Beyers, Goossens, and Soenens (2004) integrated both 
views: Exploration in breadth leads to the formation of commitments, and 
exploration in depth promotes identification with already formed 
commitments. In all relevant operationalisations and definitions, exploration 
refers to the active and deliberate thinking through or into alternatives. 
 Researchers have soon acknowledged that the identity status 
paradigm is outcome-oriented. Berzonsky (1990), Kurtines (see Berman, 
Schwartz, Kurtines, & Berman, 2001), and others have suggested cognitive 
components of exploration in an attempt to introduce a process perspective in 
the identity status concept. Grotevant (1987), however, warned that rational 
models might not capture the essence of identity formation. Instead, he 
suggested that “individuals who explore possibilities [are] pragmatic, 
anticipating and testing out possible results of choices, rather than 
systematically testing their compatibility with each possible option” (pp. 210-
211). In his model, based on mate selection literature, he introduced affective 
components as inextricable parts of the exploration process.  
 
Identity and Emotions  
Emotions and identity are related in various ways (Bosma & Kunnen, 2001; 
Haviland, Davidson, Ruetch, Gebelt, & Lancelot, 1994; Strayer, 2002). Here, 
we will refer only to emotions as connected to commitments (and their 
formation). In literature, negative emotions, such as distress (Adams & 
Marshall, 1996) and anxiety (Archer & Waterman, 1994), trigger the 
exploration process. Once activated, exploration involves feelings of anxiety 
and uncertainty (also Archer & Waterman, 1994), of challenge or 
discouragement as a result of perceived failure, of satisfaction as a result of 
success, and of sadness “over opportunities foregone even when desired 
choices are made” (Grotevant, 1987, p. 213). Positive emotions promote 
exploration and new ways of looking at things (Isen, 1993). The satisfaction 
derived from commitments determines whether and to what extent 
exploration will be initiated in the future (Grotevant, 1987).  
A different view of the role of emotions in identity is given in the 
construct of personal expressiveness (Waterman, et al., 2003). Drawing from 
the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia, Waterman suggested that feelings of 
personal expressiveness (positive emotions) are related to “activities that 
reflect one’s core sense of being” (Waterman, et al., 2003, p. 1449). Personal 
expressiveness is reflected, among others, in feeling intensely alive, feeling 
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complete or fulfilled, and feeling that this is who one really is (for a fuller 
account of the concept of eudaimonia, Waterman, 1993). Although the 
aforementioned lines of reasoning root from different perspectives on the 
formation of identity (construction vs. discovery; Waterman, 1984), they both 
allow for the possibility to find links between identity and emotions.  
 
Overview of Chapters 
The present dissertation focuses on how emotions inform on the process of 
commitment formation. The major questions that guided the research 
reported are: Should we exclusively focus on rational aspects of commitment 
formation? In what way can emotions be related to this process? The 
forthcoming chapters deal with these questions.  
Chapter 2 questions the emphasis of research on the rational aspects of 
commitment formation. An example of such aspects is the concept of identity 
styles, which refer to the social cognitive strategies that individuals 
supposedly use when approaching identity issues (Berzonsky, 1990). We used 
psychological well-being (Ryff, 1989) as an index of what matters for the 
individuals. Regression analyses show that being committed is important for 
one’s well-being, but the way of reaching these commitments, i.e., their 
identity style, is not. This is a first sign that the focus on the rational aspects of 
identity formation solely might be misleading.  
Chapter 3 questions the emphasis of literature on exploration as the 
process of change and stability of commitments. We use the domain of 
parents as an example of an identity domain where exploration may not 
explain changes and stability of commitments. Our data show that 
exploration hardly ever occurred, and, even when it did, it could not explain 
the course of commitments. On the other hand, positive and negative 
emotions with respect to parents explain it. In Chapter 4, we build a dynamic 
systems model to predict the course of commitments towards parents based 
on friends-related emotions. We exhibit the viability of the model through 
empirically testing it. The essence of this chapter is that even experience not 
directly related to an identity area may affect the commitments regarding this 
area.  
Chapter 5 considers the course of a different identity domain, namely 
that of personal characteristics, which can easily be related to self as well as to 
identity literature. We build a dynamic systems model to describe the course 
of maturity of one’s commitment towards personal characteristics based on 
emotions related to friends, parents, perceived competence and 
incompetence, and reflections towards oneself. Empirical data provide 
support to this model. Finally, in Chapter 6, we discuss the importance of the 
findings presented in Chapters 2 to 5 for the theory on commitment 
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A successful identity formation is related to being psychologically well 
(Erikson, 1963). This link seems to be lost in the identity style literature that 
focuses either on the maturity of the identity styles, or on adaptive and 
maladaptive behaviour correlates of identity styles. In this study, we address 
this lost link. We administered the Identity Style Inventory (Berzonsky, 
1992a) and the scales of Psychological Well-Being (Ryff, 1989) to 230 Hellene 
University students. The Hellenic translations of the scales functioned 
appropriately. The findings suggest that, first, avoiding facing identity issues 
is negatively related to psychological well-being, and, second, when such 
issues are faced, the way of facing them is not important. 
 
This chapter is based on:  
Vleioras, G. & Bosma, H. A. (2005). Are identity styles important for 




Adolescents face the task of forming an identity: They need to make up their 
minds on important issues in their lives, such as what profession to follow, in 
what religion to believe, or what political ideas to adopt. They may approach 
such issues in different ways. For instance, they may gather information and 
make decisions accordingly, or they may adopt the guidelines set forth by 
significant others. This study addresses whether the way of approaching 
identity issues is important for the well-being of individuals.  
 
Identity, Identity Status, and Identity Styles 
Identity formation is the successful resolution of the so-called identity crisis, 
presented in Erikson’s (1982) psychosocial theory. Erikson described 
development as a series of conflicts faced at different ages, which result from 
the interplay between the social environment and individual growth 
(Erikson, 1963). The success or failure of resolving each conflict affects the 
success of resolving future conflicts (this principle is known as the epigenetic 
principle). Successful resolution of the conflicts is related to the emergence 
and re-emergence of an increased sense of inner unity, and an increase of 
good judgement and of the capacity of doing well (Erikson, 1980). 
As Erikson (1959) himself admitted, the content of identity has not been 
very specific in his theory. Therefore, different operationalisations have been 
suggested (e.g., Blasi & Milton, 1991; Van Hoof, 1998). From these, the 
identity status paradigm, introduced by Marcia (1966), proved to be the most 
famous and research inspiring one. Marcia (1966) described four “individual 
styles of coping” (p. 558) with the identity formation task, and called these 
identity statuses. Individuals are assigned to these statuses on the basis of the 
degrees to which they have explored or are exploring identity alternatives 
and to which they are committed to one of these alternatives.  
 Identity achievers and foreclosures are both committed: The former 
have firstly explored identity alternatives, while the latter have not done so. 
On the other hand, moratoriums and diffusions are not committed: The 
former are now in the process of exploring, while the latter have not explored 
identity alternatives. Extrapolating from Erikson’s theory, we would expect 
identity achievement and foreclosure to be developmentally more favoured 
than moratorium and diffusion, because the former involve having made 
commitments. This is only partly true: In the identity status literature, 
identity achievement is a mature and diffusion an immature status (Meeus, 
Iedema, Helsen, & Vollebergh, 1999); moratorium, however, is considered 
more mature a status than foreclosure (Waterman, 1982). Therefore, it appears 
that, in the identity status paradigm, the interest is diverted from holding 
commitments to exploring identity alternatives.  
Identity styles and psychological well-being 
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Although exploration refers to the process of identity formation, the 
identity status paradigm itself is rather outcome-oriented. Acknowledging 
this, Berzonsky (1990) proposed the idea of identity styles to describe the 
social-cognitive strategies individuals use to face identity issues. An 
information orientation involves actively seeking out, elaborating, and 
evaluating relevant information in order to form commitments. A normative 
orientation involves a focus on the normative expectations held for the 
individuals by significant others. Finally, a diffuse/avoidant orientation 
refers to avoiding the confrontation of identity issues for the longest possible. 
Extensive research (Berzonsky & Adams, 1999; Berzonsky, 2002) has shown 
that identity achievers and moratoriums use mainly an information 
orientation, foreclosures a norm orientation, and diffusions a 
diffuse/avoidant orientation. In accordance with the aforementioned idea on 
the maturity of identity statuses, an information orientation is considered the 
maturest identity style, a diffuse/avoidant orientation the least mature, and 
the norm orientation lies in between (Berzonsky, 1990).  
 
Identity Styles and Well-Being 
As we mentioned before, Erikson inextricably related the developmentally 
desirable outcome of identity formation with one’s good judgement, sense of 
inner unity, and capacity of doing well, what can be readily identified as 
characteristics of somebody being psychologically well. On the other hand, 
the theory behind identity styles refers to their maturity, but not to their 
outcomes in terms of being well. This gap is partly covered by several studies 
that addressed whether identity styles are differentially related to indices of 
well-being.  
 An information orientation is related positively to successful coping 
with stress and anxiety, to problem-focused coping, and to openness to 
experience, and negatively to other-directedness, to debilitative effects of 
anxiety, to reliance to wishful thinking, and to emotional distancing. On the 
other hand, a diffuse/avoidant orientation is related negatively to quality of 
peer relationships, to academic achievement, and to self-esteem, and 
positively to debilitative effects of anxiety, to emotional distancing, to other-
directedness, to maladaptive decisional strategies, to drugs and alcohol 
problems, to depressive reactions (Nurmi, Berzonsky, Tammi, & Kinney, 
1997), to neuroticism, and to eating and conduct disorders (for reviews, see 
Berzonsky, 1990, 2002, 2003).  
While information orientation is clearly positively related to well-being 
and diffuse/avoidant orientation is clearly negatively related to well-being, 
the relationship of normative orientation and well-being is not clear-cut. 
Thus, similarly to information orientation, it is positively related to effective 
behaviours, while, similarly to diffuse/avoidant orientation, it is also 
Chapter 2 
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positively related to emotional avoidance and to debilitative effects of anxiety 
(Berzonsky, 1992b). Lastly, unlike information orientation, it is negatively 
related to problem-focused coping and to openness regarding core areas of 
the self (Berzonsky, 1990).  
In conclusion, previous research on identity styles and well-being has 
mainly relied on indices of adaptive and maladaptive behaviours, and on 
negative indices of well-being. These seem to be only fragments of what 
Erikson described as characteristics of being well. We here suggest that the 
model of psychological well-being suggested by Ryff (1989) may prove useful 
in this respect. 
 
Psychological Well-Being 
Starting from the conviction that “positive health is more than the absence of 
illness” (Ryff & Singer, 1998, p. 1), Ryff (1989) suggested that psychological 
well-being comprises what one needs to be psychologically well (contrast the 
notion of subjective well-being, which refers to feeling well), which is highly 
parallel to the characteristics of a healthy personality set forth by Erikson. In 
order to define the criteria of psychological well-being, Ryff reviewed the 
works of Maslow on self-actualisation, of Rogers on the fully functioning 
person, of Jung on individuation, of Allport on maturity, of Erikson on his 
psychosocial model, of Buhler on the basic life tendencies, of Neugarten on 
personality change in adulthood, and of Jahoda on the positive criteria of 
mental health (Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Singer, 1996).  
 Ryff (1989) concluded that they all converge in the following criteria: 
holding a positive opinion about oneself (self-acceptance), being able to 
choose or create contexts appropriate for one’s psychological condition 
(environmental mastery), having warm and trusting relationships and being 
able to love (positive relations with others), having goals, intentions, and a 
sense of direction (purpose in life), continuous development of one’s potential 
(personal growth), and being self-determined and independent (autonomy). 
These criteria are related positively to positive functioning (such as life 
satisfaction), and negatively to negative functioning (such as depression; Ryff 
& Singer, 1996). Finally, they are also related to biological health (Ryff & 
Singer, 2002).  
 
Aim of the Present Study 
Based on previous research presented above and on the link between 
measures of psychological well-being and of other measures of well-being, it 
would be reasonable to form a research hypothesis on possible links between 
identity styles and psychological well-being. However, because of the 
conceptual difference between the indices of well-being used before and the 
Identity styles and psychological well-being 
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psychological well-being, we prefer to formulate a research question: Are 




Participants were 230 (43 male, 187 female) Hellene1 University students. The 
high proportion of females is typical for psychological, classical, and 
theoretical studies in the Hellenic Republic. Their age ranged from 18 to 23 
years (mean = 20.13, s = 1.59). The sample comprised 148 (64.3%) psychology 
students, 22 (9.6%) students of classical or theoretical studies, and 60 (26.1%) 
students of applied sciences. Fifty- two (22.6%) were in the first year of 
studies, 51 (22.2%) in the second, 70 (30.4%) in the third, 32 (13.9%) in the 
fourth, and 25 (10.9%) in the fifth or later. No reward was given for 




We used the Identity Style Inventory (Berzonsky, 1992a). This 40-item 
inventory contains four scales: an information, a normative, and a 
diffuse/avoidant orientation scale, and an index of the strength of 
commitment. The psychometric qualities of the original version are 
satisfactory (Berzonsky, 2003). The Identity Style Inventory was translated 
into the Hellenic language. Some items were re-formulated to better fit the 
Hellenic educational system. The internal reliability coefficients (alphas) for 
the identity style scales in this sample were acceptable (0.63, 0.62, and 0.66, for 
the information, normative and diffuse/avoidant orientation, respectively), 
but lower than the ones reported for the original version (Berzonsky, 1992a). 
Eliminating items only slightly improved these coefficients. Therefore, we 
retained the original scales. The alpha coefficient for the commitment index 
was 0.68, acceptable, and comparable to that reported for the original version 
(Berzonsky, 1992a).  
 
Psychological well-being 
We used the Psychological Well-Being scales devised by Ryff (1989). These 
are six 14-item scales, measuring the psychological well-being dimensions of 
Ryff’s (1989) model: self-acceptance, environmental mastery, positive 
relations with others, purpose in life, personal growth, and autonomy (for a 
description of these scales, Table 1). The psychometric qualities of the original  
 
1 Hellene, Hellenic, and Hellenic Republic are the proper terms for Greek (person), 
Greek (object), and Greece 
Chapter 2 
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version are satisfactory (Ryff, 1989). These scales were translated into the 
Hellenic language. The internal reliability coefficients (alphas) in the present 
sample ranged from 0.77 to 0.86, and were slightly lower than the ones 
reported for the original version (Ryff, 1989). Eliminating items only slightly 
increased these coefficients. Therefore, the original scales were used. 
 
Table 1. Content of the psychological well-being scales. 
A high score in: Shows: 
Self-acceptance positive attitude toward the self;  
acknowledgement and acceptance of multiple aspects of self  
including good and bad qualities;  
feeling positive about past life 
Environmental 
mastery 
sense of mastery;  
competence in managing the environment;  
control of a complex array of external activities;  
effective use of surrounding opportunities;  
ability to choose or create contexts suitable to personal 
needs and values 
Positive relations with 
others 
warm, satisfying, trusting relationships with others;  
concern about the welfare of others;  
capability of strong empathy, affection, and intimacy;  
understanding of give and take of human relationships. 
Purpose in life goals in life and sense of directedness;  
feeling there is meaning to present and past life;  
beliefs that give life purpose;  
aims and objectives for living 
Personal growth feeling of continued development;  
seeing self as growing and expanding;  
openness to new experiences;  
seeing sense of realising one's potential;  
seeing improvement in self and behaviour over time;  
change in ways that reflect more self knowledge and 
effectiveness 
Autonomy self-determination;  
independence;  
ability to resist to social pressures to think and act in certain 
ways;  
regulation of behaviour from within;  
self-evaluation by personal standards 
 
Procedure 
The first author approached the participants in their faculties, informed them 
about the study, and asked them to fill in a battery consisting of a sheet on 
demographic characteristics, the two aforementioned questionnaires, and a 
Identity styles and psychological well-being 
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personality questionnaire. The order of the questionnaires in the battery was 
randomised. The participants were free to choose whether to fill in the battery 




This is the first time that the Identity Style Inventory and the Psychological 
Well-Being scales were used in the Hellenic language. Therefore, we first 
present some preliminary analyses to compare the behaviour of the Hellenic 
to the original versions of the questionnaires.  
 
Intercorrelations 
Table 2 exhibits the intercorrelations between the identity style, strength of 
commitment, and psychological well-being scales. Unlike previous research 
(Berzonsky, 1992c), the identity styles did not correlate with each other. 
Similarly to previous research (Berzonsky, 1992c), strength of commitment 
correlated with all three identity styles: The higher the strength of 
commitment, the higher the score in the information and normative 
orientations, and the lower the score in the diffuse/avoidant orientation. All 
psychological well-being scales positively correlated with each other. The 
direction and significance of these correlations are comparable to previous 
research (Kling, Seltzer, & Ryff, 1997). Despite the magnitude of these 
correlations, Ryff and colleagues (Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995) advise not to 
sum all psychological well-being scales into one general scale, because they 
represent distinct facets of positive mental health. Finally, the information 
orientation positively correlated with all psychological well-being except for 
self-acceptance, the normative orientation positively correlated with 
environmental mastery, the diffuse/avoidant orientation negatively 
correlated with all psychological well-being scales, and the strength of 
commitment positively correlated with all psychological well-being scales. 
 
Gender and age differences 
At this preliminary level, we conducted only univariate analyses. We 
calculated bivariate correlations to test for age effects, and conducted t-tests to 
test for gender differences. As far as psychological well-being is concerned, 
age positively correlated with autonomy, r (224)=0.16, p<0.05. Previous 
research found more age differences, but, in those studies, wider age groups 
were compared (such as young vs. middle-aged vs. old-aged individuals; 
Ryff, 1989). In accordance with previous findings (Ryff, 1995), women scored 
higher than men in positive relations with others and in personal growth, t 
(225) = -3.54, p<0.001 and t (226) = -3.67, p<0.001, respectively. Unlike 
Chapter 2 
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previous findings, they also scored higher in purpose in life, t (225) = -3.13, 
p<0.01. No age or gender differences were found regarding identity styles. 
This is in accordance with the identity style theory (Berzonsky, 1990), 
according to which, by late adolescence, all individuals are capable of using 
all three identity styles.  
 
In sum, the Hellenic versions of the Identity Style Inventory and the 
Psychological Well-Being scales behave by and large similarly to the original 
versions: Identity style and psychological well-being scales intercorrelate in 
the expected way (except for the absence of correlation between information 
and diffuse/avoidant orientation), and comparisons between age groups and 
genders roughly replicate previous findings.  
 
Are Identity Styles Related to Psychological Well-Being? 
The research question of this study is whether identity styles are related to 
psychological well-being; in other words, whether identity styles are 
significant predictors of psychological well-being, in the statistical sense. 
Because the psychological well-being scales correlated with each other, a 
multivariate GLM analysis was conducted. This gave the same results as a 
series of univariate regression analyses (simultaneous regression of each 
psychological well-being scale on the identity style and strength of 
commitment scales). For reasons of ease of interpretability, only the latter 
analyses will be presented. To account for the increase in the risk of a type I 
error, due to conducting multiple analyses, we used a significance cut-off 
level of 0.01.  
 Although our research question refers to the identity styles only, the 
strength of commitment was also included in the analyses. On a conceptual 
level, information and normative orientations are related to having 
commitments (high score in strength of commitment), while the 
diffuse/avoidant orientation is related with not having commitments (low 
score in strength of commitment). Strength of commitment, on the other 
hand, significantly correlated with all psychological well-being scales (see 
Preliminary analyses- Intercorrelations). Accordingly, it may be that 
information and normative orientations are positively related to 
psychological well-being because they lead to making commitments, and that 
the diffuse/avoidant orientation is negatively related to psychological well-
being because it results in lack of commitments. Including the strength of 
commitment in the analyses secured that such effects would be controlled for.  
Table 3 summarises the results of the regression analyses. Eliminating 
outliers did not alter the results, and multicollinearity problems were not 
detected. The diffuse/avoidant orientation was a significant predictor of 





Table 2. Intercorrelations between the identity style, the strength of commitment, and the psychological well-being 
scales (N=230). 
 
Variables A B C D E F G H I 
Identity scales          
A. Information orientation          
B. Normative orientation  0.13         
C. Diffuse/Avoidant orientation -0.11  0.09        
D. Strength of commitment  0.32*** 0.39*** -0.34**       
 
Psychological Well-Being Scales  
         
E. Self-acceptance  0.12  0.01 -0.30*** 0.43***      
F. Environmental mastery  0.17*  0.14* -0.37*** 0.44*** 0.67***     
G. Positive relations with others  0.17**  0.08 -0.30*** 0.38*** 0.48*** 0.42***    
H. Purpose in life  0.16*  0.06 -0.52*** 0.54*** 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.39***   
I. Personal growth  0.35*** -0.10 -0.31*** 0.35*** 0.46*** 0.40*** 0.52*** 0.55***  






personal growth: The higher the score in the diffuse/avoidant orientation, the 
lower the score in these psychological well-being scales. The information and 
normative orientations were significant predictors only in the case of personal 
growth: The higher the score in information and the lower the score in 
normative orientation, the higher the score in personal growth. Including 
interaction effects between age and identity styles did not significantly add to 
the model.  
 
Table 3. Betas, standardised errors, standardised betas, and significance levels 
for the multiple linear regression analyses of each of the psychological well-











Information -0.04 0.14 -0.02 n.s. 
Normative -0.33 0.16 -0.14 n.s. 
Diffuse/avoidant -0.28 0.13 -0.14 n.s. 
Self-acceptance 
Commitment 0.96 0.16 0.46 <0.001 
Information 0.05 0.12 0.03 n.s. 
Normative 0.08 0.12 0.04 n.s. 
Diffuse/avoidant -0.44 0.11 -0.26 <0.001 
Environmental 
mastery 
Commitment 0.61 0.13 0.34 <0.001 
Information 0.15 0.14 0.07 n.s. 
Normative -0.03 0.15 -0.02 n.s. 
Diffuse/avoidant -0.36 0.13 -0.19 <0.01 
Positive relations 
with others 
Commitment 0.60 0.15 0.30 <0.001 
Information 0.00 0.11 -0.00 n.s. 
Normative -0.11 0.11 -0.06 n.s. 
Diffuse/avoidant -0.65 0.10 -0.38 <0.001 
Purpose in life 
Commitment 0.81 0.11 0.44 <0.001 
Information 0.41 0.10 0.26 <0.001 
Normative -0.36 0.10 -0.23 <0.001 
Diffuse/avoidant -0.23 0.09 -0.17 <0.01 
Personal growth 
Commitment 0.47 0.10 0.33 <0.001 
Information 0.19 0.15 0.09 n.s. 
Normative -0.31 0.16 -0.14 n.s. 
Diffuse/avoidant -0.23 0.14 -0.12 n.s. 
Autonomy 
Commitment 0.34 0.16 0.17 n.s. 
 
A series of hierarchical regression analyses was conducted to check 
whether information and normative orientations were not significant 
predictors in the rest of the psychological well-being scales because of shared 
variance in prediction. Each of the psychological well-being scales (except for 
the personal growth) has been hierarchically regressed first on the 
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diffuse/avoidant orientation and the strength of commitment, and then on all 
three identity styles and strength of commitment. The R2 values of the two 
models were compared. In none of the analyses did the inclusion of the 
normative and information orientation significantly add to the R2 (Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Summary of hierarchical regression analyses of each psychological 
well-being scale on diffuse/avoidant orientation and strength of commitment 
(model 1) and on information, normative, and diffuse/avoidant orientation 










1 0.22 0.21 0.22 <0.001 Self-acceptance 
2 0.24 0.22 0.02 n.s. 
1 0.26 0.26 0.26 <0.001 Environmental 
mastery 2 0.26 0.25 0.00 n.s. 
1 0.18 0.17 0.18 <0.001 Positive relations 
with others 2 0.18 0.16 0.00 n.s. 
1 0.43 0.43 0.43 <0.001 Purpose in life 
2 0.44 0.43 0.00 n.s. 
1 0.06 0.05 0.06 <0.01 Autonomy 
2 0.08 0.07 0.02 n.s. 
Note: The R square change describes the explained variable added by every new 
model. For model 1, it equals the respective R square because the R square for a 
hypothetical model with no dependent variables is 0. For model 2, it equals the R 
square of model 2 minus the R square of model 1. The F-change tests whether the R 
square change is statistically significant.  
 
CONCLUSION- DISCUSSION 
Previous research has related identity styles with separate indices of well-
being. This is the first study that related them with an integrated model of 
positive mental health. The diffuse/avoidant orientation was a significant 
predictor of the scores in four psychological well-being scales, and the 
information and norm orientations were significant predictors of the scores in 
only one psychological well-being scale. The strength of commitment was a 
significant predictor in all psychological well-being scales but one, and none 
of the identity styles was a significant predictor of that scale either. Thus, it 
appears that not dealing with identity issues is related to less psychological 
well-being, that dealing with identity issues (resulting in commitments) is 
related to more psychological well-being, but that the way individuals deal 
with identity issues is not related to psychological well-being.  
 As we described in the introduction, previous research relates 
diffuse/avoidant orientation with low well-being, and information 
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orientation with high well-being. Norm orientation is related both positively 
and negatively with different facets of well-being. In this study, only the 
negative connection between diffuse/avoidant orientation and psychological 
well-being was replicated. Why may this be the case? In previous research, 
the role of commitment was not taken into account. As Berzonsky (2003) 
showed, however, commitment does matter when it comes to the relationship 
between identity styles and well-being.  
Some insight on the way it matters can be gained through the literature 
on identity statuses and well-being. The concept of commitment is inherent in 
the identity statuses, giving them a comparative advantage over identity 
styles. Reviewing relevant literature, Meeus (1996) and Meeus et al. (1999) 
concluded that achievers and foreclosures have the highest well-being, 
moratoriums have the lowest, and diffusions lie in between (also, Waterman, 
1999). The fact that achievers and foreclosures are the highest in well-being 
signifies that, at least in terms of well-being, it is more preferable to have 
(than not to have) identity commitments, no matter how these were reached.  
In the Results section, we suggested that one possible way through 
which the diffuse/avoidant orientation is negatively related to well-being is 
that the former leads to a lack of commitments, which is related to low well-
being. This would mean that in hierarchical regression analyses, in which 
each of the psychological well-being scales would be first regressed on the 
identity style scales and then on the identity styles and strength of 
commitment scales, the diffuse/avoidant orientation would be a significant 
predictor of the psychological well-being scale only in step 1. This was true 
only for the self-acceptance scale. Diffuse/avoidant orientation predicted the 
scores in four psychological well-being scales beyond its effect on lacking 
commitments. According to the conceptualisation of this orientation 
(Berzonsky, 1990), it refers, among other things, to decisional and behavioural 
procrastination, which have been related to low well-being (Ferrari, 1991).  
 Two psychological well-being scales (namely, personal growth and 
autonomy) had distinct profiles in terms of identity styles. All three identity 
styles were significant predictors of scores in personal growth: The higher the 
score in the information orientation and the lower the scores in the normative 
and diffuse/avoidant orientations, the higher the score in personal growth. A 
high score in personal growth represents realising that one has the potential 
of continuous development and improvement over time (Table 1). This is 
possibly related to active decision-making (information orientation). On the 
other hand, relying on norms set forth by others (normative orientation) or 
not facing problems (diffuse/avoidant orientation) exhibits a rather passive 
perspective on development. That is, the identity styles reflect different 
perspectives towards one’s potential for continuous development. Therefore, 
it is reasonable that they were all significant predictors of personal growth.  
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 None of the identity styles or the strength of commitment were 
significant predictors of autonomy. That is, autonomy seems to be unrelated 
to both the process and the outcome of making commitments. As one can see 
in Table 4, however, the diffuse/avoidant orientation and the strength of 
commitment together did predict autonomy. This is concealed when 
inspecting the beta values of the individual variables. That is, it appears that 
the diffuse/avoidant orientation and the strength of commitment have shared 
variance in the prediction of autonomy. Therefore, inspecting the beta values 
of each identity style separately exhibits that none of them significantly 
predicts autonomy.  
Some weak points of this study should be kept in mind before 
generalising these findings. First, the scores in some of the psychological well-
being scales significantly differed between men and women. However, due to 
the small number of men in our sample, it was not feasible to test whether the 
observed relations with identity styles hold similarly in both genders 
(repeating the analyses in the female sample gave roughly the same results). 
A second limitation concerns the satisfactory but rather low internal 
reliability of the identity style scales. This is not a peculiarity of the Hellenic 
version, though; it appears that, in several studies (Berzonsky, 1992b; Clancy 
Dollinger, 1995), the alpha coefficients of the Identity Style Inventory are 
rather low. This points to problems in the operationalisation of the identity 
styles. Finally, heretofore, we implied that psychological well-being is the 
outcome variable. This is in line with previous research (Berzonsky, 2003; 
Nurmi, et al., 1997), but alternative causal relations are also plausible.  
Despite these weaknesses, there are also some strong points that 
support the validity of this study. This paper represents a first attempt to 
translate and use the Identity Style Inventory and the Psychological Well-
Being scales in the Hellenic language. Some preliminary analyses on the 
intercorrelations between the identity style, strength of commitment, and 
psychological well-being scales, as well as on age and gender differences in 
the aforementioned scales showed that these new versions behave 
satisfactorily. The size of the sample was adequate to test the regression 
models, given the number of variables included. The instruments used were 
carefully selected and adapted in the Hellenic language. Particular attention 
was paid when collecting the data, so that most inventories were fully 
completed. Finally, the data collected do not violate the assumptions of 
regression analysis (as presented in Miles & Shevlin, 2001).  
In conclusion, when identity issues are approached, it makes no 
difference in terms of psychological well-being whether individuals seek 
answers themselves or adopt norms. Does this mean that we should deny the 
usefulness of identity styles as a whole? We are going to discuss three points 
with reference to this question. For a start, it may be that identity styles do not 
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appropriately capture the social-cognitive strategies used by Hellenes, since 
the Hellenic culture is much more traditional in terms of values than western 
European countries. For instance, the information orientation question “I’ve 
spent a good deal of time reading and talking to others about religious ideas” 
of the Identity Style Inventory (Berzonsky, 1992a) may be inapplicable in a 
country, where formal education includes a compulsory course on orthodox 
Christianity. On the other hand, there is evidence (e.g., Phillips & Pittman, 
2004) that, in the American society as well, there is no link between identity 
styles and well-being.  
Secondly, it may be useful to consider the operationalisation of the 
identity styles. As we already mentioned, the Identity Style Inventory suffers 
from low internal reliability. Furthermore, as Berzonsky (2002) himself 
asserts, his identity styles cannot be fully assessed by one single measure. 
Moreover, the Identity Style Inventory measures the extent to which 
individuals reportedly use the identity styles (see Berzonsky, 1992c), and not 
the extent to which they actually use them. Finally, many identity style items 
refer to the way of having dealt with identity issues, rather than of currently 
dealing with them (for the meaning of the present perfect tense, see Kirszner 
& Mandell, 2002). An alternative means of identity style measurement is the 
Current Identity Q-sort (Kerpelman, Pittman, Lamke, & Sollie, 2003), in which 
items are formed in the present term.  
Lastly, it may be that identity styles are important for the psychological 
well-being in a different context. Literature (Berzonsky & Ferrari, 1996; 
Grotevant, 1987; Kunnen & Bosma, 2000; Magai & Hunziker, 1994) suggests 
that conflicts between identity and environmental input are causally related 
to identity change. Berzonsky (1992c) assumes that successful adaptation 
involves a balance between assimilative and accommodative processes that 
aim at reducing such conflicts. In the long run, he suggests, “information-
based decisions will maximize adaptation” (Berzonsky, 1992c, p. 194). That is, 
identity styles may be relevant to psychological well-being in cases where 
individuals are exposed to environments that challenge their identities.  
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Foreword to Chapters 3 to 5 
 
As was already mentioned, Chapters 3 to 5 look into the processes of 
commitment change and stability. This is done in a context where identity 
changes are likely. Different sources (e.g., Erikson, 1968; Grotevant, 1987) 
stress the role of relational, communal, and cultural variables in identity 
formation. Starting from this, we chose a context that involves changes in 
culture, society, and relationships: the international exchange experience. The 
European Union initiated the Socrates programme in 1989 in order to 
encourage exchanges of students of all educational stages, professionals, and 
teachers between the countries-members of the European Union and several 
other European countries. A division of Socrates, the Erasmus programme,2 
concerns exchanges of undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral students 
across European Universities for 3 to 15 months.  
  What makes this experience interesting is that it inevitably involves 
two cultural transitions, within a relatively short period of time. Both 
transitions entail changes in societal data, since the individuals draw away 
from their familiar home society, and enter a new, the host one, within which 
they will typically interact with other international students. Furthermore, 
Erasmus students have to deal with going away from important others 
(relatives, friends) and starting new relationships ex nihilo. Although this 
experience is neither usual nor normative, we assume that the mechanism 
lying behind commitment formation will be the same as in “normal” life.  
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Predicting Change in Relational Identity 




Exploration has long been assumed to be the primary mechanism behind 
changes in identity commitments. Conceptual and operational definitions of 
exploration emphasize the active role of the individual. In addition to this 
mechanism, we propose a model based on emotions to explain changes in 
relational identity commitments. To investigate the viability of this model, 
four individuals (aged 20-22 years) reported daily identity-relevant 
experiences for 5 months. The Groningen Identity Development Scale 
(Bosma, 1985) and a variant thereof were administered at the beginning and 
end of this period, respectively. The results challenge the primacy of 
exploration as a mechanism behind commitment changes, and reveal an 
important role for emotions in such changes.  
 
This chapter is based on: 
Vleioras, G. & Bosma, H. A. (2005). Predicting change in relational identity 




Forming an identity is the major developmental task during the transition to 
adulthood (Erikson, 1950). In the best-known operationalization of identity, 
the identity status paradigm, Marcia (1966) suggested looking at the 
commitments individuals make in respect to occupation and ideology. Later, 
Rogow, Marcia, and Slugoski (1983) suggested that any personally relevant 
issue can be used from the perspective of the identity status paradigm. 
Following this suggestion, the identity status paradigm has been applied in 
various identity issues. However, the question of whether the same processes 
of commitment formation apply to all such domains has not been addressed.  
 
Commitments 
Characteristics and formation 
Two basic characteristics of commitments are their strength and their content. 
Strength of commitment refers to “the degree of personal investment” 
(Marcia, 1966, p. 551) in beliefs or decisions regarding important fields in 
people’s lives, the so-called identity domains. The content of commitments 
(such as an occupational plan) refers to the beliefs or decisions themselves 
(Bosma, 1985; Kroger, 2003).  
According to Marcia (1966), late adolescents are expected to commit 
themselves in respect to occupation and ideology. Optimally, they form such 
commitments after a period of engaging themselves in exploration. Starting 
with Marcia, exploration has received considerable attention as a basic 
process underlying commitment formation (Berman, Schwartz, Kurtines, & 
Berman, 2001; Grotevant, 1987). However, its definition as well as its function 
has varied among researchers. 
Initially, Marcia (1966) defined exploration as a “period of engagement 
in choosing among alternatives” (p. 551). Later, he (Marcia, 1967) stressed the 
individual’s active role in so doing. Meilman (1979) defined exploration as 
“the process of rethinking one’s position” (p. 230), and Bosma (1985) 
concluded that it includes the “active orientation to other persons … and an 
active attempt to come to a new commitment” (p. 104). For Meeus, Iedema, 
and Maassen (2002), as well, exploration refers to actively dealing with 
commitments, but its function is the maintenance and validation of existing 
commitments, rather than the formation of new ones. A common theme in 
most definitions, then, is the active role of individuals in gathering 
information and making decisions.  
 
Commitments in relational domains: Identity vs. intimacy 
Following the reasoning by Rogow, et al. (1983), the concepts of exploration 
and commitment have been applied to relational domains, such as friendship 
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and dating (Grotevant & Adams, 1984), and parents (Bosma, 1985). What is 
the meaning of having commitments with regard to relationships? Grotevant, 
Thornbecke, and Meyer (1982) proposed that committing oneself in an 
ideology of intimate relationships possibly precedes establishing such 
relationships. Bosma (1985) suggested that a “here-and-now” (p. 119) 
perspective on identity domains may be more important than future 
commitments for one’s sense of identity. In agreement with this view, 
Grotevant (1987) and Meeus, Oosterwegel, and Vollebergh (2002) used the 
concept of commitment in relational domains to refer to commitments in 
relationships rather than in ideology of relationships. This difference, 
however, renders problematic the distinction between identity and intimacy, 
the next developmental task in Erikson’s (1950) theory.  
Intimacy refers to the capacity of the individual to form intimate 
relationships (Orlofsky, 1993). Stated differently, it has to do with the 
individual’s position in close relationships (Erikson, 1950) rather than with 
the individual’s statements on these close relationships. For example, the 
extent to which individuals self-disclose to their parents refers to their 
intimacy (see Clark & Reis, 1988), whereas the importance of parents in the 
individuals’ lives refers to their commitments with regard to their 
relationships with their parents, that is, to their identity.  
 
Evolution of Parent-Offspring Relationships 
We chose to study the relational domain of parents because there is extensive 
literature on parent-offspring relationship changes. This relationship is 
altered in time because of changes in the experiences and capacities of both 
sides of the relationship (Collins, 1997), developmental changes in the family 
life (Barker, 1998), and changes in roles that the child undertakes outside the 
family (Dubas & Petersen, 1996). The nature of the parent-child relationship 
at earlier ages (Rossi & Rossi, 1990) and the position of the parents (Collins, 
1997) are important factors as well.  
As they start forming close relationships with peers, individuals 
become less dependent on their parents (Ainsworth, 1989). Autonomy, 
however, develops jointly with the maintenance of a close and affectionate 
relationship with parents (O’Connor, Allen, Bell, & Hauser, 1996). By late 
adolescence, the emotional distance and emerging cognitive capacities allow 
the re-evaluation of the relationship with parents (Allen & Land, 1999), which 
changes, eventually, from hierarchical to symmetrical (Barker, 1998).  
From this short overview, it appears that many factors affect the 
formation of the relationship between individuals and their parents. 
Obviously, the individuals are important as well. However, it may be 
simplistic to assume that only one aspect of their behavior, collecting 
information and deliberately choosing among alternatives, defines their 
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commitments with respect to parents. In other words, it is likely that 
exploration does not apply as the only mechanism of commitment formation 
in respect to relationships with parents.  
 
Theoretical model of this study 
According to various process models of identity change (such as Grotevant, 
1987; Kerpelman, Pittman, & Lamke, 1997), changes in commitments are 
initiated by perceived conflicts between identity standards and 
environmental input. Following Bosma and Kunnen (2001a), we assume that 
every context- individual transaction results in a match or a mismatch 
between commitments and context. Match confirms commitments, whereas 
action is triggered to reduce mismatch. According to Bosma and Kunnen, 
action can take the form of assimilation or accommodation. However, 
Grotevant (1987) warned against rational models describing the making of 
important decisions. Besides cognitively based models, emotions have been 
related to identity (Bosma & Kunnen, 2001b; Strayer, 2002).  
 
Emotions 
Emotions arise when objective situations, the so-called objects of emotions, 
are appraised (Frijda, 1993). Although initially thought of as disorganizing 
(Pervin, 1993), in modern theories, emotions have both positive and negative 
effects on behavior (Mellers, 2000), cognition (Frijda, 1993), and motivation 
(Isen, 1993). According to cognitive-constructivist theories, they convey 
information on the personal relevance of environmental stimuli (e.g., Mellers, 
2000). Following a frequently cited taxonomy (e.g., Parkinson, 1995), 
emotions may be positive or negative. Both categories of emotions are related 
to stimuli that are of personal concern (Frijda, 1993), the most often cited 
being goal achievement (Pomerantz, Saxon, & Oishi, 2000). Because of the 
developmental significance of having made commitments (Erikson, 1968), it is 
expected that positive and negative emotions will be related to the 
confirmation and disconfirmation of commitments, respectively.  
 
Emotions and commitments 
Commitments refer to the equilibrium between internal standards and 
environmental data (Burke, 1991). As was previously stated, environmental 
data may match or mismatch identity commitments. Literature predicts that, 
when environmental data match internal standards, no change is likely 
(Kunnen & Bosma, 2000). We suggest that this is so only when positive 
emotions arise from the match. However, negative emotions may also arise. 
For example, when individuals meet people who are differently committed in 
respect to their parents, they may feel unsatisfied with their own 
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commitments. Then, matching environmental data shall yield negative 
emotions, and the content of the commitments shall be likely to change 
(compare the function of accommodation; Bosma & Kunnen, 2001a).  
 When positive emotions arise from environmental data that mismatch 
a commitment, it is likely that a new commitment will be formed to account 
for the subjectively favored mismatching experience. When emotions 
deriving from mismatch are negative, the individual is likely to retain the 
previously held commitment and reduce the importance of the unfitting data 
(compare the function of assimilation; Bosma & Kunnen, 2001a).  
Stated differently, our model predicts that, if the object of positive 
emotions matches a commitment or the object of negative emotions 
mismatches a commitment, this commitment is unlikely to change. If the 
object of negative emotions matches a commitment or the object of positive 
emotions mismatches a commitment, then this commitment is likely to 
change. For example, take the commitment “My parents are the most 
important persons in my life,” and the environmental data “My parents 
called me today” (matching, because it shows that they are present in my life) 
and “My parents are absent” (mismatching, because it shows that they are not 
part of my life). If the matching datum causes joy, the commitment will 
possibly be retained. If it causes sadness, the commitment will possibly 
change. Similarly, if the mismatching datum causes sadness, the commitment 
will possibly be retained. If the mismatching datum causes joy, the 
commitment will possibly change.  
 
Emotions and exploration: Friends or rivals? 
Literature has for a long time relied on exploration to explain identity 
changes. Here, a model based on emotions is presented. These two notions 
are not incompatible. Different emotions are assumed to signify the onset, 
process, and end of exploration. Thus, negative emotions, such as subjective 
discomfort (Waterman, 1982), can trigger the exploration process. Once 
activated, this shall involve feelings such as anxiety, satisfaction, and 
challenge according to the perceived success or failure of the exploratory 
behaviors (Grotevant, 1987). Relief and excitement shall accompany identity 
changes (Stein, Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993). In short, the concepts of exploration 
and emotions may well work hand-in-hand in explaining identity changes.   
Furthermore, introducing emotions in the identity change process does 
not deny the role of cognitive processes, which are important in the 
exploration concept. Emotions arise as a result of the appraisal of 
environmental stimuli (Frijda, 1993). The quality of emotions (negative or 
positive) depends on the relevance of their objects to the personal concern of 
the individual (Frijda, 1993). In other words, assuming that emotions play an 
important role in identity formation does not mean that cognitive factors are 
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not important, because the latter are inextricably related to emotions. What is 
added to the exploration model is that other aspects of the individual- context 
interaction are taken into account, in addition to the active quest of 
information (i.e., exploration).  
 
Studying Identity Changes: In What Context? 
The literature has identified relational, communal, and cultural variables (for 
instance, Baumeister & Muraven, 1996), as well as environments exposing the 
individual to alternative points of view (Grotevant, 1987) or to new contexts 
(Kroger & Green, 1996), as factors related to changes in commitments. Based 
on this, we chose to study individuals when they participate in an 
international exchange program. The European Union runs such a program, 
the Socrates/Erasmus, in order to encourage students to live and study 
abroad. Participating in this program entails temporarily living in a different 
culture, usually far away from parents (for implications of living away from 
parents, see Dubas & Petersen, 1996), and exposure to alternative ways of 
relating with them (for examples of country differences in parent-offspring 
relationships, see Scabini, 1998).  
 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were tested, as regards relationships with parents:  
1. Exploration predicts whether or not commitment will change.  
2. Emotions predict whether or not commitment will change.  
 
METHOD 
Overview of Methodological Design 
We followed the participants for five months, while they participated in the 
Socrates/Erasmus program. During this period, they were filling in daily 
diaries on identity relevant experience. Before and after their stay abroad, we 
took descriptions of the content and measurements of the strength of their 
commitments.   
 
Sample  
Four Hellene female psychology students were studied. During her 
participation in this study, V., 20, was in her third year of studies. Her parents 
were high school graduates. Her father was working while her mother was a 
homemaker. Before her stay abroad, she was living with one of her three 
siblings in a flat underneath the flat of her parents and other two siblings. E., 
21, was in her fourth year of studies. Her parents were high school graduates. 
Her father was working, and her mother was retired. For 3 years before the 
study, E. lived alone. T., 21, was in her fourth year of studies when she 
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participated in this study. Her parents were working university graduates. 
Before her stay abroad, she was living with her parents and siblings. Finally, 
during her participation in this study, A., 21, was in her third year of studies. 
Both her parents were working University graduates. Before her stay abroad, 
she was living with her parents and siblings.  
 
Measures 
Content and strength of commitments 
The only instrument that measures both content and strength of commitment 
is the Groningen Identity Development Scale (GIDS; Bosma, 1985). The GIDS 
yields descriptions of the content, and scores in the strength of commitment 
and in the amount of exploration (18 and 14 items, respectively, answered on 
a 0 to 2 scale), in six identity domains: philosophy of life, occupation- 
university- leisure, personal characteristics, friends, intimate partner, and 
parents. The GIDS procedure was modified when readministered to focus on 
the period between the first and second measurements. Psychometric 
properties of the original version of the instrument are satisfactory (Bosma, 
1985). At the end of the part of the project presented here, two commitments 
per participant per identity domain were available, together with the 
respective scores on strength of commitment and amount of exploration. 
Given the hypotheses of this study, only the content and strength of 
commitments in the identity domain “parents” were further analyzed. The 
scores in the amount of exploration only give an estimation of the degree to 
which individuals explore, but no information on day-to-day behavior that is 
the focus in this study.  
 
Identity-related experience 
A diary and an instruction booklet were used. The diary booklet included two 
diary sheets for each day abroad. More sheets were provided on request. In 
every sheet, the participants filled in the date of inscription, described the 
identity- relevant experience, and reported related emotions, accompanied by 
a number describing the intensity of the emotions (weak, intermediate, or 
strong). For examples of diary entries, see Appendix 1. We instructed the 
participants to complete one diary sheet per experience. Experience was 
defined as “facts that you meet or on which you are informed by others, 
actions by yourself or by others, thoughts by yourself or by others, 
discussions in which you participate or which you attend, etc.” We asked 
them to report any experience that was related, in their view, to the domains 
discussed in the GIDS, and any other experience that they considered 
important.  Lacking any research on the use of emotional terms in the 
Hellenic language, the participants were free to use whatever terms they 
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wanted. A suggestive list (see Appendix 2) rooting from English literature 
and Hellenic dictionaries was attached to the diary booklet.  
 
Procedure 
We administered the GIDS in the last two weeks before the participants left 
for abroad. After the interview, we gave them the diary and instructions 
booklet, and asked them to familiarize themselves with the procedure by 
filling in some diary sheets before their departures. They could then discuss 
about problems that may have appeared. During their stay abroad (about five 
months), they were filling in their diaries on a daily basis. At regular 
intervals, they were sending them to the main researcher. All participants 
went back to Hellas3 for a two-week vacation in the middle of the term. Three 
of them continued completing their diaries during that period. Within a 
maximum of two weeks after their final return to Hellas, we administered the 
variation of the GIDS.  
 
Analyses 
Testing the hypotheses 
In order to test our hypotheses, we assumed that individuals are committed 
at all times. The measurements taken before (T1) and after (T2) their stay 
abroad provide precise information on the characteristics of these 
commitments. Our two hypotheses assume that exploration and emotion 
entries provide enough hints to predict the T2 based on the T1 measurement.  
Assume that individuals hold both T1 and T2 commitments during 
their participation in the study. At any time point, they report the strongest. 
The weakest acts as an alternative commitment. Based on this assumption, 
testing our two hypotheses can be reformulated as follows: If no change in 
content occurs, exploration behaviors and emotions shall explain how the T1 
commitment remained stronger than the alternative commitment. Possible 
changes in the strength of this commitment shall also be explained. If content 
changes, exploration and emotions are assumed to explain why the T1 
commitment becomes less strong than the alternative. 
At T1, the content of the alternative commitment is by definition 
different from that of the reported commitment. Its exact content, however, 
can be determined only a posteriori and as long as a change in the content of 
the commitment occurs. By definition, as well, the alternative commitment is 
weaker than the reported (at T1) commitment. If the T1 commitment implied 
a theoretically immature relationship with parents, it is more probable that an 
alternative commitment will be stronger at T2; therefore, the strength of the 
alternative commitment is closer to that of the T1 commitment.  
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Applying this concept of alternative commitments, environmental data 
that mismatch the T1 commitment shall match an alternative commitment, 
and vice versa. Moreover, positive and negative emotions shall confirm and 
disconfirm, respectively, the commitment that agrees with their eliciting 
object. If a commitment is confirmed, its strength will increase, or the strength 
of an alternative commitment will decrease. Similarly, the disconfirmation of 
a commitment shall be manifested as a decrease in its strength or an increase 
in the strength of an alternative commitment.  
 
Comparisons of scores in strength of commitment 
The null hypothesis is that the difference between the T1 and T2 scores in 
strength of commitment is zero; the T1 and T2 scores come from the same 
underlying distribution. Using parametric statistics to test this hypothesis 
requires drawing conclusions about the distribution of all possible scores 
obtained by each individual (Welch, Huffman, & Lawrenz, 1998). Drawing 
such conclusions from two measurements is unsafe. Alternatively, 
resampling techniques can be used (Castro, 2002; Hayes, 2000).  
As we mentioned before, the null hypothesis is that the difference 
between the T1 and T2 scores in strength of commitment is zero; stated 
differently, that the T1 and T2 scores come from the same underlying 
distribution. We will explain the technique we used to test this hypothesis by 
means of an example. Assume that individual X scores 30 and 36 in the 
strength of commitment at T1 and T2, respectively. These scores are the sums 
of X’s answers to the 18 items on strength of commitment (see Measures). We 
first calculated the absolute observed difference between the T1 and T2 scores 
(|30-36|=6). If our null hypothesis is correct, it does not make any difference 
which answers were given in which time point; the difference between the 
sums at the two time points should be approximately the same.  
To test this, we re arranged the answers to the 18 items in the two time 
points, and calculated the absolute difference between the respective sums. 
The first two columns of Table 1 show the observed answers to the strength of 
commitment items at T1 and T2 for the imaginary individual X. Note that the 
sums for T1 and T2 are 30 and 36 respectively. The third and fourth, and fifth 
and sixth columns of this table show two random re arrangements. The 
possible number of rearrangements is 18! that is far beyond the capabilities of 
usual computers. Using the function SHUFFLE from the PopTools3 in Excel 
for Windows, we calculated the differences for 50,000 rearrangements. We 
derived the p value for our null hypothesis by dividing by 50,000 the number 
of times that a difference equal to or higher than the observed one occurred. 
In our example, such a difference occurred 2,261 times, and the p value is  
 
3 See http://www.cse.csiro.au/poptools 
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(2,261/50,000=).045 (for an introduction on such techniques, Good, 1994).  
 
Table 1. Examples of re arranged answers to the 18 items on strength of 




Rearrangement #1 Rearrangement #2 
Item T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
3 2 1 2 2 2 2 
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 
5 2 0 2 2 2 2 
6 2 2 2 2 2 2 
7 2 2 2 2 0 2 
8 2 2 2 2 2 2 
9 2 2 2 2 2 2 
10 2 2 2 2 2 2 
11 2 2 0 2 2 2 
12 2 1 1 2 2 1 
13 2 2 2 2 2 2 
14 2 1 2 2 2 2 
15 2 2 2 1 1 2 
16 2 1 1 2 1 2 
17 2 2 1 2 2 2 
18 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Sum 36 30 31 35 32 34 
|T1-T2| 6 4 2 
 
Comparisons of contents of commitment  
For every participant, the contents of the T1 and T2 commitments were 
compared. The two commitments were considered as different if any element 
referring to the relationship between the participant and her parents has been 
changed, added, or eliminated, if the participant used words denoting 
subjective change (for instance, “ameliorated”), or when the two 
commitments were logically incompatible. In all other cases, the two 
commitments were supposed equivalent. A 100% agreement between two 
independent raters was achieved.  
 
Coding of diary entries 
The diary entries provided data on experience related to all domains included 
in the GIDS. From these, we chose the entries in which the participants used 
any of the words “mother,” “father,” “parents,” “family,” or “relatives,” or a 
personal pronoun that clearly referred to any of these. This criterion yielded a 
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number of 81 parent-related entries. Only these entries were further 
processed. In order to test the first hypothesis, we sought entries that 
described exploration behaviors, as appearing in Balistreri, Busch-Rossnagel, 
and Geisinger (1995), Bosma (1985), and Meeus, Oosterwegel, and Vollebergh 
(2002). The full list of these behaviors appears in Appendix 3. Agreement 
between two raters was 98%. In cases of disagreement, the entry was coded as 
not describing exploration (see Appendix 1 for examples of coding for 
exploration). Seven entries described exploration.  
In order to test the second hypothesis, we sought parent-related 
emotions. In the 81 parent-related entries, 210 emotional terms were used. 
Further, in 18 of these entries, emotions were described in the main body of 
the entry. All these emotions were first categorized according to their object. 
The main researcher concluded that emotions referred to being away from 
parents (54 occurrences), being with them (23 occurrences), doing things with 
them (16 occurrences), the parents themselves (14 occurrences), and 
experiences in which the parents are not of main focus (24 occurrences; for 
examples of coding on emotion occurrences, see Appendix 1). A last category 
included emotions that were not parent-relevant (90 occurrences). The second 
author acted as a second rater in assigning parent-related emotions to these 
categories. The initial interrater agreement was 84%. Following discussion 
between the raters, the agreement was 97%. When no agreement was 
achieved, emotions were kept out of further analyses.  
Coding on emotions was conducted independently of the content of 
T1 and T2 commitments. At the next step, for every participant, we judged 
whether the object of each emotion matched the T1 commitment. The effect of 
positive and negative emotions (see Appendix 2) on the T1 commitment and 
on some alternative commitment was determined according to the 
formulation presented above. All commitments could be roughly 
summarized in the extent to which the participants were satisfied from their 
relationships with their parents, expressed in terms of importance or of 
satisfaction. If the T1 commitment exhibited that the relationship was 
satisfactory, being with and doing things with parents matched this 
commitment, while being away from them mismatched it. Positive emotions 
towards parents matched this commitment, as well. Reversely, if the T1 
commitment exhibited that the participant was not satisfied with her 
relationship with her parents, being with and doing things with parents, as 
well as positive emotions towards her parents, mismatched the T1 
commitment. Being away from them matched it.  
 
RESULTS 
Due to the small sample size, we did not calculate z values for the scores in 
strength of commitment. Although we used the raw, arithmetic data to 
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proceed with the comparisons, here we only report the strength category in 
which the scores fell: very low, rather low, moderate, rather high, and very 
high (for the use of absolute scores, Hofstee & Hendriks, 1998). An overview 
of the occurrences of exploration and emotion entries appears in Table 2.  
 
Data on V. 
At both T1 and T2, V.’s commitment referred to the faultlessness of her 
relationship with her parents (very high strength of commitment; p=.60). 
 
Testing the hypotheses 
1. Exploration predicts whether or not commitment will change  
No entry referred to exploration. Thus, the data on V. do not support the first 
hypothesis.  
 
2. Emotions predict whether or not commitment will change 
Fifteen parent-relevant emotions appeared in V.’s diaries. Three of them 
referred to being away from parents, five to being with them, five to doing 
things with them, and two to the parents themselves. V. consistently reported 
negative emotions (such as worry) for being away from parents and positive 
emotions (such as joy) for being with or doing things with them. The former 
emotions disconfirm any alternative commitment, while the latter confirm the 
T1 commitment. Furthermore, V. reported love towards her parents twice. As 
expected, neither the content nor the (already very high) strength of V.’s 
commitment changed. The only possible effect of the aforementioned positive 
and negative emotions is the decrease of the strength of some alternative 
commitment, which, though cannot be tested. In conclusion, the data on V. 
support the second hypothesis.  
 
Data on E. 
At both T1 and T2, E.’s commitment referred to a satisfactory relationship of 
support and respect for each other’s choices (very high strength of 
commitment; p=.74). 
 
Testing the hypotheses 
1. Exploration predicts whether or not commitment will change 
No entry referred to exploration. Thus, the data on E. do not support the first 
hypothesis.  
 
2. Emotions predict whether or not commitment will change 
Forty-four parent-relevant emotions appeared in E.’s diaries. Nineteen of 








Table 2. Overview of number of diary entries referring to exploration, and of emotional terms used by V., E., T., and A.  
 











Parent-relevant emotions 15 44 12 28 
         
Emotions referring to: Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Being away from parents 0 3 3 16 0 6 2 17 
Being with parents 5 0 11 0 1 0 3 1 
Doing things with parents 5 0 10 0 0 0 1 0 
Parents  2 0 4 0 1 4 2 2 
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doing things with them, and four to the parents themselves. Sixteen (84.2%) 
out of the 19 emotions referring to being away from parents were negative 
(worry, sadness, nostalgia). The remaining three (15.8%) referred to her 
ability of managing to live alone (hope, zest, trust), rather to being away from 
the parents. E. consistently reported positive emotions (such as joy, content) 
for being with or doing things with her parents. In four instances, she 
expressed interest and affection towards her parents. The negative emotions 
referring to being away from her parents disconfirm alternative 
commitments, while the positive emotions referring to being or doing things 
with them and to the parents themselves confirm the T1 commitment.  
 As expected, no change in the content of commitment occurred. In 
addition, no increase in the strength of commitment is expected, because this 
was already very high. Indeed, no change occurred. As was the case in V., the 
only possible effect of the reported positive and negative emotions is the 
weakening of some alternative commitment. However, since no direct 
measurement of any alternative commitment is available, this effect cannot be 
tested. In conclusion, the data on E. support the second hypothesis.  
 
Data on T. 
At T1, T.’s commitment referred to a rather bad relationship with her parents, 
but a rather positive disposition toward her mother because of her successful 
attempt to raise her daughters. At T2, T. reported that her relationship with 
her parents “has become more substantial,” that their communication 
ameliorated, and that she feels emotionally closer to them. The strength of 
commitment significantly (p=.014) increased from rather high to very high.  
 
Testing the hypotheses 
1. Exploration predicts whether or not commitment will change 
Three entries referred to exploration: “We were discussing … the news of 
[my] family. I am speculating my mother’s behavior;” “My mother takes 
some things very seriously;” and “As December approaches, I think more of 
my family…. [A friend] is talking very nostalgically for … her family.” The 
first and second entries contradict her commitment at T1, when she was 
disposed very positively toward her mother. The friend, who talks 
nostalgically of her parents, is a person who holds a similar commitment. 
While these exploration entries predict that a change in the commitment is 
likely, none of them predicts the direction of the change that actually 
occurred. Thus, the data on T. do not support the first hypothesis.  
 
2. Emotions predict whether or not commitment will change  
Twelve parent-relevant emotions appeared in T.’s diaries. Six emotions 
referred to being away from parents, one to being with them, and five to the 
Exploration and emotions 
 41 
parents themselves. T. constantly reported negative emotions (such as 
sadness, worry) for being away from her parents. Unlike the previous cases, 
T. did not report a good relationship with her parents at T1. Therefore, the 
object of her negative emotions (being away) agrees with her T1 commitment, 
and the negative emotions themselves disconfirm this commitment. T. also 
reported negative emotions (such as annoyance) toward her mother, who was 
favored at T1. These emotions as well disconfirm the T1 commitment.  
There are only two positive emotions; these include love towards the 
parents and joy for being with her father. These are the only emotions that 
support an alternative commitment; that of a good relationship with T.’s 
parents. The emotions reported by T. suggest that there can well be a change 
in the content of her commitment, because her initial commitment continually 
loses ground, while an alternative one seems to be more favored now. Indeed, 
the content of T.’s commitment changed. Moreover, the strength of the 
commitment changed in the expected direction: It increased. A decrease in the 
strength of the T1 commitment (that is an alternative commitment at T2) is 
also predicted by these emotions, but no data are available in this respect. In 
sum, the data on T. support the second hypothesis.  
 
Data on A. 
At T1, A.’s commitment referred to her parents being the most important 
persons in her life and to the benefits she gains from their relationship. At T2, 
she eliminated the element “the most important” and added the hope that 
they will become less overprotective. The two commitments were judged as 
different. The strength of commitment significantly (p=.02) decreased from 
very high to rather high.  
 
Testing the hypotheses 
1. Exploration predicts whether or not commitment will change  
Four diary entries referred to exploration: “I wonder whether it is worth 
somebody leaving his family and putting it in so many expenses;” “In such a 
society, parents who would like to raise their children with principles … have 
to face many problems … in the upbringing of these [youngsters];” “[H]e told 
me that he speaks with his parents on the phone once per week. … I speak 
with them every day;” and “[Upon return home,] I will have to keep up with 
the pace of the family.” None of these entries refer to parents being the most 
important persons in her life, to the benefits A. gains from their relationship, 
or to their being less overprotective. That is, the exploration that occurred 
does not predict the observed changes. Thus, the data on A. do not support 




2. Emotions predict whether or not commitment will change 
Twenty-eight parent-relevant emotions appeared in A.’s diaries. Nineteen of 
them referred to being away from her parents, four to being with them, one to 
doing things with them, and four to the parents themselves. Unlike all 
previous cases, A. did not constantly favor one commitment over another. 
Seventeen of the emotions referring to being away from her parents are 
negative (such as worry, upset, nostalgia). The remaining two emotions are 
positive (content, satisfaction): they refer to enjoying life abroad (as opposed 
to going back home), and to cooking in the absence of the mother. On the 
other hand, although she mainly reported positive emotions (such as joy) for 
being with or doing things with her parents, in one case she reported missing 
life away from them. In one entry, she reported love and, in another, irritation 
towards her mother. Finally, in one entry, she reported sadness and worry for 
being uncared for by her mother.  
A peculiarity in the content of A.’s commitment is that there is a change 
(unlike V. and E.), but not a radical one (like T.). The element of her parents 
being important persons in her life exists in both commitments. Thus, both 
commitments are supported by the negative emotions that confirm that her 
parents are important and by the negative emotions that disconfirm the 
alternative that they are not. In terms of change, then, these emotions can be 
overlooked. The two entries reporting positive emotions for being away from 
her parents confirm the T2 commitment, that they are not the most important 
persons in her life. Furthermore, the sadness and irritation reported towards 
her mother confirm the view that her parents have drawbacks that A. would 
like eliminated. In short, the emotion entries successfully predict the change 
in the content of commitment. However, the observed decrease in the 
strength of commitment cannot be accounted for by these data. In sum, the 
data on A. partly support the second hypothesis.  
 
CONCLUSION- DISCUSSION 
The identity status literature has for long relied on exploration as the main 
mechanism underlying changes in commitments. This study suggests that 
exploration behaviors do not predict commitment changes, at least in the 
relational domain of parents. On the other hand, emotions, largely neglected 
in identity literature, seem to provide more information regarding changes in 
commitments.  
As we already described in the introduction, various researchers have 
defined exploration in varying ways. A common theme in these definitions 
refers to the active role of individuals in gathering information and making 
decisions. In this study, we operationalized exploration according to 
behaviors appearing in relevant means of measurement (namely, in Balistreri, 
et al., 1995; Bosma, 1985; Meeus, Oosterwegel, et al., 2002). The link between 
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these behaviors and the active search of information and decision making is 
not always clear. If a more theoretically driven operationalization were used, 
even less exploration behaviors would have been detected. So doing, the 
conclusion would still be the same: Exploration does not predict changes in 
commitment.  
The assumption lies in literature that emotions can communicate 
information about the personal relevance of experience (Mellers, 2000). Based 
on this, our second hypothesis suggested that emotions predict whether or 
not commitment will change. Data on three of the four cases presented here 
supported this hypothesis: Emotions successfully predicted the stability in the 
content and strength of E.’s and V.’s commitments, and the change in the 
content and the increase in the strength of T.’s commitment. In one case, that 
of A., emotions successfully predicted the change in the content of 
commitment, but not the observed decrease in its strength. 
Why may this be the case? Factor analyzing his data collected with 
GIDS, Bosma (1985) concluded that the items on strength of commitment load 
on two factors: the degree to which individuals identify with their 
commitments and the degree to which these commitments provide direction 
for the future. In the case of A., the identification score remained very high 
(p=1.00); therefore, the observed decrease in the strength of commitment 
reflects the decrease in the score in direction for the future only. This score is 
only indirectly related to the initial theoretical definition on which we based 
our theoretical model. The identification score, on the other hand, which is 
more directly related to this model, remains high, as one would predict, based 
on the emotion occurrences.  
We chose to study the link between everyday experience and 
commitments in relation to parents because there is abundant literature on 
the relationship between parents and their growing children, and because of 
the diversity of the commitment trajectories of our four participants (changes 
as well as stability in strength and in content of commitment). These 
arguments may appear problematic. Although relationship with parents is a 
relational identity domain appearing in literature (Bosma, 1985), it is in 
several ways different, for instance, from relationships with friends: People 
cannot choose their parents, and they are related to them even without 
having formed relevant commitments. Such differences between identity 
domains, though, led us to the conclusion that maybe exploration is not the 
only mechanism yielding identity changes.  
Further, although the commitment trajectories were interesting, only a 
small fraction (81 out of 610; 13%) of the total number of diary entries referred 
to parents. Moreover, how can, for example, a single phone call change the 
view an individual has built on her parents throughout a span of 20 or more 
years? As we noted earlier, participants were asked to report experiences 
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related to any of the identity domains tapped in the GIDS. Although we 
hoped that participants would report all related experiences, it appeared that 
they eventually reported only the most prominent ones; for most days of their 
stay abroad, there was only one diary entry. Thus, we assumed that parent-
related experiences were reported, when they subjectively had, at least some, 
impact on the participants. 
  This study was exploratory: It aimed at revealing some weaknesses of 
this theory and at supporting some alternative ideas. In this respect, the small 
sample size of this study is one of its strengths. Case studies have several 
advantages. Rosenberg (1989) suggested that “any general explanatory 
principle… must ultimately be shown to apply at the individual level” (p. 
418). Also, Magai and Hunziker (1993) warned against the use of nomothetic 
studies when the focus is on dynamics of individual development. Kroger 
(1993) recommended case studies in areas without well-established theory, as 
is the link between commitments and emotions. On the other hand, although 
it is interesting to see that exploration does not apply as the main mechanism 
of commitment change, investigating the role of emotions in four cases cannot 
support building a new theory accordingly. To do so, it is essential to follow 
more individuals, in a longitudinal design, focusing on microprocesses, as we 
did here.  
In designing this study, we took into account the convenience of the 
participants: They chose where to be interviewed, which experiences to 
report, which emotion terms to use, and how often to send the diary entries to 
the researchers. This had the expected results: No dropouts, high punctuality 
in filling in the diaries, will to participate in all phases of the project. A lack of 
appropriate instruments, and a concern in the content of the experience and 
of the commitments led us to use mainly open instruments. This was a 
suitable way to approach the questions raised in this study. On the other 
hand, objectively coding open diaries and comparing the content of 
commitments in order to reach safe conclusions may have led to losing 
important information. Devising easy-to-use instruments that yield easy-to-
analyze data should precede replicating such a study.  
Due to the exploratory nature of this study, we relied on rather 
simplistic ways to approach our data. We assumed that the order of 
experiences in terms of time is not important; that all kinds of experience 
have the same effect on the strength of commitment; and that parent-related 
experiences are independent of other identity- related experiences. These 
assumptions may not hold. It may be more influential to experience joy for 
doing something with one’s parents after rather than before a long period of 
living away from them. When expressing content for things with the parents, 
part of the content may arise because of the activity itself. Therefore, content 
for being with one’s parents may be more important than content for doing 
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things with them. Finally, experiences with friends or with an intimate 
partner may be related to experiences with parents.  
As we suggested in the introduction, emotions and exploration may be 
related. Accordingly, the participants were instructed to report emotions 
related to experience that was later coded as exploration. However, the small 
number of exploration entries did not allow testing whether the theory-
predicted series of exploration-related emotions actually hold. Instead, our 
analyses showed that emotions alone are more informative than exploration 
in terms of explaining changes and stability in commitment with respect to 
parents. It would be interesting to see whether the same holds for other kinds 
of relationships, such as friendships or intimate relationships, and for 
nonrelational identity domains. Finally, it would be interesting to define in 
more detail the effect of emotions on commitment, by building, for example, a 
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APPENDICES 
1. Examples of Diary Entries and Related Codes 
 
Exploration coding 
Code Diary entry 
Presence of exploration “I was talking to a German student, and he told me that he 
speaks with his parents on the phone once per week. And 
when he heard that I speak everyday with them, he was 
surprised! Is it possible to talk so sparsely to your 
parents?” 
 
Absence of exploration “We went with my parents [on an excursion]. They liked it 




“We all three agreed that we miss our families” 
 
Emotion coding 
Code Diary entry 
Being away from (any 
of) the parents 
“Today my mother left to Hellas. We were both touched. I 
do not mind I will be here; it is just that it will be long till I 
see her again. Commotion, worry” 
Being with (any of) the 
parents 
“Finally we flew! With a big delay, we arrived in [Hellas]!! 
There our parents were waiting for us. I was very pleased 
to see them because I had missed them much. Elation, 
relief, joy, zest” 
Doing things with (any 
of) the parents 
“Today we stayed in [the town of studies]. My parents had 
not seen it at all and we had the chance to do so today. 
They liked it much, although it does not have anything 
special and it is small. Calmness, joy, content” 
The parents themselves “In the evening, I felt lonely and I missed very much my 
relatives. I particularly missed the affection and company 
of my mother. Love” 
Experience in which the 
parents are not the 
main focus 
“My father announced to me that we reserved a new car 




2. List of Emotional Terms Used in the Diary Entries 
 





































Emotional terms marked with an asterisk appeared in the suggestive list of emotional 
terms attached to the diary booklet. 
 
 
3. List of exploration behaviors 
- Trying to learn more things on (parents) 
- Trying to find out what others think on (parents) 
- Speaking with others on (parents)  
- Thinking about (parents) 
- Having problems with (parents) 
- Talking with others about (parents) 
- Having problems with (parents) 
- Talking with others about (parents) 
- Noticing that others can have different commitments to (parents) 
- Comparing one’s commitment to that of others 
- Having conflicts with others about (parents) 
- Engaging in discussions about (parents) 
- Thoughtfully considering different ways of commitment 
- Trying to learn about different ways of committing oneself to find the 
most suitable for one 










Friends and Relationships with Parents: 






We used a dynamic systems approach to study the assumption that building 
mature friendships triggers a process of transforming one’s relationship with 
one’s parents. We built a mathematical model aiming at simulating this 
process in time. To investigate the viability of this model, four individuals 
(20-22 years old) reported daily peer-related experiences for five months, 
while they participated in an international exchange program. In the 
beginning and end of this period, we took descriptions of their commitments 
concerning their relationships with their parents. The data collected provide 
overall support for our model. 
 
This chapter is based on:  
Vleioras, G., Van Geert, P. L. C., & Bosma, H. A. (submitted). Tell me about 
your friends and I will tell you… what you think about your parents: A 




Relationships with parents and friends are important in the lives of 
adolescents (Kerr, Stattin, Biesecker, & Ferrer-Wreder, 2003). Typically, 
researchers assume that characteristics of the parents (Wright, 1999) or of the 
parent-offspring relationship (Ducharme, Doyle, & Markiewicz, 2002) affect 
the kinds of friendships that individuals develop. Sabatelli and Mazor (1985) 
were the first to suggest a supplementary link: That building friendships in 
adolescence provides individuals with the social support they need to change 
their relationships with their parents. Others have also expressed similar 
views but nobody has tested them. We will here suggest a process model for 
this supplementary link, and test it against empirical data.  
 
Changes in the Parent-Offspring Relationship 
The most cited framework on the parent-offspring relationship is the 
attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969; 1973). According to this theory, forming 
relationships with the so-called attachment figures is of paramount 
importance for the social and emotional development of children. Typically, 
mothers are the main attachment figures in the first months of life. Later in 
childhood, fathers assume a comparable position. During adolescence, other 
individuals enter the scene, and the attachment to parents grows weaker. 
Despite this attenuation, it remains important across the life span. The 
continuing importance of parents in the lives of children recurs in literature 
(e.g., Dwyer, 2000).  
Although parents remain important, parent-offspring relationships go 
through several transformations (Collins, 1997). Preadolescents consider their 
parents omnipotent. As they grow older, they increasingly realize that 
parents have weaknesses (Orvin, 1995), and that they can make mistakes; 
parents also start accepting that adolescents can have their own views 
(Youniss & Smollar, 1989). Furthermore, adolescents spend decreasing time 
with their parents (Collins, 1997; Steinberg & Morris, 2001). Finally, the 
parent-child complementary, unilateral relationship transforms into a 
symmetrical (Knap, 1984), mutual (Graber & Brooks- Gunn, 1996), and 
egalitarian one (Steinberg & Morris, 2001). In conclusion, a mature parent-
offspring relationship is mutual and egalitarian; an immature one lacks such 
characteristics.  
 
Parents and Friends: A Supplementary Link 
Researchers typically assume that characteristics of the parents or of the 
parent-offspring relationship affect friendships. There are two problems with 
this view. First, it is inappropriate to relate friendships with only static 
characteristics of the changing parent-offspring relationship. Second, research 
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supporting this link (for instance, Engels, Finkenauer, Meeus, & Dekovic, 
2001) is equivocal because it is cross-sectional. A supplementary link appears 
in theoretical accounts only. The support, approval, and security provided by 
friends are essential for renegotiating one’s relationship with their parents 
(Sabatelli & Mazor, 1985). It is in the context of mutual friendships that 
adolescents’ individuality is expressed and accepted by others for the first 
time (Youniss & Smollar, 1985). Moreover, in mature friendships, adolescents 
learn social skills not learnt in the parent-offspring relationship (Zimmer-
Gembeck, 2002). These skills are then applied in the parent-offspring 
relationship to allow for the adolescents’ individuality to be expressed and 
accepted. Finally, establishing affect and inclusion patterns in peer 
relationships alters the interpersonal needs in the family relationships (Knap, 
1984). In conclusion, it is theoretically plausible that friendships contribute to 
the maturation of the parent-offspring relationship.  
Friendships are personal relationships built on a voluntary basis that 
typically provide intimacy and assistance to their members, who like each 
other and seek each other’s company (Fehr, 1996). Building friendships entails 
several steps. First, contextual factors, such as physical proximity (Furnham, 
1989), constrain with whom people can become friends. From the available 
individuals, people choose the most attractive ones (for a review, Perlman & 
Fehr, 1986). They then initiate a movement to establish a friendship, and the 
other person needs to reciprocate (Hallinan, 1978/79). Then, the friendship 
starts being built (Levinger, 1980), for example through less personal or 
intimate activities (Blieszner, 1989). At later stages, friendships can continue 
at a high level of exchange of personal information, switch to earlier stages of 
interaction, or dissolve (Berscheid & Reis, 1998; Blieszner, 1989).  
From this overview of friendship building, it becomes clear that 
friendships should be treated like processes, rather than states (see also Duck 
& Sants, 1983). Here, we expect the building of mature friendships to trigger a 
process of transformation of the parent-offspring relationship. Meeting 
people that one finds attractive is a first step in starting questioning the 
preponderance of parents in one’s life. Initiating a movement to establish a 
friendship means that the individual brings new emotional needs in the 
family. However, only relatively high levels of interaction allow one’s 
relationship with parents to reach its mature form. In conclusion, a process 
rather than a static perspective is more likely to adequately grasp the link 
between the creation of friendships and the maturation of the parent-
offspring relationship.  
 
Experience through the Eyes of the Individual 
In this study, we focus explicitly on the experiences of individuals from their 
perspective. Research on relationships with parents and friends usually rests 
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on questionnaires; findings are interpreted as if they exhibited objective 
reality, and as if this reality were what really mattered. This approach has 
some drawbacks. Answering questions on relationships with parents reflects 
the individuals’ perceptions of these relationships (Engels, et al., 2001), rather 
than some objective relational quality. Similarly, answering questions on 
friends reflects expectations from and beliefs about friendships, but not 
information on actual interactions (Parker & Gottman, 1989). Further, the 
subjective perception of reality is at least equally (Bronfenbrenner, 1977), if 
not more psychologically consequential (Engels, et al., 2001) than objective 
reality. Here, we will focus on these subjective perceptions. This has more 
interpretational than methodological implications. In terms of method, we 
will still focus on the perceptions of individuals, as was previously done. In 
terms of interpretation, though, we will accept these as perceptions of the 
relationship, not assuming that they reflect some objective relational 
properties.  
 We will focus on perceptions of the parent-offspring relationships by 
looking at the commitments individuals hold towards their parents. 
Commitments initially described the beliefs or decisions of individuals 
towards ideological issues (Marcia, 1966); later, they were extended to 
relational domains as well (for instance, Grotevant & Adams, 1984). Bosma 
(1985) applied commitments to the issue of parents. Here, we assume that, in 
their commitments towards parents, individuals describe their perspective on 
their relationship with their parents. Commitments towards parents will be 
called mature or immature depending on whether the individuals ascribe 
mature (such as mutuality) or immature (such as parents as perfect) 
characteristics to their relationship with their parents. The more the 
individuals identify with their commitments and the more they derive 
direction for the future from them, the stronger these commitments are 
(Bosma, 1985; Marcia, 1966).  
 We will use the emotions arising from peer-related experiences to 
examine the position of peers in the lives of individuals. Emotions result from 
the subjective appraisal of objective situations (Frijda, 1993), and convey 
information on the personal relevance of these situations (Mellers, 2000). In 
particular, they signal changes in the probability of achieving personal goals 
(here, the creation of friendships), and initiate action aimed at increasing this 
probability (Oatley & Duncan, 1992). For instance, sadness signals a loss, 
stops an activity, and initiates the search of new plans. We will use a 
frequently cited distinction between positive and negative emotions (for 
instance, Parkinson, 1995). Positive and negative emotions arising from 
different kinds of peer-related experiences shall exhibit different positions of 
peers in the lives of individuals; for instance, enjoying meeting peers shows 
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that these are acquaintances, while expressing love and interest for them 
shows that they are friends.  
 
Methodological Considerations 
In the last two sections, we explained that we focus on the process relating the 
subjective experience with friends with the subjective perception of the 
parent-offspring relationship. Here, we discuss two methodological 
implications of our focus on processes and on subjective experience: The 
sample size, and the nature of data to be collected. Regarding the sample size, 
case studies are particularly useful when testing explanatory processes 
(Branner, 1992; Rosenberg, 1989), as well as in areas without well-established 
theory (Kroger, 1993). Although we know many things about relationships 
with parents, friendships, and the effect of parents on friendships, we know 
far less about the process through which friendships affect relationships with 
parents. Therefore, we decided to conduct case studies and to compensate for 
this small sample size by taking dense measurements. If case studies support 
a hypothesis, then it makes sense to design projects that follow more 
individuals. Qualitative data are particularly suited for small samples, and 
when the focus is on processes and on reality as constructed in the 
individuals’ mind (Neuman, 2000; Pelham & Blanton, 2003). The use of 
diaries, in particular, allows inspecting the subjective experience of people on 
people, events, and settings that are not directly observable (Bodgan & 
Taylor, 1975).  
  
Studying Changes in Relationships: In what Context? 
Following Elder (1998), we sought a context in which relationship changes are 
likely. Golish (2000) identified leaving the parental home as a turning point in 
the parent-offspring relationship, which may lead to its amelioration or 
deterioration. Acquiring physical distance also entails changes in friendships: 
Moving away from home necessitates negotiating how much contact to keep 
with hometown friends (Johnson, Staton, & Jorgensen- Earp, 1995). The initial 
strength of the relationships determines which ones will hold and which will 
reach a natural end. While decreased direct contact with parents and friends 
is unequivocal (Weiss, 1990), the need for social provisions increases, since 
the physical distance induces several stressors (for examples, Fisher, 1990), 
making the search of new relationships more likely.  
 Participating in an international exchange program entails 
temporarily living away from home. The European Union has initiated the 
Socrates/ Erasmus program to encourage students to spend at least three 
months studying in another European country. The program assists the 
students financially and administratively, thus reducing the load of stressors. 
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Further, the temporary character of the program implies that the experience is 
less strong than the one entailed in permanent losses (see Weiss, 1990). For 
these reasons, we assumed that participating in the Socrates/Erasmus 
program is an appropriate context for studying changes in relationships. 
Since it is the daily peer-related experience that is important in our model, we 
need to focus on daily measurements of this experience to secure the validity 
of our study. Measuring peer-related experience on a daily basis is also 
economic in the context of the Socrates/Erasmus program because we expect 
changes to occur within a relatively short period.  
 
Aims of the Present Study 
Our major assumption is that building mature friendships triggers a process 
of transformation of the parent-offspring relationship. We can now further 
specify our aims as follows:  
(a) Building a mathematical model describing the process linking the friends-
related emotions and the maturity of commitments towards parents; and  
(b) Empirically testing this model.  
 
METHOD 
Overview of Methodological Design 
We followed the participants for five months, while they participated in the 
Socrates/Erasmus program. Before (T1) and after (T2) their stay abroad, we 
took measurements of their commitments towards parents. During their stay 
abroad, they were completing daily diaries on friends-related experience.  
 
Sample 
Four Hellene female psychology students participated in this study. None of 
them had a history of emotional or other psychological problems. T., 21, was 
in her fourth year of studies. Her parents were working university graduates. 
Before her stay abroad, she was living with her parents and two of her three 
siblings. A., 21, was in her third year of studies. Her parents were working 
university graduates. Before her stay abroad, she was living with her parents 
and two siblings. E., 21, was in her fourth year of studies. Her parents were 
high school graduates. Her father was working, while her mother was retired. 
Before her stay abroad, E. was living alone in a city 200 km away from her 
hometown, where her parents and sibling lived. Finally, V., 20, was in her 
third year of studies. Her parents were high school graduates. Her father was 
working, while her mother was a housewife. Before her stay abroad, she was 
living with one of her three siblings in a flat underneath the flat of her parents 
and other two siblings.  
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Measures 
Commitments towards parents 
The only measure of the content and strength of commitments is the 
Groningen Identity Development Scale (GIDS; Bosma, 1985), which taps on 
the issues of parents, friendship, personal characteristics, intimate 
relationships, future occupation- leisure- school, and philosophy of life. We 
will here refer only to the section on parents. We first interviewed the 
participants on their parents: In what respects are they important to you? 
What do you appreciate in them? What irritates you about them? We slightly 
changed these questions at T2 so that they refer to the period between T1 and 
T2 (for instance: What irritated you about them while abroad?). We 
concluded this interview with the question: How would you summarize your 
commitment towards parents? We will further refer to the qualitative answer 
to this question as the content of the commitment.  
Finally, the participants answered a 32-item questionnaire. All items 
were answered on a 0-2 scale. Here, we will use the scales measuring the 
strength of commitment (18 items; e.g., “Are you satisfied with your 
commitment?”) and the active attempt to reach a new commitment (7 items; 
e.g., “Do you try to develop a new commitment for this issue?”). Both scales 
have acceptable alpha coefficients in the original version of the GIDS (.84 and 
.80, respectively). All scores were divided by the maximum of the scale to 
yield a score ranging from 0 to 1.  
 
Friends-related emotions 
We found no diary protocol concerning friends-related emotions. We devised 
a booklet including two diary sheets per intended day abroad. More sheets 
were available upon request. Diary sheets included spaces to complete the 
dates of inscription and of described experience, the friends-related 
experience, and the related emotions (e.g., joy, satisfaction). We instructed the 
participants to complete their diaries daily, and to use a separate diary sheet 
for every experience reported. If no noticeable experience occurred, they 
should give a brief outline of the day.  
We defined experience as “events that you meet or on which you are 
informed by others, actions by yourself or by others, thoughts by yourself or 
by others, discussions in which you participate or which you attend, etc.” We 
asked them to report experiences related, in their view, to the domains 
discussed in the GIDS, and all other experiences that they considered 
important. For the needs of this study, we further processed only entries 
referring to peers. Lacking any research on emotional terms in the Hellenic3 
language, the participants were free to use whatever terms they wanted. A 
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We administered the GIDS in the last two weeks before the participants left 
for abroad (T1). Then, we gave them the diary and an instruction booklet and 
asked them to familiarize themselves with the procedure by completing some 
diary sheets before their departures. They could then discuss about problems 
that may have appeared. While abroad (about five months), they were 
completing their daily diaries. At regular intervals, they were sending these 
to the first author. All participants went back to Hellas4 for a two-week 
vacation in the middle of the term. Three of them continued completing their 
diaries during that period. Within maximum two weeks after their final 
return to Hellas (T2), we administered the parallel version of GIDS.  
 
Analyses 
In the introduction, we stated that the aim of this study is the mathematical 
description and the empirical test of a model of the process linking the peer-
related emotions with the course of the commitments towards parents. Stated 
differently, we seek to describe and test a process based on peer-related 
experience that takes the T1 commitment as its input and gives the T2 
commitment as its output. We will here summarize a parsimonious way of 
describing the course of commitments; we will describe the coding scheme of 
the peer-related diary entries; and we will outline how we empirically tested 
our model.  
 
Parsimonious description of the course of commitments  
In our previous work (Vleioras, 2003; Vleioras & Bosma, 2005), we introduced 
a way of describing the course of the strength and content of commitments. 
We suggested that at all times individuals hold two commitments: the one 
they report and some alternative commitment. The content and strength of 
the reported commitment are the ones given out, for instance, in GIDS. For 
example, an individual may report the commitment “My parents are the most 
important persons in my life” and this commitment may be very strong.  
The content of the alternative commitment is by definition different 
from that of the reported one. In our example, the most generic alternative 
commitment would be “My parents are not the most important persons in my 
life.” This means that “My parents are still important, but my partner is more 
important” or that “My parents are not important at all.” We can specify the 
exact content of this alternative commitment only if a different commitment is 
reported at some second measurement. Then, we can assume that the specific 
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content of the alternative commitment during the first measurement was the 
one reported at the second measurement. The strength of the alternative 
commitment is by definition lower than that of the reported one. A change in 
the content of commitment occurs if the alternative becomes stronger than the 
reported commitment. This conceptualization facilitates the explanation of 
processes of commitment trajectories: Instead of explaining the course of the 
strength and of the content of a commitment, we now need to explain only 
the course of the strength of commitments.  
 
Coding of diary entries 
The diary entries provided data on experience related to all domains 
discussed in the GIDS. From these, we further processed only entries 
referring to peers. By peers, we mean “individuals who are similar to the 
[individual] in age and/or development level” (Ladd, 1989, p. 5). We studied 
peers in general, rather than friends only, because we were interested in both 
existing and prospective friends. We considered as peers individuals that 
were explicitly called friends or that were of similar status (students, 
exchange students, and age mates), excluding intimate partners. We also 
included entries referring to a family with which T. reported very good 
communication, despite the age difference. If any of the persons mentioned in 
an entry was a peer, we considered this a peer-related entry. 
We first created an exhaustive coding scheme of the peer-related 
entries. We distinguished emotions as related to the following categories of 
peer-related experience:  
(1) Positive emotions for first encounters with people: “The Erasmus 
coordinator wined and dined us: Other girls that have come from 
other countries through Erasmus were also there... Thus, we had the 
chance to meet them. Zest”  
(2) Positive emotions for doing things with others: “In the evening, I went 
out with a girl with whom we hang around here, and went to a 
Brazilian party. Content, enjoyment”  
(3) Positive emotions for getting to know the others better: “Today, I was 
sleeping the whole day. In the evening, I went to [student house]. We 
were discussing with L. and M. They are very nice. It was relaxing and 
fine. Content”  
(4) Positive emotions for the presence of specific peers: “These days, I and 
A. spend most of the time together... I am very happy that she is here. 
Elation, trust, joy” 
(5) Negative emotions for the absence of specific peers: “Today in the 
evening, we met the Romanian girl. Communication was a bit 
difficult. However, we managed! We all three agreed that we miss our 
families and friends. Sadness, worry” 
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(6) Affection towards peers: “Without anything special having occurred, I 
got up in a bad mood. Rather nostalgic. I missed much my relatives 
and friends in Hellas. Sadness, worry, interest, affection” 
(7) Positive emotions for reflecting on the course of the relationship with 
peers: “I like this companionship and friendship I have developed 
with the guys. Each is busy with their distinct schedule, but we often 
eat together, spend quite some hours together. I did not have the 
chance to live such experiences in Athens. Content” 
(8) Positive emotions for characteristics or behaviors of peers: “We went 
to the supermarket with two [natives]. They are very nice and 
pleasant. They also helped me register in the student house, showed 
me around, and gave me some useful information. Joy” 
(9) Negative emotions for characteristics or behaviors of peers: “A girl 
with whom we have hanged around for two months left from [place] 
forever without saying goodbye to us, not even letting us know. 
Surprise, anger, indifference” 
(10) Positive emotions for contacting friends: “I wrote a big letter to my 
friend E., in Athens. Unfortunately, I cannot describe to her in a single 
letter all I see here. Content, zest” 
(11) Emotions related to studying: “We officially started our paper... 
Fortunately, we have time but it is difficult. However, I believe that 
we will make it. Strain, curiosity, hope” 
(12) Emotions appearing in peer-related entries, but not related in any way 
to peer-related experiences, as described in categories 1-11: “In the 
evening, we saw the movie ‘Life is beautiful’ by Benini. [I can accept] 
that the Jews suffered much. However, they will never cease the 
propaganda for that period. Annoyance” 
 
Empirical test of the model 
We first needed to know the content and strength of the reported and 
alternative commitments at T1. The content and strength of the reported 
commitment is the one derived through the GIDS. Based on this content, we 
judged whether this commitment was immature or mature. If a commitment 
did not reflect any of the qualities related to maturity, we looked into the 
interview material and derived these qualities from there. We stated before 
that, by definition, the content of the alternative is different than the content 
of the reported commitment. Therefore, if the content of the reported 
commitment was immature, the content of the alternative commitment was 
mature, and vice versa.  
 The strength of the alternative commitment was by definition lower 
than that of the reported one, but could only be approximated. We already 
mentioned a scale that measures the active attempt of the individual to reach 
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a new commitment. We assumed that the higher the score on this scale, the 
more the individual is aware of the existence of an alternative commitment, 
and the higher the strength of this commitment. If the score on this scale is 
zero, the individual is not aware of the existence of any alternative 
commitment, and the strength of this commitment is zero. Assuming that A 
and C are the strengths of the alternative and reported commitments, that Ch 
is the score in the active attempt of the individual to reach a new 
commitment, and that all three scores are expressed on a 0 to 1 scale, then:  
A = C * Ch (1) 
 
The model to be constructed shall take these strengths and contents of the 
reported and alternative commitments at T1 as input and lead to some 
strengths and contents of these commitments as output on the basis of the 
reported peer-related emotions. Empirically testing this model shall entail 
testing whether our model successfully predicts the strengths and contents of 
the reported and alternative commitments at T2. This task can be broken into 
two components: Strength (do the strengths of the predicted reported and 
alternative commitments equal those of the empirically derived ones?) and 
content (do the predicted and empirically derived alternative and reported 
commitments agree with each other in terms of maturity?). 
Regarding the first component, our null hypothesis is that the difference 
between an empirically derived and a predicted score on the strength of 
commitment is zero. Resampling techniques are advisable here (Castro, 2002; 
Hayes, 2000), because of the small number of measurements. There is one 
important difference between the strengths of the current and of the 
alternative commitments. In the case of the current commitment, we have not 
only the score in the strength, but also the scores of each individual in the 18 
items on the strength of commitment (see Measures). In the case of the 
alternative commitment, we only have the score in the strength of 
commitment (derived through equation (1)). Because of this difference, we 
used different techniques for these two kinds of commitments. Both 
techniques rely on the logic of regenerating an assumed distribution on the 
basis of the available measurements (for an overview of such techniques, 
Good, 1994).  
In order to test for statistical significance the difference between a 
predicted and an observed score in the strength of the current commitment, 
we built an algorithm as follows: For every pair of measurements (say, .916 
and 1), we calculated the absolute observed difference (|.916-1|=.084). Note 
that, by using an absolute difference, we conduct a two-tailed test. In order to 
conduct a one-tailed test, we would calculate the exact difference. If the null 
hypothesis is correct, the difference between the two scores is zero; stated 
differently, the two scores come from the same distribution. In order to create 
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a distribution that contains the observed score, we created combinations of 
the answers to the 18 items on strength of commitment (see Measures) 
choosing 18 answers with replacement. Table 1 shows examples of such 
combinations. Note that, unlike the technique used in Chapter 3, replacement 
is essential here so as not to always use the same set of 18 items time (in this 
case, the p value would always be 1.00). The number of possible combinations 
is 1818 and exceeds the capacities of personal computers. We used the function 
RESAMPLE from the PopTools in Excel for Windows to create a distribution 
of 50,000 such combinations (for examples of such combinations, Table 1). We 
then calculated the difference between each of these 50,000 scores and the 
predicted score. We derived the p value of our null hypothesis by dividing by 
50,000 the number of times that a difference equal to or higher than the 
observed one occurred.  In our example, such a difference occurred 30,035 
times, and the p value is (30,035/50,000=).60.  
 
Table 1. Examples of combinations with replacement 
 
Item Observed data Combination 1 Combination 2 Combination 3 
1 2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 
4 2 2 2 1 
5 1 1 2 2 
6 1 2 2 2 
7 2 2 2 1 
8 2 1 2 2 
9 2 2 2 2 
10 2 2 2 2 
11 2 1 1 2 
12 1 1 2 2 
13 2 2 2 1 
14 2 2 2 2 
15 2 2 2 2 
16 2 2 1 2 
17 2 2 2 2 
18 2 2 2 2 
Sum 33 32 34 33 
 
In order to test the statistical significance of the difference between a 
predicted and an observed score in the strength of the alternative 
commitment, we built an algorithm as follows: For every pair of 
measurements (say, .833 and 1), we calculated the absolute observed 
difference (|1-.833|=.167) and the expected value under the null hypothesis 
that these two values are not statistically different ((1+.833)/2=.9165). Using 
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the random number generation function in Excel for Windows, we created a 
binomial distribution of random scores using the expected value (.9165) as the 
probability that the answer to an item of the strength of commitment scale is 
1. If this answer is not 1, then it is 0. Note that because such items were 
answered on a 0 to 2 scale, we re created the scores in 36 instead of 18 items.  
We then used the Monte Carlo simulation tool5 to create a distribution 
of 50,000 random differences between two scores coming from this 
distribution. The p value for our null hypothesis was derived by dividing by 
50,000 the number of times that a difference equal to or higher than the 
observed one (.167) occurred (in our example, this difference occurred 456 
times, and the p value is 456/50,000=.009). Note that this technique gives 
comparable results to the one testing the significance of the difference 
between the observed and predicted strengths of the current commitment, as 
well as to the technique used in Chapter 3.  
Regarding the second component, the maturity of the empirically 
derived reported and alternative commitments was judged following the 
criteria outlined above. If a participant reported a mature commitment at T1 
and the model predicted that this remained stronger than the immature 
(alternative) commitment, then a mature commitment should be reported at 
T2. If the model predicted that the immature (alternative) commitment 
became stronger than the mature (reported) one, then an immature 
commitment should be reported at T2. Similarly, if a participant reported an 
immature commitment at T1, and the model predicted that this remained 
stronger than the mature (alternative) one, an immature commitment should 
be reported at T2. If the model predicted that the mature (alternative) 
commitment became stronger than the immature (reported) one, then a 
mature commitment should be reported at T2.  
 
RESULTS 
Building a mathematical model 
Our mathematical model aims at describing the process linking the peer-
related emotions and the maturity of the commitments towards parents. In 
the Introduction, we suggested that the level of interaction and the depth of 
friendships determine the maturity of the commitments towards parents. 
Such a theoretical description allows only for general statements about the 
process in hand (Kunnen & Bosma, 2000). Mathematically describing a 
process challenges the investigator to make explicit statements about the 
interdependence of the variables and the effects of time (Van Geert, 1994).  
We found three characteristics of dynamic systems models particularly 
attractive in so doing (see Huckfeldt, Kohfeld, & Likens, 1982). First, time can 
be represented as a series of time steps (defined, for instance, as the 
occurrences of experiences), rather than as a continuous variable. Running 
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such a model entails calculating the values of the variables over all time steps 
(compare, describing a process), not only the final time point (as, for instance, 
in linear models). Second, using difference rather than differential equations 
allows describing relatively more patterns over time with relatively simpler 
models. Finally, using difference equations requires only moderate 
mathematical sophistication.  
In this section, we will mathematically model the course of the strength 
of the reported and alternative commitments. First, consider the case in which 
a strong immature commitment towards parents is reported. We can then 
assume that the alternative commitment is mature and weaker. We will start 
with describing the course of the strength of this mature commitment. In the 
introduction, we suggested that different levels of interaction and different 
depths of relationships with friends allow the relationship with parents to 
reach different levels of maturity. Further, the strength of the mature 
commitment depends on the strength already attained (for instance, Kunnen 
& Bosma, 2000). The logistic growth equation (Van Geert, 1994) adequately 
describes this reasoning:  
Cmt+1 = Cmt  + Cmt * r * (K – Cmt)/K  (2) 
This equation describes how a later growth level of the strength of the mature 
commitment (Cmt+1) is caused by an earlier growth level (Cmt), some growth 
rate (r), and a carrying capacity (K). The carrying capacity is a concept 
borrowed from ecology and refers to the whole of resources (here, the peer-
related experience) that support and maintain the variable at issue (here, the 
strength of the mature commitment). The sum of resources corresponds to the 
maximal level that Cm can reach (see Van Geert, 1994).  
Changes ∆ in the strength of the immature commitment depend on the 
actual strengths of the immature and mature commitments:  
∆Cim = f (Cim, Cm)  (3) 
 
Two points are important in order to define function f:  
a) The mature and immature commitments are incompatible with each other 
(my parents cannot be both the most important and not the most important 
persons in my life); therefore, changes in the strength of the mature lead to 
reverse changes in the strength of the immature commitment: 
∆Cim = - Cim * ∆Cm   (4) 
 
b) A successful identity formation entails the preponderance of one 
commitment over alternatives (for instance, Marcia, 1966). When this 
commitment is reached, maintenance and validation behaviors are initiated 
(Meeus, Iedema, & Maassen, 2002). In terms of our conceptualization, this 
means that if a mature commitment is reported and strong, further 
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experiences verifying it will have the effect of decreasing the strength of 
alternative commitments by a certain magnitude d: 
∆Cim = - d * Cim * Cm (5) 
 
Note that no modifying parameter was included in equation (4), where a 
change is proportionate to a change. Because no change element is included 
in the right part of equation (5), parameter d is needed to modify the effect of 
Cm.  
 
Equations (4) and (5) can easily be combined:  
∆Cim = - Cim * (∆Cm + d * Cm)  (6) 
 
Equation (6) can take the form of a difference equation:  
Cimt+1 = Cimt + ∆Cim = Cimt  – Cimt * (Cmt+1 – Cmt) – d * Cimt * Cmt (7) 
 
Finally, we need to describe how peer-related experiences are related to 
equations (2) and (7). Our major assumption is that having friends is 
important for having a mature relationship with one’s parents. In the 
Introduction, we specified that the level of interaction and the depth of the 
friendships are important for the maturity of the parent-offspring 
relationship. In terms of equation (2), this means that the peer-related 
experiences determine the resources necessary to achieve a strong mature 
commitment towards parents, and, therefore, correspond to the carrying 
capacity of the strength of the mature commitment towards parents (K in 
equation (2)).  
Based on the theory presented in the Introduction, we further used 
experience categories 1-7 (Method- Coding of diary entries). Experience 
categories 8-12 do not yield information on the level of interaction or the 
depth of friendships. Assume that a person has no peer-related experiences: 
Then, the level that the strength of the mature commitment can reach is 
minimal. The deeper the friendships created the higher this level. We expect 
the peer-related experiences 1-7 to show increasing depth of the friendships 
and, therefore, increasing carrying capacity of the mature commitment 
towards parents. Experiences 1 to 3 refer to increasing levels of interaction 
with peers, while experiences 4 to 7 denote the importance of the relationship 
for the individual.  
We will use the word “order” to describe the depth of the friendships as 
described in everyday experiences: The higher the order of an experience, the 
deeper the friendship described. Expressing positive emotions for first 
encounters with people (first-order experience) is a first step for creating 
friendships. Enjoying doing things with others (second-order experience) is a 
context of exploratory affective exchange. Getting to know each other through 
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discussions (third-order experience) denotes a higher level of exchange of 
personal information. Positive emotions for the presence and negative 
emotions for the absence (fourth-order experience) of others are signs that 
their company is sought. Expressing affection (fifth-order experience) outside 
the context of a romantic relationship shows the importance of a person in 
one’s life. Finally, explicitly calling somebody a friend and reflecting on one’s 
relationship with him/her (sixth-order experience) is the ultimate sign that a 
friendship has been built.  
The carrying capacity of the mature commitment is minimal in the 
absence of peer-related experience. When some peer-related experience 
occurs, the carrying capacity increases to some higher level depending on the 
order of this experience. The higher the level of this experience, the higher the 
carrying capacity. We have seen that friendships, once established, can 
continue at a higher level of interaction, switch to earlier stages of the 
interaction, or dissolve. Accordingly, the carrying capacity may increase, 
decrease, or remain stable, according to the next experiences. At every next 
step, if a higher-order experience occurs (higher level of interaction), the 
carrying capacity increases again to the level corresponding to this new 
experience. If a lower-order experience occurs (earlier stages of interaction, 
friendship dissolution), the carrying capacity will decrease; the lower the 
order of the new experience, the closer the friendship is to dissolve, and, 
therefore, the higher the rate of decrease of the carrying capacity. Moreover, 
the higher the previous strength of commitment, the more difficult for this 
friendship to dissolve, and, therefore, the lower the rate of decrease.  
So far, we referred to the case, in which the person reports an immature 
commitment. Then the mature commitment starts with a rather low strength 
and, given the right peer-related experience, has full potential of growth. If a 
person reports a mature commitment, following our reasoning, we can safely 
assume that this person has had previous peer-related experiences. These 
experiences will be of the same order as the experience corresponding to a 
carrying capacity higher than the strength of this mature commitment. 
Thanks to these experiences, the parent-offspring relationship is already 
transformed. There is no literature suggesting that a transformed relationship 
can switch back to its immature form. Therefore, even if no higher-order 
experience occurs, we will set the minimal value the strength of the mature 
commitment can reach at the carrying capacity corresponding to the 
immediately lower than the order of the previous peer-related experience.  
Graphs 1 and 2 illustrate the course of the strengths of commitments of 
persons X and Y. The x-axis represents time in the form of 150 discreet 
iterations, and the y-axis the strength of the mature and immature 
commitments. The values of these strengths are calculated for every time step 
using equations (2) and (7). At any time step, the individual would report the 
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stronger of the two commitments; the weaker would be an alternative 
commitment. Person X starts with an immature commitment, meets some 
people (first-order experience), gets involved in activities with them (second-
order experience), at some points expresses his affection for his friends (fifth- 
order experience), and then continues enjoying their company (fourth-order 
experience). The result is the dominance of a mature commitment. Person Y 
starts with an immature commitment, meets some people (first-order 
experience), goes through to reflecting on his new friends rather early (sixth-
order experience), and then retreats from any kind of social activity, apart 
from meeting some people every now and then (first order experience). The 
result is the dominance of an immature commitment.  
 
Empirically Test of the Model  
Empirically testing dynamic systems models requires intensive longitudinal 
data (for instance, Kunnen & Bosma, 2000). In the Introduction, we explained 
why we intensively followed a small number of individuals. In this section, 
we will present the data on these individuals, and we will see whether they 
provide support for our model. As we described in the Method, we instructed 
the participants to fill in a diary sheet even on days that no identity-related 
experience occurred. For days that, despite this instruction, participants have 
not filled in their diaries, we considered the strengths of the mature and 
immature commitments to remain unchanged; these days will appear as gaps 
in the lines describing the course of the strengths of the commitments. If the 
participants filled in their diaries but no peer-related experience had 
occurred, the designated decrease in the carrying capacity occurred (see 
previous section).  
Our model is supported if it successfully predicts successfully the 
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Graph 1. Illustrative example of the course of the strengths of 
the mature and immature commitments across 150 iterations of 
person X who meets some people, gets involved in activities 
with them, expresses his affection for his new friends, and 
continues enjoying their company 
Graph 2. Illustrative example of the course of the strengths of 
the mature and immature commitments across 150 iterations of  
person Y who meets some people, reflects on his newly acquired 
friends rather early, and then retreats from any kind of social 
activity, apart from meeting some people every now and then 
Graph 1. Illustrative example of the 
course of the strengths of the mature 
and immature commitments across 150 
iterations of person X  
 
Graph 2. Illustrative example of the course of 
the strengths of the mature and immature 
commitmen  across 150 iterations of person Y 
r h 1. Illustrative example of the c urse of 
the strengths of the mature and i mature 
commit ents across 150 iterations of p rson X 
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will now explain what we mean by prediction in a dynamic mathematical 
model. Our model consists of equations (2) and (7) and of the restrictions on 
the course of the carrying capacity of the strength of the mature commitment 
as outlined before. Feeding this model with the T1 values of the strength of 
the mature and immature commitments and the occurrences of the friends-
related experiences (that determine the changes in the carrying capacity) 
leads to an end result comprising the strength of the mature and immature 
commitments at T2. We shall refer to these strengths as the predicted 
strengths. The predicted content of the reported commitment depends on the 
predicted strengths of the mature and immature commitments. If the 
predicted strength of the mature commitment is higher than that of the 
immature one, the predicted content of the reported commitment is mature; 
and vice versa. If the predicted content of the reported commitment, and the 
predicted strengths of the mature and immature commitments match the 
observed ones, our data support our model.  
 
Data on T. 
At T1, T. reported the following commitment: “My relations with my parents 
are in general [rather bad]. I feel lucky because they tried to raise me and 
instruct me properly. Especially my mother always tries to be emotionally the 
closest possible to her children, to understand them, and to side them.” In her 
interview, T. reported a rather distant relationship with her father (“My 
father gives me the impression… that he is not emotionally close to his 
family”) and a rather conflictual relationship with her mother (“With my 
mother [conflicts] are unavoidable”). Therefore, her commitment was judged 
immature. The strengths of the reported (immature) and alternative (mature) 
commitments were .694 and .347, respectively. Recollect that the strength of 
the reported commitment is the raw score on the relevant scale divided by 36, 
and the strength of the alternative commitment is given by equation (1). 
Graph 3a exhibits the occurrence of first- to sixth-order experiences for T. in 
time and graph 3b the course of strengths of the immature and mature 
commitments.  As was the case in graphs 1 and 2, the x-axis represents time 
as 146 iterations (one for every day between T.’s first and last days abroad) 
over which equations (2) and (7) were run to calculate the strengths of the 
mature and immature commitments (represented in the y-axis).  
Our model predicted that, at T2, T. would report a mature commitment. The 
predicted strengths for the reported (mature) and alternative (immature) 
commitments were .891 and .215. Indeed, at T2, T. reported a mature 
commitment: “After my experience in [town], I feel that my relationship with 
my parents has become more substantial. We communicate better with each 
other and I feel emotionally closer to them.” The empirically derived 
strengths of the reported (mature) and alternative (immature) commitments 
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were .917 and .131, respectively, and did not significantly differ from the 
predicted ones (p>.05; the calculation of these p values was described in the 
Method).  
 
Data on A. 
At T1, A. reported the following commitment: “Parents are the most 
important persons in my life. Apart from the material support, they also 
provide me with emotional support. They are the persons that will always 
stand by us and that will never betray us. Of course, both sides (parents- 
children) have to mutually draw back to build a healthy, harmonious, and 
beautiful relationship.” This commitment was judged immature because it 
exhibits a unilateral relationship where the parents always give, and a picture 
of the parents as perfect and the most important persons in A.’s life. The 
strengths of the reported (immature) and alternative (mature) commitments 
were 1 and .143, respectively. Graph 4a exhibits the occurrence of first- to 
sixth-order experiences for A. in time and graph 4b the course of the strengths 
of the immature and mature commitments.  
 
 
Graph 4a. Occurrence of first- to sixth- order experiences over 
time in A.’s diaries  
Graph 4b. Simulated course of the strengths of the reported 
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Graph 3a. Occurrence of first- to sixth- 
order experiences over time in T.’s diaries 
Graph 3b. Simulated course of the strengths of the 
reported and alternative com it ents of V. 
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Our model predicted that, at T2, A. would report an immature commitment. 
The predicted strengths of the reported (immature) and alternative (mature) 
commitments were .864 and .288, respectively. At T2, A. reported the 
following commitment: “My relationship with my parents continues to be a 
relationship of trust, affection, and mutual support. I hope that my stay 
[abroad] will make them less overprotective. This is the only negative thing 
that I find in them.” This was judged an immature commitment: Although A. 
stresses the mutuality of the relationship, she admits a sole negative point in 
her relationship with her parents, and leaves a tone of dissatisfaction from the 
relationship. The empirically derived strength of the reported (immature) 
commitment was .833 and did not significantly differ from the predicted one 
(p>.05). The empirically derived strength of the alternative (mature) 
commitment was .119 and significantly differed from the predicted one 
(p<.05).  
 
Data on E.  
At T1, E. reported the following commitment: “I am very satisfied from my 
relationship with my parents. Now they are both parents and friends, and I 
know that, whenever I need them, they will stand by me. I appreciate very 
much the help and support they have offered me without ever becoming 
indiscreet and without interfering in my personal life and choices.” This 
commitment was judged mature, because it describes a mutual relationship in 
which E.’s individuality is fully respected. The strengths of the reported 
(mature) and alternative (immature) commitments were .917 and .065, 
respectively. Graph 5a exhibits the occurrence of first- to sixth-order 
experiences for E. in time and graph 5b the course of the strength of the 
immature and mature commitments.  
 
Our model predicted that, at T2, E. would report a mature commitment. The 
predicted strengths for the reported (mature) and alternative (immature) 
Graph 5a. Occurrence of first- to sixth- order experiences over 
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commitments were .900 and .022, respectively. Indeed, at T2, E. reported a 
mature commitment: “It is a relationship of supporting each other within 
which each has the freedom of choice and of individual evolution.” The 
empirically derived strengths of the reported (mature) and alternative 
(immature) commitments were .972 and .069, and did not significantly differ 
from the predicted ones (p>.05).  
 
Data on V. 
At T1, V. reported the following commitment: “Parents are certainly models 
for their offspring. They must both have professional careers, so that they are 
[full grown] as persons and that they can provide their children with stimuli. 
Moreover, they have to be present at their children’s difficult and good times 
at any cost.” In her interview, V. said: “I am very important for them, they 
take care of me, they protect me, … and I, on the other hand, worry a lot for 
them, I want them to have a good time, to be healthy” (mutual relationship). 
Based on this interview, we judged V.’s commitment as mature. The strengths 
of the reported (mature) and alternative (immature) commitments were .917 
and .262, respectively. Graph 6a exhibits the occurrence of first- to sixth- order 
experiences for V. in time and graph 6b the course of the strength of the 
immature and mature commitments.  
Our model predicted that, at T2, V. would report a mature commitment. The 
predicted strengths of the reported (mature) and alternative (immature) 
commitments were .902 and .128. Indeed, at T2, V. reported a mature 
commitment: “My relationship with my parents fortunately continues to be 
flawless, [I continue] finding in them support, [they continue] respecting my 
choices and freedoms.” This was judged a mature commitment. The 
empirically derived strengths of the reported (mature) and alternative 
(immature) commitments were .972 and .068, and did not significantly differ 
from the predicted ones (p>.05).  
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Developmental psychologists often assume that characteristics of the parents 
or of the parent-offspring relationship affect the friendships people develop. 
A supplementary link, present in theoretical accounts only, is that friendships 
contribute to the maturation of the parent-offspring relationship. Treating 
friendships as processes, rather than states, we here suggested a simple 
process through which building mature friendships triggers a process of 
transformation of the parent-offspring relationship. We translated this into a 
mathematical model and empirically tested it. Our findings provide support 
for this model. 
Two of our participants (E. and V.) had a mature and two (T. and A.) an 
immature commitment towards parents at T1. While abroad, V. and T. 
reported experiences ranging from meeting people to reflecting on their 
friendships. E. did not report any reflections, and A. did not report positive 
emotions for first encounters with people either. Based on these experiences, 
our model successfully predicted that E., V., and T. would report a mature 
and A. an immature commitment at T2. The strengths of both the reported 
and alternative commitments were also successfully predicted for E., V., and 
T. In the case of A., only the strength of the reported commitment was 
successfully predicted. The only failure of our model was the prediction of 
the strength of the alternative commitment of A. at T2.  
This failure is more likely to uncover a problem in reconstructing A.’s 
experience based on her diary data, rather than some deficiency of the model. 
In particular, only 28 of A.’s 94 peer-related entries fell into categories 1-7 (see 
Method). It is worth mentioning that 16 of the excluded entries included the 
emotion of surprise. Surprise is elicited by the disconfirmation of expectations 
(Gendolla & Koller, 2001), and directs behavior towards the related stimuli 
(Izard, 1977), possibly not allowing the further processing of other 
information (compare older theories that emotions interrupt ongoing 
behaviors and thoughts; Scherer, 1982). For example, A. reported “[W]e went 
with [the teacher] and the pupils to eat in a … restaurant. I was impressed 
that the pupils did not offer to pay for us. I think that [they] are too 
closefisted! Surprise.” A. expected to be treated by the pupils but was not. 
This surprised her, and did not let her report, for instance, whether she 
enjoyed the dinner.  
When describing our mathematical model, we argued for a dynamic 
systems approach to study processes. Given a bigger number of participants, 
one could opt for estimating a linear model, which would be simpler. 
However, except for parsimony, descriptive adequacy is an important 
criterion when choosing a model: To what extent does a model describe what 
it is supposed to describe? In this study, we aimed at describing a process. A 
linear model would allow for predictions of the form “If a person reports an 
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immature commitment at T1, then the probability that s/he will report a 
mature commitment at T2 is …%.” Such a prediction does not give any 
insight into the processes that link the T1 and T2 measurements. In a dynamic 
systems model, prediction refers to whether the starting point (T1 
measurement) leads to the final point data (T2 measurement) if the process 
modeled is applied on it. If it does, the description is adequate.  
One last point for the choice of a dynamic systems approach is its use of 
time. In a linear model, time is treated as continuous, and, thus, change is 
independent of experiences occurring in time. For instance, one would choose 
a simple linear model, if T1 and T2 measurements were dependent only on 
age or only on staying abroad for five months. Our data show that none of 
this is the case. The participants do not have the same age, and their 
trajectories are different despite staying abroad for five months. In a dynamic 
systems model, time is handled as discreet, and the trajectories of individuals 
depend on their starting points (whether they had a mature or immature 
commitment before going abroad) and on the experiences they had while 
abroad. Consider, for instance, that although both T. and A. were 21, they 
both started with immature commitments and they both stayed abroad for 
five months, only T. had the experiences needed to reach a mature 
commitment at T2. This is in line with Elder’s (1998) view that the choices and 
actions of individuals are important for the construction of their life course.  
We will now discuss the gender, age, and cultural background of our 
participants, issues that suggest a high selectivity of our sample. First, the 
preponderance of female participants is an issue recurring in relationship 
research (Berscheid & Reis, 1998). We studied only female participants to 
account for the clear gender differences in relationships (Winstead, 1986) and 
emotionality (Manstead, 1992); given our small sample, this guaranteed that 
friendships and emotions would function homogeneously across all cases. In 
larger samples, male participants should be studied as well. In theory, 
relationships with parents mature in adolescence. The end of adolescence is 
not clear-cut, though. For Lerner and Villaruel (1996), in adolescence, “most 
of a person’s biological, psychological, and social characteristics are changing 
from what is considered childlike to what is considered adult” (p. 130). Given 
this definition, two of our participants had already achieved an adult 
commitment concerning parents, while the other two were still adolescents in 
this respect. This is very likely in southern Europe, where adult-like 
arrangements of the parent-offspring relationship usually take place much 
later than in northern Europe (Scabini, 1998). Despite this delay, however, 
there are no theoretical reasons to believe that the essence of these 
arrangements is different from those in northern societies.  
In designing this study, we took into account the convenience of our 
participants: They could choose where to be interviewed, which experiences 
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to report, which emotional terms to use, how often to send their diary entries 
to the researchers. This resulted in no dropouts and punctuality in filling in 
the diaries. The originality of the theme, the subsequent lack of previously 
used instruments, and our concern for the content of the experience and the 
commitments led us to use mainly open instruments. This was a suitable way 
to approach the questions raised in this study. On the other hand, coding 
open diaries and judging the maturity of the commitments on a yes/no basis 
may have led to losing important information. Taking into account the 
convenience of both the participants and the researcher requires the 
construction of easy-to-use instruments that yield easy-to-analyze data before 
following more participants. 
All in all, we made informed decisions on which theoretical ideas to 
follow, which design to apply, what analyses to conduct, and what kind of 
conclusions to reach, compromising between theoretical speculations, 
practical constraints, and our participants’ convenience. Suggestions for 
future research include following more individuals, follow also male 
participants, better quantifying the variables, and using advanced person-
oriented statistical techniques.  
The contribution of this study is twofold. On a theoretical level, we gave 
a different perspective on the relation between one’s relationships with peers 
and with parents. In particular, we provided support for the hypothesis that 
creating friendships is an important step in acquiring a mature perspective 
towards one’s parents. On a methodological level, we were explicit on the 
kinds of relationships we expected between our variables, we simulated these 
relationships over real time steps, we gave some ideas on how to combine 
micro- (emotions) and macro- (commitment) processes, and we made 
suggestions on the use of diaries. We hope that this study provides a good 
starting point to introduce this new methodology in the study of processes.  
 
REFERENCES 
Berscheid, E. & Reis, H.T. (1998). Attraction and close relationships. In 
Gilbert, D.T., Fiske, S.T., & Lindzey, G. (Eds.), The Handbook of Social 
Psychology, Vol. II (pp. 193-281). Boston, Massachusetts [etc]: The 
McGRAW- HILL Companies, Inc.  
Blieszner, R. (1989). Developmental processes of friendship. In Adams, R.G. & 
Blieszner, R. (Eds.), Older adult friendship: Structure and process (pp. 108-
126). Newbury Park [etc]: Sage Publications.  
Bodgan, R. & Taylor, S.J. (1975). Introduction to qualitative research methods: A 
phenomenological approach to the social sciences. New York [etc]: John 
Wiley & Sons.  
Friends and parents 
 75 
Bosma, H.A. (1985). Identity in adolescence: Coping with commitments. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, State University, Groningen, The 
Netherlands.  
Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss, Vol. I: Attachment. Middlesex [etc]: 
Penguin Books.  
Bowlby, J. (1973). Separation: Anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 
Publishers.  
Branner, J. (1992). Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches: An 
overview. In Brannen, J. (Ed.), Mixing methods: Qualitative and 
quantitative research (pp. 3-37). Aldershot [etc]: Avebury.  
Bronfenbrenner, K. (1977). Toward an experimental ecology of human 
development. American Psychologist, 32, 513-531. 
Castro, S.L. (2002). A comparison of intraclass correlation coefficients, rwg(j), 
hierarchical linear modeling, within- and between- analysis, and 
random group resampling. The Leadership Quarterly, 13 (1), 69-93.  
Collins, W.A. (1997). Relationships and development during adolescence: 
Interpersonal adaptation to individual change. Personal Relationships, 4 
(1), 1-14.  
Ducharme, J., Doyle, A.B., & Markiewicz, D. (2002). Attachment security with 
mother and father: Associations with adolescents’ reports of 
interpersonal behavior with parents and peers. Journal of Social and 
Personal Relationships, 19 (2), 203-231.  
Duck, S. & Sants, H. (1983). On the origin of the specious: Are personal 
relationships really interpersonal states? Journal of Social and Clinical 
Psychology, 1 (1), 27-41.  
Dwyer, D. (2000). Interpersonal relationships. London [etc]: Routledge.  
Elder, Jr., G.H. (1998). The life course as developmental theory. Child 
Development, 69 (1), 1-12.  
Engels, R.C.M.E., Finkenauer, C., Meeus, W., & Dekovic, M. (2001). Parental 
attachment and adolescents’ emotional adjustment: The association 
with social skills and relational competence. Journal of Counseling 
Psychology, 48 (4), 428-439.  
Fehr, B. (1996). Friendship processes. Thousand Oaks [etc]: SAGE Publications. 
Fisher, S. (1990). The psychological effects of leaving home: Homesickness, 
health and obsessional thoughts. In Fisher, S. & Cooper, C.L. (Eds.), On 
the move: The psychology of change and transition (pp. 153-170). Chichester 
[etc]: John Wiley & Sons.  
Frijda, N.H. (1993). Moods, emotion episodes, and emotions. In Lewis, M. & 
Haviland, J.M. (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (pp. 381-403). New York & 
London: The Guilford Press.  
Chapter 4 
 76 
Furnham, A. (1989). Friendship and personal development. In Porter, R. & 
Tomaselli, S. (Eds.), The dialectics of friendship (pp. 92-110). London & 
New York: Routledge. 
Gendolla, G.H.E. & Koller, M. (2001). Surprise and motivation of causal 
search: How are they affected by outcome valence and importance? 
Motivation and Emotion, 25, 327-349. 
Golish, T. (2000). Changes in closeness between adult children and their 
parents: A turning point analysis. Communication Reports, 13 (2), 79-97.  
Good, P. (1994). Permutation tests: A practical guide to resampling methods for 
testing hypotheses. New York [etc]: Springer-Verlag.  
Graber, J.A. & Brooks- Gunn, J. (1996). Expectations for and precursors to 
leaving home in young women. In Graber, J.A. & Dubas, J.S. (Eds.), 
Leaving home: Understanding the transition to adulthood (pp. 21-38). San 
Fransisco: Jossey- Bass Publishers.  
Grotevant, H.D. & Adams, G.R. (1984). Development of an objective measure 
to assess ego identity in adolescence: Validation and replication. Journal 
of Adolescent Research, 2, 203-222.  
Hallinan, M.T. (1978/79). The process of friendship formation. Social 
Networks, 1, 193-210. 
Hayes, A.F. (2000). Commentary: Randomization tests and the equality of 
variance assumption when comparing group means. Animal Behaviour, 
59, 653-656.  
Huckfeldt, R.R., Kohfeld, C.W., & Likens, T.W. (1982). Dynamic modeling: An 
introduction. Beverly Hills [etc]: Sage Publications.  
Izard, C.E. (1977). Human emotions. Cambridge [etc]: Cambridge University 
Press & Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme. 
Johnson, G.M., Staton, A.Q., & Jorgensen-Earp, C.R. (1995). An ecological 
perspective on the transition of new university freshmen. 
Communication Education, 44 (4), 336-352.  
Kerr, M., Stattin, H., Biesecker, G., & Ferrer- Wreder, L. (2003). Relationships 
with parents and peers in adolescence. In Lerner, R.M., Easterbrooks, 
M.A., & Mistry, J. (Eds.), Handbook of psychology, Vol. 6: Developmental 
psychology (pp. 395-419). New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.  
Knap, M.L. (1984). Interpersonal communication and human relationships. 
Massachussets: Allyn and Bacon, Inc. 
Kroger, J. (1993). On the nature of structural transition in the identity 
formation process. In Kroger, J. (Ed.), Discussions on ego identity (pp. 205-
234). Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.  
Kunnen, E.S. & Bosma, H.A. (2000). Development of meaning making: A 
dynamic systems approach. New Ideas in Psychology, 18, 57-82.  
Ladd, G.W. (1989). Toward a further understanding of peer relationships and 
their contributions to child development. In Berndt, T.J. & Ladd, G.W. 
Friends and parents 
 77 
(Eds.), Peer relationships in child development (pp. 1-11). New York [etc]: 
John Wiley & Sons.  
Lerner, G.M. & Villarruel, F.A. (1996). Adolescence. In De Corte, E. & 
Weinert, F.E.  (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of Developmental and 
Instructional Psychology (pp. 130-136). Oxford [etc.]: Pergamon. 
Levinger, G. (1980). Toward the analysis of close relationships. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 16, 510-544.  
Manstead, A.S.R. (1992). Gender differences in emotion. In Gale, A. & 
Eysenck, M.W. (Eds.), Handbook of individual differences: Biological 
perspectives (pp. 355-387). Chichester [etc]: John Wiley & Sons.  
Marcia, J.E. (1966). Development and validation of ego-identity status. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 3 (5), 551-558.  
Meeus, W., Iedema, J., & Maassen, G.H. (2002). Commitment and exploration 
as mechanisms of identity formation. Psychological Reports, 90, 771-785.  
Mellers, B.A. (2000). Choice and the relative pleasure of consequences. 
Psychological Bulletin, 126 (6), 910-924.  
Neuman, W.L. (2000). Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. Boston [etc]: Allyn and Bacon.  
Oatley, K. & Duncan, E. (1992). Incidents of emotion in daily life. In 
Strongman, K.T. (Ed.), International review of studies on emotion, Vol. 2 
(pp. 249-293). Oxford: John Wiley & Sons. Orvin, 1995 
Orvin, G.H. (1995). Understanding the adolescent. Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Press, Inc.  
Parker, J.G. & Gottman, J.M. (1989). Social and emotional development in 
relational context: Friendship interaction from early childhood to 
adolescence. In Berndt, T.J. & Ladd, G.W. (Eds.), Peer relationships in 
child development (pp. 95-131). New York [etc]: John Wiley & Sons.  
Parkinson, B. (1995). Introduction. In: Parkinson, B. & Colman, A.M. (Eds.), 
Emotion and motivation (pp. xi-xvi). London & New York: Longman.  
Pelham, B.W. & Blanton, H. (2003). Conducting research in psychology: 
Measuring the weight of smoke. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.  
Perlman, D. & Fehr, B. (1986). Theories of friendship: The analysis of 
interpersonal attraction. In: Derlega, V.J. & Winstead, B.A. (Eds.), 
Friendship and social interaction (pp. 9-40). New York [etc]: Springer- 
Verlag.  
Rosenberg, S. (1989). A study of personality in literary autobiography: An 
analysis of Thomas Wolfe’s Look Homeward, Angel. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 56 (3), 416-430.  
Sabatelli, R.M. & Mazor, A. (1985). Differentiation, individuation, and identity 
formation: The integration of family system and individual 
developmental perspectives. Adolescence, 20 (79), 619-633.  
Chapter 4 
 78 
Scabini, E. (1998). Il paese dei cocchi di mamma [The country of mammy’s 
boy]. Psicologia Contemporanea, 150, 51-55. 
Scherer, K.R. (1982). Emotions as a process: Function, origin and regulation. 
Social Science Information/ sur les sciences socials, 21, 555-570.  
Steinberg, L. & Morris, A.S. (2001). Adolescent development. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 52, 83-110.  
Van Geert, P.L.C. (1994). Dynamic systems of development: Change between 
complexity and chaos. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.  
Vleioras, G. (2003). Identity trajectories: A parsimonious description. Paper 
presented in the 10th Annual Conference of the Society for Research on 
Identity Formation (SRIF), May 15-18, Vancouver, British Columbia, 
Canada.  
Vleioras, G. & Bosma, H.A. (2005). Predicting change in relational identity 
commitments: Exploration and emotions. Identity, 5 (1), 35-56.  
Weiss, R. (1990). Losses associated with mobility. In Fisher, S. & Cooper, C.L. 
(Eds.), On the move: The psychology of change and transition (pp. 3-12). 
Chichester [etc]: John Wiley & Sons. 
Winstead, B.A. (1986). Sex differences in same-sex friendships. In Derlega, V.J. 
& Winstead, B.A. (Eds.), Friendship and social interaction (pp. 81-99). New 
York [etc]: Springer- Verlag. 
Wright, D.E. (1999). Personal relationships: An interdisciplinary approach. 
California: Mayfield Publishing Company.  
Youniss, J. & Smollar, J. (1985). Adolescent relations with mothers, fathers, and 
friends. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Youniss, J. & Smollar, J. (1989). Adolescents’ interpersonal relationships in 
social context. In Berndt, T.J. & Ladd, G.W. (Eds.), Peer relationships in 
child development (pp. 300-316). New York [etc]: John Wiley & Sons. 
Zimmer- Gembeck, M.J. (2002). The development of romantic relationships 
and adaptations in the system of peer relationships. Journal of Adolescent 
















We used a dynamic system approach to describe a process through which 
friendships, parent-offspring relationships, perceived competence, and 
reflections on own characteristics allow adolescents to view themselves 
maturely. We considered emotions as the main informants of the personal 
relevance of related experience. We expressed this model as a set of difference 
equations that allowed us to simulate the function of the model and use 
empirical data to demonstrate its viability. We followed four individuals for 
five months. At the beginning and end of this period, we administered the 
Groningen Identity Development Scale; during this period, the participants 
filled in daily diaries on identity-related experiences and emotions. Our 
model provides better fit to these empirical data than a series of random 
models. In conclusion, our model adequately describes the process of identity 
changes and stability. 
 
This chapter is based on:  
Vleioras, G., Van Geert, P. L. C., & Bosma, H. A. (in preparation). “What 




Adolescents need to view themselves maturely. Developmental and social 
psychology abound in constructs related to this task; self development 
(Harter, 1999) and identity formation (Erikson, 1968) are examples. There are 
different ways to reach such a view. Here, we describe and test a process 
through which friendships, mature relationships with parents, perceived 
competence, and reflections on personal characteristics lead to a mature view 
of oneself.  
 
A Dynamic Systems Approach 
We adopted a dynamic systems approach to describe this process. In 
traditional approaches, time is reduced to some abstract dimension that 
uniformly affects the outcomes of processes. For example, we know that the 
identity status occurrences change over time (Meeus, Iedema, Helsen, & 
Vollebergh, 1999); the effect of time, however, is unknown. In a dynamic 
systems approach, we formulate explicit hypotheses about the underlying 
processes. We can then represent time as a number of discrete steps (time 
units or occurrence of events; Van Geert, 1994). The predefined process runs 
across all these time steps yielding an outcome (be it a final measurement or 
the end state of development). In short, in dynamic systems, the effect of time 
is explicitly taken into account.  
We need to stress here that dynamic systems models have different 
aims from statistical models (see Cook, et al., 1995). The former describe “how 
one state develops into another state over the course of time” (Weisstein, 
1999, p. 501) but do not test whether this description is accurate. The latter 
test whether two variables are related but do not give any insight into the 
underlying process. We used a dynamic systems model to describe a process, 
and a statistical model to test whether this description is accurate. 
Dynamic systems modeling entails three steps. The first is to define the 
variables and to describe how they act upon one another over time (compare 
the notion of interaction in traditional statistics; Stevens, 1996). The second is 
to express this conceptual model mathematically. This step allows the 
simulation of the process at hand and the formulation of precise predictions. 
Because theory rarely goes into micro processes, this step entails much 
educated guessing and scientific intuition. The last step is to empirically test 
the model. In this study, we proceeded with all three steps. We start by 
defining our variables.  
 
Commitments towards Personal Characteristics 
We study the maturity of individuals’ views on themselves by looking at the 
commitments they hold towards their personal characteristics (Bosma, 1985; 
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1992). Commitments root in the identity status paradigm (Marcia, 1966), an 
operationalization of Erikson’s (1968) theory of identity in adolescence. 
Marcia (1966) suggested that the commitments towards ideology and future 
occupation reflect one’s identity. More domains were studied when the 
researchers thought that they were important (for instance, family-career 
priorities, Archer, 1989; dating, Grotevant & Adams, 1984). Bosma (1985) 
asked the adolescents what was important for their self-definition. Personal 
characteristics were one of these domains.  
Commitments towards personal characteristics are the individuals’ 
standpoints towards their appearance, character, and gender. They are 
comparable to many self-related constructs. Similar to self-representations, 
self-perceptions, and self-descriptions (Harter, 1999), they refer to 
characteristics that one can consciously report. Similar to the self-concept as 
the sum of self-schemata (Baumeister, 1995), they refer to different areas. 
Similar to self-esteem (van der Meulen, 2001), they reflect one’s positive or 
negative evaluation of oneself. In sum, commitments towards personal 
characteristics bear clear similarities with other self-related constructs.  
Moreover, commitments come with two characteristics from the 
identity literature. First, identification refers to the degree to which 
individuals invest in their commitments (Marcia, 1966). A typical 
identification item is “Are you certain of this commitment?” (Bosma, 1985). 
Second, commitments give a direction for the future. A typical item 
measuring this is “My commitment gives me strength for the future” (Bosma, 
1985; Meeus, 1996). The sum of these two scores is often viewed as the 
strength of commitments. However, consider a person strongly identifying 
with being unattractive and dull; this commitment provides low direction for 
the future. The moderately high sum of these identification and direction for 
the future scores inadequately describes the strength of this commitment. To 
account for such cases, we consider identification and direction for the future 
distinct.  
Maturity refers to the state of being fully developed (Collins English 
Dictionary, 1983). Children see themselves unrealistically positively. With 
age, they increasingly perceive positive and negative self-attributes, until, in 
late adolescence, they view themselves in an accurate and balanced way 
(Harter, 1999). Accordingly, the content of a commitment towards personal 
characteristics is mature if it reflects a balance between positive and negative 
self-attributes. A mature content further reflects a positive attitude towards 
oneself (compare the meaning of self-esteem, Baumeister, 1995). In 
contradistinction, an immature content reflects only positive or mainly 
negative self-attributes. We consider the content of commitments showing 
gradual acceptance of negative (positive) characteristics as changing. It is 
changing immature if individuals tend to disregard these characteristics in 
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favor of an extremely positive (negative) self-image, and changing mature if no 
such tendency is identified, but the positive attitude towards oneself is not 
consolidated.  
Previously, we suggested that identification and direction for the future 
are important, but distinct characteristics of commitments. Different values of 
these characteristics represent different probabilities that one will change 
his/her commitment. We use these probabilities to distinguish between 
degrees of maturity: The lower the probability of (changing) mature 
commitments to change towards less mature commitments, the more mature 
these commitments. Similarly, the higher the probability of (changing) 
immature commitments to change towards more mature commitment, the 
more mature these commitments.  
If both identification and direction for the future are high, the chances 
of changing from an immature to a mature or from a mature to an immature 
content are low; if they are both low, the chances of changing are high. 
Consider the mature commitment “I think I am an interesting person.” Person 
A scores high in identification but low in direction for the future; person B 
scores low in identification but high in direction for the future. We think that 
B is more likely to change towards an immature commitment; that is, 
identification is more important than direction for the future in estimating the 
chances of changing one’s commitment.  
So far, we explained how we use the content of commitments towards 
personal characteristics, and the scores in identification and direction for the 
future to derive the commitment maturity. Assume that Mt is the degree of 
this maturity at time t. If time is not important, we use M without the 
subscript t. We will now describe the growth of M in time (see Van Geert, 
1994). First, any growth process depends on factors that have a positive effect 
on it. This positive effect can be summarized by the term resources, in 
accordance with the use of this term in ecology. Resources, thus, refer to the 
factors that support growth. For instance the resources for the growth of 
plants are oxygen, water, and sun; and those for the growth of knowledge are 
books, time, and effort. We assume that the resources needed for the growth 
of maturity of commitments toward personal characteristics are the ones 
provided by relationships with parents, by friendships, by perceived 
competence, and by reflections on own characteristics. Equal amounts of 
resources yield equal growth levels; the more the resources available, the 
higher the growth level. When all the available resources are consumed, the 
growing variable stabilizes. The amount of resources corresponding to this 
stable value is called carrying capacity (K; Van Geert, 1994).  
The presence of resources alone does not explain growth. There must be 
a mechanism that uses the resources to actually cause the growth of maturity. 
For the sake of building our model, we do not need to know the exact 
Self in adolescence 
 83 
mechanism; two points are enough. First, individuals differ in the 
effectiveness of using these resources for growth; thus, some grow faster than 
others. Second, growth depends crucially on the current size or properties of 
the growing variable. This is an important difference from additive change 
models, in which growth takes the form of adding some fixed or variable 
amount to the level that is already achieved. These principles can be 
summarized as follows:  
∆M/∆t = f(M, r, K) (1) 
 
Equation (1) says that the change in maturity (∆Μ) over a period ∆t is a 
function of maturity itself, of a growth rate relationship, and of a collection of 
resources that takes the form of a carrying capacity K. The standard way of 
expressing the form of this function (see, for instance, Case & Okamoto, 1996; 
Olthof, Kunnen, & Boom, 2000; Van Geert, 1994) is by means of the equation:  
Mt+1= Mt + Mt * r - Mt* r * Mt/K (2) 
 
Equation (2) says that M at t+1 equals M at t plus the quantity [Mt*r] minus 
the quantity [Mt*r*Mt/K]. The quantity [Mt*r] equals M at t multiplied by 
some growth rate r: The higher the growth rate, the faster the growth. The 
quantity [Mt*r*Mt/K] is the quantity [Mt*r] multiplied by the “damping 
parameter“ (Case & Okamoto, 1996, p. 164) [Mt/K]. When M approaches its 
maximum value, given the carrying capacity K, this ratio increases, allowing 
smaller increases in M. When M equals this maximum value (Mt=K), the 
growth stops.  
 
Resources for a Mature View on Oneself 
We assume that, in order to view themselves maturely, individuals need to 
have friends and mature relationships with their parents, to feel competent, 
and to reflect on their personal characteristics. These refer to the components 
of the carrying capacity of M. We use Kf, Kp, and Kn to denote the components 
related to friends, to parents, and to non-relational issues (competence and 
reflections), respectively. The overall carrying capacity K is then:  
K=wf*Kf+wp*Kp+wn*Kn (3) 
where wx denotes the importance of each of these components for the 
individuals.  
 
Why these components? The importance of relationships for the self is widely 
supported (e.g., self-in-relations theories; see Batgos & Leadbeater, 1994). We 
assume that relationships are important in two ways: Relationships grant 
individuals with relational provisions and with the space they need to 
develop as individuals (compare the concepts of connectedness and 
individuality, Grotevant & Cooper, 1986; and of attachment and autonomy, 
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Noom, Dekovic, & Meeus, 1999). Friendships are voluntarily built personal 
relationships that provide intimacy and assistance to their members, who like 
each other and seek each other’s company (Fehr, 1996). Within friendships, 
adolescents experience increased connectedness (Collins, 1997): They acquire 
consensual validation of their interests, receive affection, and intimately 
disclose (Parker & Gottman, 1989). Furthermore, friends decreasingly ask for 
conformity and increasingly tolerate each other’s individuality (Steinberg & 
Morris, 2001). In this context, individuals acquire their sense of being distinct 
from their relational partners.  
 Relationships with parents have similar effects. Despite earlier stress 
on the need for detachment (Hoffman, 1984), recent theories (Grotevant & 
Cooper, 1986) and empirical findings (O’Connor, Allen, Bell, & Hauser, 1996) 
suggest that parents remain important for their adolescent children. For 
instance, adolescents with warm and supportive relationships with parents 
are more socially competent (Steinberg & Morris, 2001). However, the parent-
offspring relationship transforms to allow the offspring to develop as 
individuals. The parents accept that adolescents can have their own views 
(Youniss & Smollar, 1989). Adolescents realize the weaknesses (Orvin, 1995) 
and fallibility of their parents (Youniss & Smollar, 1989). The relationship 
itself transforms from complementary and unilateral into symmetrical (Knap, 
1984), mutual (Graber & Brooks- Gunn, 1996), and egalitarian (Steinberg & 
Morris, 2001).  
 Relationships with friends and parents are processes rather than states 
(see Duck & Sants, 1983). As such, they have an important difference. The 
former are voluntary (Collins, 1997). People meet others, choose to whom to 
express their attraction, start sharing less personal or intimate activities, and 
continue with exchanging more personal information. At any time, 
friendships may stop developing, switch to earlier stages, or dissolve 
(Berscheid & Reis, 1998; Blieszner, 1989). We assume that the deeper the 
friendships of adolescents, the more the resources these provide for the 
maturity of commitments towards personal characteristics. Assume that D is 
the depth of friendships, then:  
Kf= f(D) (4) 
 
The parent-offspring relationship, on the other hand, is involuntary (Collins, 
1997). We assume that the more mature the relationship, the more resources it 
provides. Maturity of and satisfaction from this relationship are distinct. In a 
mature relationship, both parties acknowledge each other’s strengths and 
weaknesses. Nevertheless, if communication is problematic, parents and/or 
children can be dissatisfied. Also, parents and/or offspring may be satisfied 
from an enmeshed (immature) relationship, where children do not develop 
autonomous behavior (see Dubas & Petersen, 1996). Adolescents derive 
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maximal resources from mature and satisfactory relationships and minimal 
resources from immature and dissatisfactory relationships. We assume that 
mature but dissatisfactory relationships provide more resources than 
satisfactory but immature ones. Assuming that Mp and S are the maturity of 
and satisfaction from the parent-offspring relationship:  
Kp= f(Mp, S) (5) 
  
Self-related constructs have also non-relational roots. For instance, part of the 
self-concept refers to one’s perception of personal abilities (Wylie, 1974). 
Findings, as well, exhibit that competence is related to self-worth (Harter, 
1999). Therefore, we consider perceived competence an important aspect of 
Kn. Furthermore, the identity literature has focused on actively thinking over 
one’s commitments (for instance, Meeus, 1996) as a mechanism of 
commitment formation (Berman, Schwartz, Kurtines, & Berman, 2001). We 
expect people to reflect on their personal characteristics if they change their 
commitments, or if they try to support the ones they already hold (compare 
Luyckx, Beyers, Goossens, & Soenens, 2004). In sum, assuming that PC is the 
perceived competence and Rf the reflections on personal characteristics:  
Kn= f(PC, Rf)  (6) 
 
We use emotions as an index of the course of the carrying capacity 
components in time. Emotions result from subjectively appraising objective 
situations (Frijda, 1993), and convey information on the personal relevance of 
these situations (Mellers, 2000). Emotions thus represent reality from the 
individuals’ perspective. This is at least equally (Bronfenbrenner, 1977), if not 
more psychologically consequential (Engels, Finkenauer, Meeus, & Dekovic, 
2001) than objective reality. Initial encounters with people are the first step for 
building friendships if they cause positive emotions. Being away from parents 
signifies a mature parent-offspring relationship if the adolescent feels 
comfortable, but an immature relationship if s/he feels lonely. Finally, 
succeeding in an exam signifies perceived competence if it causes satisfaction. 
We will define the effects of emotions on Kf, Kp, and Kn in the Results section.  
In this section, we explained why we consider friendships, mature 
parent-offspring relations, perceived competence, and reflections on own 
characteristics necessary for achieving a mature commitment towards 
personal characteristics. In terms of our dynamic systems thinking, these refer 
to the components of the carrying capacity (K in equation (2)). We also 
outlined why we will use emotions as an index of the course of these 




Changes in the Carrying Capacity: In what Context? 
Empirically testing our model validly necessitates taking dense 
measurements. For economic reasons, we needed a context where changes in 
maturity were expected in a relatively short period (see Elder, 1998). 
Temporarily studying in a foreign country is such a context. We followed the 
effects of such temporary switches in the context of the Socrates/Erasmus 
exchange program. We expect participating in this program to affect the 
maturity of commitments towards personal characteristics, because it affects 
the carrying capacity components (see Van Geert, 1994): Leaving home is a 
turning point in the parent-offspring relationship (Golish, 2000). 
Communication with hometown friends decreases, and new friendships are 
formed (Johnson, Staton, & Jorgensen-Earp, 1995). Finally, moving away 
involves several stressors (see Fisher, 1990) that require functioning more 
effectively. For these, we expect the Socrates/ Erasmus program to be an 
appropriate context to empirically test our model. 
 
Aims of the Present Study 
So far, we defined our variables and how they act upon one another across 
time. We also expressed these mathematically. From now on, we will aim at:  
1. Expressing mathematically the effect of emotions on the carrying capacity 
components;  
2. Finding meaningful values for the parameters used in our model; and  
3. Empirically testing our model.  
 
METHOD 
Overview of Methodological Design 
The participants completed daily diaries on their experiences while 
participating in the Socrates/Erasmus program. Before (T1) and after their 
stay abroad (T2), we interviewed them on their commitments towards 




We followed four Hellene female psychology students. None had emotional 
problems. T., 21, was in her fourth study year. Her parents were university 
graduates and fully employed. Before leaving for abroad, she lived with her 
parents and two of her three siblings. A., 21, was in her third study year. Her 
parents were university graduates and fully employed. Before her stay 
abroad, she lived with her parents and two siblings. E., 21, was in her fourth 
study year. Her parents were high school graduates. Her father was fully 
employed, and her mother was retired. Before leaving for abroad, she lived 
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alone in a city 200 km away from her parents and sibling. V., 20, was in her 
third study year. Her parents were high school graduates. Her father was 
fully employed, and her mother was a homemaker. Before her stay abroad, 
she lived with one of her siblings in a flat underneath the flat of her parents 
and other two siblings.  
 
Measures 
We administered an interview to measure the T1 and T2 degrees of maturity 
of commitments towards personal characteristics and the T1 values of the 
carrying capacity components. We used a diary to collect information on the 
emotions related to friends, parents, and non-relational aspects of the self. We 
will now present these measures.  
 
T1 and T2 maturity of commitments towards personal characteristics 
We used the Groningen Identity Development Scale (GIDS; Bosma, 1985), 
which taps on the domains of personal characteristics, parents, friendship, 
intimate relationships, future occupation- leisure- school, and philosophy of 
life. We will here refer to the first domain. First, we interviewed the 
participants on their appearance, personality, and gender: What do you think 
about your appearance? Name some characteristics of your personality that 
you like/ don’t like. You are a woman; what do you think about this? At T2, 
these questions referred to the period abroad. We concluded this interview 
asking: “How would you summarize your view on yourself?” The qualitative 
answer to this question is the content of the commitment. Then, the 
participants answered to 32 questions on a 0-2 scale. We will use the items 
measuring the degrees of identification and of direction for the future (alpha 
coefficients in the original version .67 and .86, respectively).  
We then transformed these data into a maturity measurement. Recollect 
that we use the content of commitment (immature, changing immature, 
changing mature, mature), and the scores in identification and in direction for 
the future (in this order) to determine the degree of maturity. Because of our 
small sample size, we used the raw scores in the scales of identification and 
direction for the future (see Hofstee & Hendriks, 1998). We grouped them in 
five intervals: very low, rather low, intermediate, rather high, and very high. 
This grouping leads to (4 levels of content maturity) x (5 identification 
intervals) x (5 direction for the future intervals)= 100 intervals of commitment 
maturity. Note that we assume no overlap between maturity intervals: A 
commitment with mature content, very high identification, and very low 
direction for the future is more mature than a commitment with mature 
content, rather high identification, and very high direction for the future. We 
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measured maturity on a 0 to 1 scale. Each of the 100 maturity intervals was 
thus set to correspond to a .01 interval.  
 
T1 values of the carrying capacity components  
In the T1 interview, we asked whether any important changes occurred in the 
participants’ lives in the previous months. No such changes had occurred. 
Therefore, we assumed that the actual friendships and parent-offspring 
relationship at T1 were good estimates of the components Kf and Kp. We used 
other parts of the GIDS to gain insight in these issues: Do you have real 
friends? What do they mean to you? In what ways are your parents important 
to you? What irritates you about your parents? From the answers to such 
questions, we derived how many resources related to friends and parents the 
participants were using at T1: How close were these to the absence of 
resources (K=0)? To full availability of resources (K=1)? To some theoretical 
middle point (K=.5)? We then compared the resources of each individual to 
the resources of the other individuals: Who has more and who has fewer 
resources available? Based on these considerations, we assigned the T1 values 
of Kp and Kf. Because we had already used the section of the GIDS on the 
personal characteristics, we used equation (3) to calculate the initial value of 
Kn.  
 
Experiences related to friends, parents, and non-relational aspects  
We devised a booklet including two diary sheets per day. More sheets were 
available upon request. The participants completed the date, described the 
experience, and gave an array of related emotions followed by an intensity 
score (e.g., sadness-1, joy-3). The participants should complete the diaries 
daily and use separate sheets for every experience. If nothing noticeable 
occurred, they should briefly outline their day. We defined experience as 
“events that you meet or on which you are informed by others, thoughts by 
yourself or by others, discussions in which you participate or which you 
attend, etc.” We asked for experiences related, in their view, to the domains 
discussed in the GIDS, and all other important experiences. We further 
processed entries referring to friends, parents, competence, and reflections on 
personal characteristics. The participants were free to use any emotional term. 
A suggestive list rooting from English literature and Hellenic3 dictionaries 
was provided.  
 
Procedure 
We administered the GIDS (Bosma, 1985) in the last two weeks before the 
participants’ departure for abroad (T1). Then, we gave them the diary and 
instruction booklet, and asked them to complete some diary sheets before 
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their departures. They could then discuss about problems that may have 
appeared. While abroad, about five months, they were completing their 
diaries daily. They were sending these to the first author regularly. All 
participants went back to Hellas for a two-week vacation in the middle of the 
term. Three of them continued completing the diaries during this period. 
Within maximally two weeks after their final return to Hellas (T2), we 
administered a parallel version of the GIDS.  
 
Analyses 
Coding of diary entries 
We first chose the entries in which any of the persons mentioned was a peer. 
We studied peers rather than friends only, because we were interested in both 
existing and prospective friends. We considered as peers individuals that 
were explicitly called friends or that had similar status (students, age mates; 
see Ladd, 1989), excluding intimate partners. We also included entries 
referring to a family with which T. reported very good communication, 
despite the age difference. From these entries, we further processed the ones 
referring to different depths of friendships. Recollect that a friendship is built 
when people meet each other, do things together, and exchange personal 
information. We thought that feeling positive emotions for the presence and 
negative for the absence of peers, affection towards peers, and positive 
emotions for reflecting on the course of a friendship show increasing depths 
of the friendships.  
Codes FD1 to FD6 describe experiences corresponding to these depths 
of friendships. Hereunder, we give the codes, the kinds of experiences 
described, and examples of related entries:  
(FD1) Positive emotions for first encounters with people: “The Welcome Day 
was… pleasant, because I met many Erasmus students. In the evening, 
we went out… and I had a wonderful time. Content-3” 
(FD2) Positive emotions for shared activities: “I went out with a girl with 
whom we hang around here, and went to a… party. Content-2, 
enjoyment-2” 
(FD3) Positive emotions for getting to know the others better: “In the evening, 
… [w]e were discussing with L. and M. They are very nice. It was 
relaxing and fine. Content-2” 
(FD4) Positive emotions for the presence and negative emotions for the 
absence of specific peers: “These days, I and A. spend most of the time 
together… I am very happy she is here. Elation-2, trust-3, joy-3” and 
“Today… we met the Romanian girl… We all three agreed that we 
miss our families and friends. Sadness-3, worry-2” 
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(FD5) Affection towards peers: “I got up in a bad mood… I missed much my 
relatives and friends in Hellas. Sadness-3, worry-2, interest-3, 
affection-3” 
(FD6) Positive emotions for reflecting on the course of friendships: “I like this 
companionship and friendship I have developed with the guys. Each 
is busy with their distinct schedule, but we often eat together, spend 
quite some hours together. I did not have the chance to live such 
experiences in Athens. Content-3” 
 
Then, we chose the entries referring to at least one of the participants’ parents. 
We distinguished between the entries that showed a mature (code PM) and 
an immature (code PIM) parent-offspring relationship. Hereunder, we give 
the codes, the kinds of experiences described, and examples of related entries:  
(PM)  Such entries described:  
- Affection towards parents: “I (am) very impatient about seeing my family 
and going back home. The more the days I will go back approach, the 
more I miss them. Impatience-2, love-3” 
- Positive emotions for being with the parents: “We went out to eat with the 
whole family for the first time within the last two months. Joy-3, love-3” 
- Weak or mild negative emotions for being away from parents: “… my 
father and brother left. I will see them again in a month. Worry-2, 
commotion-2” 
- Annoyance for behavior of mother: “[My brother] is very [sick]. I have [to 
take care of everything] and I also have a godmother and a mother to 
bother me and to ask me and to suggest what I should do… Irritation-3, 
discouragement-1, indignation-1, worry-2” 
- Increasing importance of peers vs. parents: “We are leaving for Hellas… 
On the one side, I am very happy I will see my relatives. On the other, I 
will miss my life and habits in [place]. I will have to keep up with the pace 
of the family” 
(PIM) Such entries described extreme negative emotions for being away from 
parents: “It is the first time that I missed my parents so much that I 
started crying… Sadness-3, nostalgia-3, upset-1, worry-3” 
 
Finally, we chose the entries referring to the non-relational aspects of the self. 
We distinguished entries describing perceived competence (code SPC), 
perceived incompetence (code SPI), and reflections on perceived change (code 
SRcha) and on one’s negative characteristics (code SRneg). Hereunder, we 
give the codes and examples of related entries:   
(SPC) Entries referred, for instance, to: 
- Study-related achievements: “… the marks in a course I expected were 
announced and… I passed. Joy-3, satisfaction-3” 
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- Language competence: “…  three persons have told me… that I speak 
good (language). I… also realize that I manage to communicate with 
others… Content-3, zest-3, satisfaction-3, joy-3” 
(SPI) Entries referred, for instance, to: 
- Study-related strains: “Studying for the paper (I must submit) on Tuesday 
and stress because I am left behind” 
- Strains for conditions beyond the individuals’ control: “The suspense is 
protracted, my flight was cancelled, and the next flight with free seats is 
on Thursday! And we have courses and studying, and had to be already 
in [country]. Strain-2, irritation-3, doubt-2” 
(SRcha) For instance: “… I feel so comfortable with V., as if I knew her for 
years, but this is strange for me because usually I find it difficult to 
feel comfortable and open up to people. I guess I am relaxed and I feel 
good. Enjoyment-2, joy-3” 
(SRneg) For instance: “Today I learned that half Germans are Catholics and 
the rest Evangelists… Here, I will learn to associate with people from 
other religions, trying, though, to evaluate the person and not what 
s/he believes- but I do not know whether I will make it in all 
instances. Surprise-3, perplexity-1” 
 
We used the Kwalitan4 to develop and manage our coding scheme. Using the 
formula (number of agreements)/(number of agreements + number of 
disagreements), the interrater reliability over 20% of the diary entries was 
91.7%.  
 
Testing the fit of the model 
In the introduction, we stated that we use a statistical model to test whether 
the description of the process at hand is accurate. The setup of our dynamic 
model5 dictates that repetitively running it yields a distribution of predicted 
outcomes rather than a single value. Furthermore, as we have already 
suggested, the observed outcome is an interval rather than a single value. 
Assuming that our description is accurate only if there is full overlap between 
the distribution of the predicted and the interval of the observed variables is 
not realistic. Rather, we compared this overlap with the overlap between the 
observed interval and the distributions of the scores predicted by a number of 
competitive models:  
 
4 Software designed for qualitative analysis. See http://www.kwalitan.net 
5 First, the T1 maturity is an interval rather than a single value. Furthermore, our 
model should not be very sensitive; small variations in the parameters and starting 
points of the variables should not seriously affect its fit. Therefore, we allowed our 
parameters and the T1 values of the carrying capacity components to vary by ±5%.  
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-  “Free friends,” “free parents,” and “free non relational” models. Each of 
the carrying capacity components varies freely. This tests whether it 
makes sense to look into the experiences related to friends, to parents, and 
to non-relational aspects of the self.  
- “Free friends experience random,” “free friends experience restricted,” 
“free parents experience,” and “free non relational experience” models. 
The effects of the friends-, parents-, and non-relational related experiences 
were randomized. For the case of friends, we constructed two models: 
one, in which the effects of the experience were totally randomized, and 
one, in which these effects were randomized but respecting a number of 
restrictions (see Results- Effects of emotions on the carrying capacity). 
This tests whether it makes sense to define the effects of the friends, 
parents, and non-relational aspects the way we did (see Results- 
Calibration of the model).  
 
For the statistical tests, we used a Monte Carlo procedure6 to run these 
eight models 1000 times per individual. This yielded a distribution of 
predicted scores per model per individual. We tested the null hypothesis that 
any differences between each random and the dedicated models are 
accidental; stated differently, that the two distributions come from the same 
underlying distribution. We tested this hypothesis as follows:  
1. We specified the distributions of the observed scores and the scores 
predicted by our dedicated model by means of a histogram with 200 bins. 
We calculated the absolute differences between the frequencies in the 
corresponding bins of the two distributions. The chi value is the average 
of these differences.  
2. We randomly permuted7 the scores of the distributions predicted by our 
dedicated and each competitive model to create an imaginary underlying 
distribution of both distributions. The random permutation simulates the 
null hypothesis that the two distributions are indistinguishable; that the 
values from the two distributions can be freely and randomly 
interchanged. 
3. We calculated the chi value of this distribution (see step 1).  
4. We used the Monte Carlo function to calculate the chi value of 1000 
underlying distributions (step 3), and compared this to the observed chi 
value (step 1). The p value of our null hypothesis is derived by dividing 
by 1000 the number of times that a chi value smaller than or equal to the 
observed one occurred in these 1000 distributions.  
 
 
6 Part of the PopTools, an add-on for Microsoft Excel for Windows.  
7 The SHUFFLE function under PopTools 
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Rejecting our null hypotheses would mean that the dedicated model fits our 
data better than the competitive models.  
 
RESULTS 
In this section, we will mathematically express the effect of the experiences 
(Method section) on the carrying capacity components. We will then describe 
our empirical data. We will use these to find meaningful values for the 
parameters used in our equations (calibration of the model). Finally, we will 
test the fit of our model to the empirical data.  
 
Effects of Emotions on the Carrying Capacity 
The depth of friendships reported is important for the Kf in three ways. First, 
the deeper the friendships, the higher the Kf. Second, if an experience 
corresponds to less deep friendships than the ones previously achieved, the 
Kf will decrease. The deeper the friendships previously achieved, the more 
difficult for these to dissolve and the lower the rate of decrease. Third, the 
lower the depth exhibited by the new experience, the closer the friendships to 
dissolve and the higher the rate of decrease. In summary:  
- If the reported experience at time t describes a friendship deeper than or 
equally deep to the one achieved at time t-1,  
Kft+1= KfFDX  (7)  
KfFDX is the carrying capacity corresponding to friends-related experience of 
depth X.  
- If the reported experience at time t describes a friendship less deep than the 
one achieved at time t-1, then the Kf at time t+1 will be  
Kft+1= Kft - Kft * (decrease rate)  (8) 
The decrease rate is bound to the restrictions described above.  
 
Entries showing a mature relationship with parents shall increase Kp; entries 
showing an immature relationship shall decrease it. We used the following 
equation to calculate the values of Kp in time: 
Kpt+1=Kpt+Kpt*(PMt*effPM-PIMt*effPIM)*(1- Kpt)  (9) 
Kpx denotes the value of Kp at time x, PMt and PIMt the occurrence at time t of 
experience showing a mature and an immature relationship (0 for non-
occurrence, 1 for occurrence), and effPM and effPIM the rates of changes caused 
by these experiences, respectively. The factor (1- Kpt) assures that Kp will not 
increase further than the maximum value 1.  
 
Similarly, we calculated the values of Kn as follows:  
Knt+1=Kn+Kn*(SPCt*effSPC+SPIt*effSPI+SRcht*effSRch+SRnegt*effSRneg)*(1-Knt) (10) 
Knx denotes the value of Kn at time x, SPCt, SPIt, SRcht, and SRnegt the 
occurrence at time t of SPC, SPI, SRch, and SRneg entries (0 for non-
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occurrence, 1 for occurrence; see Method), and effv the rate of change caused 
by experience v on the Kn. The factor (1- Knt) assures that Kn will not increase 
further than the maximum value 1.  
 
The carrying capacity components decline towards their T1 values in the 
absence of experience. We modeled this decline by iteratively subtracting 
small, random values from the values of the carrying capacity components 
(compare the notion of attractors, Van Geert, 1994).  
 
Description of Data 
Maturity of commitments towards personal characteristics 
Recollect that each combination of content maturity (immature, changing 
immature, changing mature, and mature), and of identification and direction 
for the future scores (very low, rather low, intermediate, rather high, and very 
high) corresponds to a .01 maturity interval (Method). At T1, T. reported 
mainly negative self-attributes and dissatisfaction with herself (immature 
content): “I am quite nervous and insecure. I am concerned to some extent 
with the others’ opinions on myself. I think that… I am agreeable and easy to 
discuss with. I can listen to others without trying to impose my opinion. One 
of [my] drawbacks is that I am rather absolute in certain issues.” Her 
identification was rather low and her direction for the future intermediate. 
Therefore, her maturity at T1 was .17-.18. At T2, she reported a, not yet 
consolidated, positive predisposition towards herself (changing mature 
content): “I have more self-confidence and I am more sociable… I changed 
quite much, I got more mature. My physical outlook also changed, but I want 
to go back to my old outlook.” Her identification and direction for the future 
were very high. Therefore, her maturity at T2 was .74-.75.  
At T1, A. reported only positive characteristics (immature content): “I 
am satisfied with my appearance, my personality, and my gender. I consider 
it particularly important for somebody to be reconciled with oneself, because 
this way s/he can exist and co-exist in harmony. We have to critically 
consider our negative points and correct them without being disappointed” 
(note that the second and third sentences refer to A.’s ideal self; see Harter, 
1999). Her identification and direction for the future were very high. 
Therefore, her maturity at T1 was .00-.01. At T2, she reported both positive 
and negative characteristics, but also a tendency to regain an all-positive view 
on herself (changing immature content): “In general, I am satisfied with 
myself. … [A] good relationship with oneself and one’s body is essential for 
the inner balance and… for the image we show to others. There are definitely 
points that should be ameliorated, but this does not frighten me but rather 
activates me.” Her identification and direction for the future were relatively 
high. Therefore, her maturity at T2 was .26-.27.  
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At T1, E. reported a positive view on herself and recognized negative 
aspects (mature content): “Regarding my appearance, I am quite satisfied. I 
am not preoccupied with changing anything so that the others like me… I 
always accept the others’ critique and I often ask for it… I recognize the good 
and bad elements (of my personality), and I try to improve myself… I have no 
problem for being a woman; rather, I am (happy) that someday I may become 
a mother.” Her identification was rather high and her direction for the future 
very high. Therefore, her maturity at T1 was .94-.95. At T2, she recognized 
positive and negative aspects of herself, and reported satisfaction (mature 
content): “My appearance has never been an obsession for me… What is more 
important is the configuration of my personality and, in general, I am looking 
for ways to improve myself.” Her identification and direction for the future 
were very high. Therefore, her maturity at T2 was .99-1.00. 
At T1, V. reported a positive view on herself and recognized negative 
aspects (mature content): “I am acquainted with my body and appearance in 
general, and I have never felt disadvantageous or special. I… represent the 
average woman of my age and I do not want any particular changes. 
Regarding my personality, I appreciate that… the others state characteristics 
of my personality, positive or negative, that actually represent me, and I get 
steamed up when (they) do not see my objective characteristics.” Her 
identification and direction for the future were very high. Therefore, her 
maturity at T1 was .99-1.00. At T2, she reported satisfaction from herself and 
recognized both positive and negative characteristics (mature content): 
“During my stay there, I found that my outlook became simpler… Regarding 
my personality, I have the feeling that I showed my real self.” Her 
identification and direction for the future were very high. Therefore, her 
maturity at T2 was .99-1.00. 
 
T1 values of the carrying capacity components 
Recollect that the T1 values of Kp and Kf are based on the data given in the T1 
interview. T. reported dissatisfaction with her relationship with her parents, 
but seemed to have a realistic perspective thereon. A., on the other hand, 
reported total satisfaction from an enmeshed relationship with her parents. 
Finally, E. and V. reported being satisfied with their mutual and egalitarian 
relationships with their parents. We set the initial Kp for T., A., E., and V. to .3, 
.1, .9, and .95, respectively. The initial Kp was smaller for E. than for V. 
because E. reported relatively more satisfaction at T2. T. had one, 
problematic, friendship. A. had also one, but satisfactory, friendship. E. and 
V. had many satisfactory friendships. We set the initial values of Kf for T., A., 
E., and V. to .1, .3, .95, and .95, respectively.  
We previously stated that we used equation (3) to calculate the T1 value 
of Kn. We used the T1 maturity as an estimate of the T1 value of K, we set the 
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values of the weights wf, wp, and wn, and we solved equation (3) for Kn. This 
calculation yielded values outside the 0-1 range. Setting the T1 value of the Kn 
to a value higher than the one derived from equation (3) has no further 
implications. However, setting it to a lower value requires some adjustments.8 
T. viewed herself realistically but negatively, and A. unrealistically positively. 
We have already said that a realistic unsatisfactory view on oneself is more 
mature than an unrealistic satisfactory view. Therefore, we set the initial Kn at 
.2 and .1 for T. and A., respectively. E. and V. had realistic positive views on 
themselves. We set the initial values of Kn for E. and V. to .90 and .95.  
 
Overview of the diary entries 
T. provided entries describing experiences that occurred in 129 days of her 
stay abroad. The corresponding numbers for A., E., and V. were 124, 123, and 
80.  Recall that the participants were asked to fill in entries also when nothing 
remarkable occurred. Following our coding scheme, we did not further 
process all these entries. The ones processed described experiences that 
occurred in 102, 52, 76, and 42 days for T., A., E., and V. respectively. Note 
that, although the percentage of days covered by our coding scheme is not 
particularly high (ranging from 41.9 to 79.1%), the number of measurement 
points justify the small size of our sample.  
Table 1 presents an overview of the occurrences of the parent-, peer-, 









8 Assume that wp=.35, wf=.45, and wn=.2.  
Firstly, assume that, at T1, K=.1, Kp=.1, and Kf=.2. Then, Kn= -.125 (equation (6)). This 
value is outside the 0 to 1 range. Because the carrying capacity refers to the maximum 
value that a variable can reach given these resources, we can easily assume that the 
carrying capacity is higher than the actual value of the variable. In other words, if Kn 
is negative, we can reset it to a value higher than 0.   
Secondly, assume that, at T1, K=.9, Kp=.8, and Kf=.9. Then, Kn =1.075 (equation (6)). 
This value is outside the 0 to 1 range. By decreasing this to a value smaller than 1, we 
also change the range of values that K (and M) can take. Consequently, the predicted 
and observed T2 maturity scores will be measured on different scales, and will, 
therefore, not agree. We solved this by subtracting from the observed maturity at T2 
the difference between the observed maturity at T1 and the sum of products 
wf*Kf+wp*Kp+wn*Kn for T1. 
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Table 1. Occurrences of parent-, peer-, and self-related entries per individual  
 
 T A E V   T A E V 
FD1 5 0 8 1  PIM 1 4 3 0 
FD2 61 26 52 22  PM 7 9 14 12 
FD3 10 1 1 2  SPC 1 9 12 5 
FD4 7 3 15 7  SPI 40 6 16 0 
FD5 4 0 2 1  SRch 5 1 0 0 
FD6 14 0 0 1  SRin 2 4 0 0 
      SRneg 0 5 0 0 
Note. For the meaning of codes, see Method 
 
First, we defined the growth rate r in equation (2). If r is too low, no 
change occurs. If it is too high, a chaotic pattern emerges. Setting r to .1 yields 
a smooth curve. In equation (3), we defined the weights of the carrying 
capacity components as follows: We know that both parents and friends are 
important relational partners in adolescence (Meeus, 1989; 1994) and that 
relational domains are more important than non-relational ones (Harter, 
1999). Because individuals are expected to spend more time with friends than 
with parents while abroad, we set a slightly higher weight to friends. We set 
wp, wf, and ws to .35, .45, and .20, respectively. For A., these values were .4, 
.35, and .25, respectively, because A. placed parents higher than anybody else 
in her life, her parents had taught her not to trust friends, and she appeared 
more preoccupied about herself than the other participants (compare the 
number of reflection entries). Because these weights needed to sum up to 1, 
they were not allowed to vary by ±5%.  
Regarding equation (7), we defined the Kf corresponding to each 
friendship depth (FD1 through FD6) as follows: Experiences FD1 to FD3 show 
the initial steps of friendship formation and experiences FD4 to FD6 show 
actual friendships. Therefore, we set the Kf to .15, .30, .45, .50, .80, and 1.00 for 
experiences FD1, FD2, FD3, FD4, FD5, and FD6, respectively. The parameters 
defining the decrease rate in equation (8) ranged from .2 to .0003125 and were 
set following the restrictions described in Effects of emotions on the carrying 
capacity.  
In equation (9), we defined the effects of experiences describing mature 
and immature relationships with parents as follows: The effects should be 
relatively large, given the relatively small number of parent-related entries. 
Because of the theoretically expected maturation of the parent-offspring 
relationship, we opted for a larger increasing effect. The increasing effect 
should not cancel out the decreasing effect. Recollect that T. had a realistic 
negative view on her relationship with her parents. The increasing and 
decreasing effects were set to .35 and .25, respectively. A. reported an 
immature but satisfactory relationship. Because of this satisfaction, we 
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assumed that she would be less willing to change this relationship. Therefore, 
we set both the increasing and decreasing effects to .3. Finally, E. and V. 
reported mature and satisfactory relationships. The increasing and decreasing 
effects were set to .35 and .2, respectively.  
In equation (10), we defined the effects of the competence and 
incompetence entries as follows: Competence entries had a positive effect for 
T., E., and V., because they support a realistic positive view on oneself. Their 
effect was negative for A., since they verified her extremely positive view on 
herself. Since T. had a negative view on herself, the effect of competence 
entries would be higher than in the cases of E. and V. The effects of 
competence entries were set to .20, -.01, .05, and .05 for T., A., E., and V. 
Following the same kind of reasoning, the effects of incompetence entries 
were set to -.0005, .10, .05, and .05, for T., A., E., and V., respectively. Note the 
particularly small effect of incompetence entries in the case of T. that is due to 
the relatively high number of related entries.  
Recall that E. and V. did not report any reflections. This agrees with our 
assumption that individuals reflect on their characteristics if they change or 
need to confirm their views (see Introduction). We set a positive effect of 
reflections on change in both T. and A. The effect was lower in A. (.10) than in 
T. (.30), because of A.’s satisfaction from her view on herself. For T., who had 
a negative view on herself, reflections on negative characteristics were set to 
have a small negative effect (-.005), because they support her negative 
perspective on herself. Such reflections were set to have a larger positive 
effect (.05) on A.’s Kn, because they question her extremely positive view on 
herself.  
 
Test of Fit 
Table 2 shows the significance tests for the null hypotheses that the 
distributions of scores predicted by our dedicated models and by each of the 
competitive models come from the same underlying distribution (see 
Method- Analyses). Our null hypotheses are rejected in most cases. The scores 
predicted by the dedicated models do not come from the same distribution as 
those predicted by the models “free carrying capacity,” “free parents,” “free  
friends,” “free non relational,” and “free non relational experience” for all 
four participants. The scores predicted by the dedicated model do not come 
from the same distribution as those by the models “free friends experience 
random” and “free friends experience restricted” for T., A., and V.. Finally, 
the scores predicted by the dedicate model do not come from the same 
distribution as those by model “free parents experience” for T. and A.  
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Table 2. Observed chi values, mean, variance, and lower and higher 
boundaries of the 95% of the scores of the 1000 simulated distributions, and p-
values for comparing the dedicated model witch each of the models “free 
carrying capacity,” “free parents,” “free friends,” “free self,” “free parents 
experience,” “free friends experience random,” “free friends experience 
restricted,” and “free self experience” for T., A., E., and V.  
   Simulated distributions  
Model  Observed 
chi value 






T 5.08 7.52 .01 7.32 7.72 <.001 
A 3.61 6.77 .01 6.54 6.96 <.001 




V 6.52 7.42 .01 7.25 7.56 <.001 
T 5.08 7.52 .01 7.33 7.70 <.001 
A 3.61 6.76 .01 6.57 6.96 <.001 
E 1.41 4.93 .01 4.71 5.15 <.001 
Free 
parents 
V 6.52 7.41 .01 7.26 7.57 <.001 
T 5.08 7.52 .01 7.34 7.70 <.001 
A 3.61 6.08 .01 5.87 6.30 <.001 
E 1.41 4.93 .01 4.69 5.15 <.001 
Free 
friends 
V 6.52 7.41 .01 7.27 7.57 <.001 
T 5.08 6.59 .01 6.37 6.81 <.001 
A 3.61 6.78 .01 6.59 6.98 <.001 
E 1.41 4.93 .01 4.71 5.15 <.001 
Free non 
relational 
V 6.52 7.39 .01 7.24 7.54 <.001 
T 5.08 7.43 .01 7.23 7.61 <.001 
A 3.61 6.72 .01 6.52 6.92 <.001 




V 6.52 6.36 .01 6.18 6.51 >.10 
T 5.08 7.50 .01 7.32 7.68 <.001 
A 3.61 6.66 .01 6.45 6.87 <.001 




random V 6.52 6.61 .01 6.47 6.77 >.10 
T 5.08 7.50 .01 7.29 7.70 <.001 
A 3.61 6.65 .01 6.44 6.86 <.001 




restricted V 6.52 6.52 .01 6.37 6.68 >.10 
T 5.08 7.51 .01 7.30 7.69 <.001 
A 3.61 6.69 .01 6.48 6.89 <.001 










Studies on self and identity stress the role of relationships and of non-
relational aspects for the maturation of one’s view on oneself. In this study, 
we integrated these views into a dynamic systems model. Our basic 
assumption is that mature relationships with parents, friendships, perceived 
competence, and reflections on one’s characteristics provide the resources one 
needs to develop a mature view on oneself. This statement allows only for 
general predictions. Therefore, we expressed it mathematically, and we 
empirically tested the resulting model. The assumptions we made can be 
justified on the following grounds.  
 First, we assumed that participating in an international exchange 
program affects the maturity of the individuals’ commitments towards their 
personal characteristics. Our data supported this assumption. T. started with 
a rather low and ended with a rather high maturity. A. started with a very 
low and ended with a rather low maturity. E. started with a very high and 
ended up with an even higher maturity. Only V. did not show any change. 
This is not surprising given V.’s extremely high starting point. Second, we 
adopted a dynamic systems perspective because we assumed that the effect of 
time in not linear. Our data supported this assumption. Had we assumed a 
linear time effect, the variation of the observed individual trajectories would 
have been interpreted as noise. In summary, we have good reasons to believe 
that we chose an appropriate context and approach for our study.  
We will now discuss the specific assumptions we made for building our 
model. Recollect the meaning of the carrying capacity: It is the amount of 
resources that support and maintain the variable at hand. We suggested that 
it has three components: friends, parents, and non-relational aspects. We 
tested this assumption by making the carrying capacity independent of these 
areas (model “free carrying capacity”). Our analyses supported our 
assumption. In all four cases, the dedicated model predicted the observed 
scores better than the competitive model. We assumed that everyday 
experiences, rather than being abroad as such, would affect the carrying 
capacity components. We tested this by letting the carrying capacity 
components change independently of related experience (models “free 
parents,” “free friends,” and “free self”). Our analyses supported our 
assumption. In all four cases, the dedicated model predicted the observed 
scores better than the competitive models.  
 Finally, we assigned specific values to our parameters based on 
theoretical expectations, on the specific data provided by our participants, 
and on intuition. We tested these assumptions by letting the effects of the 
parents-, friends-, and non relational aspects effects vary freely (models “free 
parent experience,” “free friends experience random,” “free friends 
experience restricted,” and “free non relational experience”). Our analyses 
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supported these assumptions but not in all cases. The dedicated model and 
the models “free parents experience” and “free friends experience restricted” 
predict equally well the T2 measurement of E. and V., and the dedicated 
model and the model “free friends experience random” predict equally well 
the T2 measurements of V. 
 This is explained by looking at the starting points of E. and V. Even at 
the absence of experience showing maturing relationships with parents, 
friendships, competence, and reflections on oneself, the carrying capacity 
components could reach minimally their T1 value (Results- Effects of 
emotions on the carrying capacity). Recollect that both E. and V. started with 
satisfactory, mature relationships with their parents and with a number of 
friendships. Because of these T1 characteristics, the values of Kp and Kf 
remained relatively high irrespectively of the effects of the related 
experiences. For this reason, the size of the effects of the parent- and friends-
related experience does not make any difference in the case of these two 
participants. 
 We will now elaborate on the consequences of our dynamic systems 
process perspective on our method. Describing and empirically testing a 
process means that we are interested in individual trajectories rather than in 
mean changes (for arguments for the case studies, see Kroger, 1993; Magai & 
Hunziker, 1993; Rosenberg, 1989). Studying cases resembles studying 
stratified samples (see Moore & McCabe, 2003). Here, however, we need to 
stratify not only on the characteristics of the individuals at T1, but also on the 
everyday experiences. This is realistic only on an individual basis. Practical 
constraints forced us to follow and analyze data from four individuals only.  
Our sample is not only very small, but also highly selective. We studied 
Hellene female psychology students aged 20-22 years. Is the value of our 
findings restricted due to generalizability problems? First, our aim is not 
generalization in the first place. Rather, we aim at providing a theoretically 
plausible description of a process and at refining it to better describe our 
empirical data. In the Introduction, we suggested that dynamic systems 
modeling entails defining a conceptual model, specifying a mathematical 
model, and empirical testing. These steps are iterative rather than linear. We 
started with a very simple conceptual model, mathematically expressed it, 
and saw that it did not accurately describe all trajectories. We looked at our 
data, went back to theory, and refined the model accordingly. The model 
presented here is the final product of this iterative process.  
Second, our research is not the only one with sample restrictions 
regarding gender and field of studies: Females and psychology students 
participate more often than others in psychological research in general (for 
instance, Berscheid & Reis, 1998). The age of our participants (20-22 years) 
would be of concern if identity (and self) formation occurred in adolescence 
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and adolescence had a definite age limit. First, starting with Erikson (1968), 
identity formation is considered a life long process. Furthermore, considering 
adolescence the period within which one’s characteristics change “from what 
is considered childlike to what is considered adult” (Lerner & Villaruel, 1996, 
p. 130), two participants had already reached adulthood, while the other two 
were still adolescents (compare also the concept of emerging adulthood; 
Arnett, 2000).  
Finally, we think that the cultural background of our participants does 
not make them different from their Western age-mates. For instance, we 
know that the Hellenic youth living in urban areas have individualistic (and, 
thus, Western-like) values (Georgas, 1989; 1991). Moreover, the youth coming 
from Southern Europe differs from that coming from the rest of Europe in the 
timing of the transition to adulthood, rather than in the qualities of this 
transition (Scabini, 1998). Finally, we based all our theoretical assumptions on 
Western literature; as we have already discussed, our data show that this 
assumptions hold in our sample.  
In conclusion, we do not argue that our small sample is representative 
of the population. Actually, large samples may also not be representative of 
the population either. The advantage of large samples is their statistical 
power: Smaller effects reach more easily statistical significance. However, 
given our focus on processes rather than means, statistical power is not an 
issue in this study. In sum, our conclusion is not that our model represents 
the population, but that it describes exemplary trajectories of change.  
Given the originality of our approach and theme, the subsequent lack of 
previously used instruments, and our concern for the subjective reality from 
the individuals’ perspective, we used mainly open instruments. This was a 
suitable way to approach the questions raised in this study. On the other 
hand, coding the diary entries and deriving the maturity scores was a rather 
intuitive process. Following more individuals is essential to establish the 
appropriateness of the coding schemes used here. Last but not least, the 
peculiarity of our data dictated the use of a statistical analysis that, although 
based on the same logic, does not rely on the assumptions underlying 
traditional statistics.  
The contribution of this study is twofold. From a theoretical 
perspective, we combined literature on relationships with parents and 
friends, on self, and on identity into an integrative dynamic systems 
framework that describes the process of maturation of one’s view on oneself. 
From a methodological perspective, we introduced a relatively new 
methodology, in which individual trajectories rather than group means are 
used for the study of processes. We hope that this study is a good step in 
applying such an approach in adolescent psychology.  
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SUMMARY OF FINDINDS 
In the introduction, we mentioned that literature suggests different rational 
processes leading to identity formation. Here, we used a well-researched 
construct (for instance, Berzonsky, 2003), the identity styles, to show that 
what is important for the psychological well-being of students is being 
committed, not the way these commitments were formed (Chapter 2). Having 
showed this, we conducted a longitudinal study to investigate the course of 
commitments from a process perspective. We followed four individuals for 
five months. Parent-related emotions predicted the course of commitments 
towards parents better than parent-related exploration (Chapter 3). Emotions 
not directly related to parents (namely, peer-related emotions) predicted the 
course of commitments towards parents (Chapter 4). Lastly, emotions related 
to friends, parents, perceived competence and incompetence, and reflections 
on one’s self predicted the course of the maturity of commitments towards 




Chapter 2 gave a first hint about why a focus on rational aspects of identity 
formation only may be misleading. Here, we will focus on Chapters 3 to 5. 
The main message of these chapters is that, besides the rational cognitive 
aspects of identity formation, its emotional aspects need to be studied as well. 
This section will elaborate on the connection of this message to the existing 
theory of commitment formation. It will be guided by the following 
questions: Why are rational aspects preponderant in commitment formation 
theory? What is usually the position attributed to emotions in the process of 
commitment formation? Is this position accurate? 
Rational cognitive components of the commitment formation have 
received by far more attention than their emotional counterparts; individuals 
are viewed as theorists or scientists who deliberately choose among identity 
alternatives (Berzonsky, 1989). The reason for this can be identified in the 
preponderance of exploration as a process of identity formation (see Berman, 
Schwartz, Kurtines, & Berman, 2001). In his seminal work, Marcia (1966) 
identified exploration as the process of formation of commitments in ideology 
and future occupation. Since then, no elaboration occurred in the identity 
literature on whether other processes may lead to such commitments. In the 
career development literature, for instance, Vondracek, Lerner, & 
Schulenberg (1986) suggested that occupational choice starts early in the 
individuals’ lives, that is, before they are cognitively able to deliberately 
reflect on these choices.  
Later, Marcia’s ideas were extended to interpersonal domains, without, 
again, questioning whether exploration suffices to explain how individuals 
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are committed with respect to their friendships, relationships with parents, or 
romantic relationships. However, for instance, theory clearly outlines how 
individuals’ perceptions of their relationships with their parents (what we 
called commitments towards parents) change in adolescence (see 
Introduction in Chapter 3), with no mention to exploration as a necessary 
process. Furthermore, Grotevant (1987) parallels the formation of 
commitments to the gradual building of commitments in romantic 
relationships. Overlooking such speculations can be attributed to the 
identified preponderance of the heavily rational exploration as the process of 
identity formation. This same reason explains the overlooking of emotions in 
the identity formation process.  
Grotevant (1987) was the first in the identity literature to suggest that 
emotions may play a role in choosing among alternatives. Starting from this, 
different emotions have been identified as signaling the initiation, 
continuation, and ending of the exploration process. In this case, emotions are 
not disregarded, but are considered only with reference to the exploration 
process. Actually, the initial aim of the studies reported in Chapters 3 to 5 was 
to trace these emotions in the exploration process, task that has not been 
undertaken in previous research. However, it soon became apparent that 
tracing these emotions in the exploration process was not possible, because 
no exploration occurred (Chapter 3). Therefore, it can be argued that, at least 
in some identity areas, reducing emotions to signals of the course of 
exploration is inadequate. Rather, emotions can be used as informants of the 
course of commitments directly, that is, not through their contribution to 
exploration.  
Using emotions as informants of the course of commitments does not 
mean that this course is wholly caused by emotions. Emotions affect 
motivation (Frijda, 1993; Isen, 1993) and are, therefore, causally related to the 
course of commitments; for instance, deriving satisfaction from observing 
changes in oneself motivates the person to seek more changes (see Chapter 5). 
In addition, emotions are reactions to external (environmental data) and 
internal (thoughts, somatic conditions) stimuli (Frijda, 1993; Stein, Trabasso, 
& Liway, 1993). These stimuli are also causally related to the course of 
commitments. Exposure to the same environment, however, does not yield 
the same emotional reactions and, therefore, the same commitments. Rather, 
emotional reactions depend on prior experiences (Stein, et al., 1993) and on 
current goals (Mellers, 2000). Furthermore, current commitments depend on 
previous commitments (Kunnen, Bosma, & Van Geert, 2001; also, Chapters 4 
and 5). The emotional reactions inevitably lead to new stimuli that inevitably 
lead to new emotional reactions. Lewis (1995) stress the interconnection of 
thoughts and emotions, and Frijda (1993) uses the term emotion episodes to 
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describe the sequences of emotional reactions aroused by any single person-
environment transaction.  
By questioning the preponderance of exploration in the commitment 
formation process, we do not argue that people have no active role in this 
process. Cognitions and emotions are intentional (Stein, et al., 1993). 
Moreover, individuals affect their experiences. For instance, extraverted 
people experience objectively more positive events and emotionally unstable 
people objectively more negative events (Magnus, Diener, Fujita, & Pavot, 
1993). Finally, exploration as the active thinking through and into identity 
alternatives (Marcia, 1966; Meeus, 1996) also yields stimuli that cause 
emotional outcomes (Grotevant, 1987). Note that exploration is embodied in 
rather than excluded from our ideas. To sum up, we like to view 
development from a developmental contextual perspective (Vondracek, et al., 
1986): Development depends on the individual, but the context is also 
important by imposing restrictions to the possible changes.  
In sum, the present studies suggested that emotions are important 
when it comes to predicting the course of commitments. This finding 
uncovers two interrelated deficiencies of the theory on commitments. First, 
this relies on exploration as the only process of commitment formation, with a 
focus on its rational cognitive aspects. Second, when emotions are 
acknowledged as important, their role is reduced to signal the different 
phases of the exploration process. The results presented here suggest that 
emotions should be studied independently of, but also including, exploration.  
 
Strengths of Present Studies- Directions for Future Research 
In Chapter 2, we reported a cross-sectional study. Two questionnaires (the 
Identity Style Inventory and the Psychological Well-Being scales) were 
translated in the Hellenic language, and administered to a sample of 230 
Hellene students. We conducted regression analyses to answer our research 
question. The main methodological concerns regarding this study refer to the 
sample studied (only students, preponderance of female participants), and to 
the low reliability coefficients of the Identity Style Inventory. For a fuller 
discussion of these limitations as well as the strengths of this study, the 
reader is referred to the relevant section of Chapter 2. Here, we will focus on 
the studies reported in Chapters 3 to 5. Because of the innovative design and 
the exploratory nature of these studies, we made many methodological 
decisions in an intuitive, although educated, way. This section will discuss 
which were these decisions and how they should be made in future research.  
First, we operationalised identity as the content and strength of 
commitment in the areas of philosophy of life, school- leisure- future 
occupation, friendships, parents, intimate relationships, and personal 
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characteristics (Bosma, 1985). Following Elder (1998), we sought identity 
changes in a context where such changes were probable, the participation in 
the Socrates/Erasmus programme. We used the Groningen Identity 
Development Scale (GIDS; Bosma, 1985) to study changes in the content and 
strength of commitments. The GIDS was transformed when administered for 
the second time. We built Excel spreadsheets to conduct statistical analyses on 
our individual trajectory data and we constructed keys to judge the contents 
of commitments and code the diary entries (Chapters 3, 4, and 5). Following 
Oatley and Duncan (1992), we used an open daily diary method to derive 
descriptions of identity-related experience and emotions. The coding schemes 
for the diary entries aimed at being objective and exhaustive of the reported 
experience. When objectivity was at stake, a second rater was used, and 
interrater reliabilities were calculated.  
The content and strength of commitments constituted an adequate 
operationalisation of identity. The amount of exploration, another variable 
frequently used in identity research, can easily be mapped on these two 
variables (Vleioras, 2003). The choice of identity areas to be studied should be 
refined in future research. Some participants were rather discouraged by the 
amount of information we requested in the T1 measurement: background 
information, expectations from participating in the programme, reactions of 
significant others to their prospective departure, the GIDS. Further, based on 
the diary entries, it later appeared that it made sense to look into 
commitments only in the areas of parents and personal characteristics. If the 
areas to be tapped on had been chosen beforehand, the whole design would 
have been more convenient for the participants.  
Choosing which identity areas to study goes hand in hand with where 
to look for identity changes. Participation in the Erasmus programme proved 
fruitful for studying commitments towards parents and personal 
characteristics. The initial intention was to study friendships and intimate 
relationships as well. However, it appeared that, although the network of 
friends was extended while abroad, the commitments towards friendships 
did not change. Further, the participants did not provide but a minimal 
number of diary entries related to intimate relationships. Different contexts 
may prove useful in the study of such areas. Being betrayed by a friend or 
starting dating are examples.  
Using the GIDS for the first identity measurement proved adequate: 
Questions were clear, commitments were successfully formulated, and the 
scores in the strength of commitment scales adequately represented the 
impression given during the interview. For the second measurement, re-
writing the interview questions so that they refer to the period between the 
two measurements did not work very well. Often the participants were bored 
because they did not have anything new to report. For a third measurement, 
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not used in the studies reported here, we provided the participants with an 
overview of the information we were interested in. They were then free to 
report per identity area. This last version functioned better. The formulation 
of the commitments and the questionnaire on the strength of commitment 
worked appropriately in all three measurements. The spreadsheets and 
coding schemes functioned without problems.  
Using open diaries was successful given the breadth of reported 
experiences. Given these diaries, the coding schemes used here fulfilled their 
aims of being exhaustive and objective. Future research may deal differently 
with the measurement of emotions. Here, compromising between the 
duration of the study and the convenience of the participants, we used daily 
diaries, acknowledging that an accumulative report of emotions once a day 
may not be an appropriate representation of the emotional experience of that 
day. Given a context of shorter duration, different approaches can be used. 
For instance, when following individuals for some days, the Experience 
Sampling Method (Czikszentmihalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977) could be used, 
while in a one-session context, such as a challenging an adolescent with 
contradictory information on an important issue, the video-recall procedure 
(Gottman & Levenson, 1985) may prove useful.  
Future research should also aim at broadening the generalisability of 
the results (studying male as well as female participants, of different ages, 
including non-students). When studying more participants, personality 
variables can be used to predict the occurrence of emotions (Costa and 
McCrae, 1988), identity styles can be used to predict the openness of 
commitments to change, and mood may be related to the everyday 
occurrence of emotions (Mayne & Ramsey, 2001). Measurements of such 
variables were also taken in the studies conducted here, but the small sample 
did not allow for enough variation to emerge.  
 
The contribution of this dissertation can be summarised in two points. First, 
we showed that focusing on deliberate decision making, a dominant trend in 
identity research, may be an inappropriate way to deal with identity 
formation (Chapters 2 and 3). Second, we suggested specific microprocesses 
relating emotions and identity commitments, and we demonstrated that 
empirical data support these suggestions (Chapters 4 and 5). Conducting the 
research presented in this dissertation was the result of applying what is 
being taught in research methodology courses: Learn what other people said 
about the area, critically approach previous theory and research findings, and 
see what gaps these leave. In particular, I read literature on identity and 
identity formation, and I saw that emotions were present in theory but not in 
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Adolescenten worden geconfronteerd met de taak een identiteit te vormen 
(Erikson, 1968). Ze moeten beslissen over hun beroep, een keuze maken in 
welke waarden ze geloven, zich een beeld vormen over hoe ze zich 
verhouden met belangrijke anderen in hun leven, en zichzelf accepteren zoals 
ze zijn. In het kader van het identiteitsstatus-paradigma (Marcia, 1966), 
operationaliseerden we identiteit als beelden, standpunten die individuen 
hebben ten aanzien van belangrijke thema’s in hun leven; zoals toekomstig 
beroep, religie, vriendschapsbanden, ouders, en persoonlijke karakteristieken 
(Bosma, 1985; Marcia, 1966; Meeus, 1996). Literatuur gebaseerd op dit 
paradigma, benoemt deze beelden als commitments.  
 De literatuur heeft zich voornamelijk gericht op twee eigenschappen 
van commitments: hun sterkte (hoeveel het individu investeert in deze 
beelden) en hun inhoud (wat is het beeld; Bosma, 1985; Kroger, 2003; Marcia, 
1966). Volgens deze literatuur worden commitments gevormd door middel 
van actief nadenken over verscheidene alternatieven (dit wordt ‘exploratie’ 
genoemd; Berman, Schwartz, Kurtines, & Berman, 2001; Grotevant, 1987). 
Verdere uitwerking van deze theorie heeft verschillende cognitieve 
componenten in het proces van exploratie geïdentificeerd (bv. Berman, et al., 
2001; Berzonsky, 1990). Wat in zowel de originele theorie als de meeste 
verdere uitwerkingen ervan ontbreekt, is de mogelijke rol die emoties kunnen 
spelen in de vorming van commitments. Indien er toch rekening gehouden 
wordt met emoties, dan worden deze steeds gereduceerd tot slechts signalen 
van het verloop van het exploratieproces (bv. Archer & Marshall, 1996).  
 Deze dissertatie richt zich op de rol van emoties in het proces van 
commitment vorming. De hoofdvragen waarop dit onderzoek een antwoord 
probeert te formuleren, zijn: Zouden we ons uitsluitend moeten richten op de 
rationele aspecten van commitment vorming? Hoe kunnen emoties aan dit 
proces gerelateerd zijn?  
Eerst voerden we een cross-sectionele studie uit om na te gaan of de 
nadruk op de rationele aspecten van identiteitsvorming gerechtvaardigd is 
(Hoofdstuk 2). Een voorbeeld van een dergelijk aspect is het concept van 
identiteitsstijlen. Identiteitsstijlen verwijzen naar de sociaal-cognitieve 
strategieën, waarvan verondersteld wordt dat individuen ze gebruiken 
wanneer ze identiteitsonderwerpen behandelen (Berzonsky, 1990). We 
hanteerden het psychologisch welzijn (Ryff, 1989) als een index voor wat 
belangrijk is voor de individuen. We boden de Identity Style Inventory 
(Berzonsky, 1992) en de Psychological Well-being scales (Ryff, 1989) aan 230 
Griekse universiteitsstudenten aan. Regressie-analyses toonden aan dat het 
gevormd hebben van een commitment (beeld) belangrijk is voor het 
psychologisch welzijn, maar de wijze waarop dit commitment gevormd 
wordt, namelijk de identiteitsstijl, niet. Dit is een eerste aanwijzing dat het 
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uitsluitend gericht zijn op de rationele aspecten van de identiteitsvorming 
misleidend kan zijn. 
 Omdat we de identiteitsvorming als een proces wilden benaderen, 
volgden we intensief vier Griekse psychologiestudenten gedurende een 
periode van vijf maanden, waarin ze deelnamen aan een internationaal 
uitwisselingsprogramma. We beschouwden dit programma als een geschikte 
context om ons een beeld te vormen van het identiteitsvormingsproces in 
actie, omdat deelname aan dit programma veranderingen in relationele, 
maatschappelijke, en culturele variabelen inhoudt, die gerelateerd zijn aan de 
identiteitsvorming (bv. Erikson, 1968; Grotevant, 1987). Aan het begin en aan 
het einde van de deelnemers hun verblijf in het buitenland boden we de 
Groningen Identity Development Scale aan (Bosma, 1985). Dit instrument 
werd ontwikkeld om de inhoud en de sterkte van de commitments te peilen 
ten aanzien van zes persoonlijk relevante domeinen: levensfilosofie, ouders, 
school- vrije tijd- toekomstig beroep, vriendschap, intieme relaties, en 
persoonlijke karakteristieken. Gedurende hun verblijf in het buitenland 
vulden de deelnemers dagelijks dagboeken in waarin ze 
identiteitsgerelateerde ervaringen en de daaruit volgende, of bijhorende, of 
aan de ervaringen gerelateerde emoties bespraken. Deze gegevens worden 
besproken in Hoofdstukken 3, 4, en 5.  
 Hoofdstuk 3 richt zich op het domein van de ouders: voorspelt 
exploratie veranderingen en stabiliteit in commitments ten aanzien van 
ouders? Volgens de literatuur over de veranderende ouder-kind relaties in de 
adolescentie lijkt dit onwaarschijnlijk: tijdens het ontwikkelingsverloop van 
de opgroeiende adolescenten veranderen de standpunten aangaande hun 
ouders, waarbij het actief nadenken over deze standpunten geen essentieel 
onderdeel is (bv. Collins, 1997). Inderdaad, onze dagboekgegevens gaven aan 
dat exploratie ten aanzien van de ouders zelden voorkwam, en, zelfs indien 
het toch voorkwam, kon de exploratie het verloop van de gerelateerde 
commitments niet voorspelen. Echter, positieve en negatieve emoties ten 
aanzien van ouders voorspelden dit verloop wel succesvol. 
 Nadat we het potentieel van emoties in het voorspellen van 
identiteitsveranderingen en –stabiliteit hadden aangetoond, modelleerden we 
in Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 de mogelijke processen die deze veranderingen en 
stabiliteit produceren. Hierbij hanteerden we een dynamische systemen (DS) 
benadering (Van Geert, 1994). Dergelijke benaderingen zijn reeds gebruikt om 
een brede variëteit aan psychologische processen te modelleren, maar nog 
niet in het identiteitsonderzoek (met uitzondering van het puur theoretische 
artikel van Kunnen & Bosma, 2000). Het belangrijkste voordeel van deze 
benaderingen, in vergelijking met traditionele benaderingen, is dat er 
expliciet rekening wordt gehouden met het verloop van processen in de tijd. 
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 Meestal veronderstelt de literatuur dat de ouder-kind relaties van 
invloed zijn op de vriendschappen die de kinderen ontwikkelen (bv. 
Ducharme, Doyle, & Markiewicz, 2002; Wright, 1999). In Hoofdstuk 4 stellen 
we een bijkomend verband voor: vriendschappen zijn belangrijk om de 
ouder-kind relaties te laten groeien (ook Sabatelli & Mazor, 1985). We richten 
ons op de percepties van deze relatie vanuit het standpunt van de kinderen, 
wat we hiervoor benoemd hebben als commitments ten aanzien van de 
ouders. We stelden een DS model op om de veranderingen en stabiliteit in 
deze commitments te voorspellen op basis van de vriendengerelateerde 
emoties. We gebruikten de empirische gegevens uit onze longitudinale studie 
om de zinvolheid van dit model aan te tonen. We concludeerden dat zelfs 
emoties die niet rechtstreeks gerelateerd zijn aan een identiteitsdomein de 
commitments ten aanzien van dit domein kunnen beïnvloeden. 
 Tenslotte belichten we in Hoofdstuk 5 een ander identiteitsdomein, 
namelijk de persoonlijke karakteristieken, het domein van wat de persoon 
van zichzelf vindt. Dit domein kan gemakkelijk gerelateerd worden aan de 
zelf- (Harter, 1999) en identiteitsliteratuur (Bosma, 1985; Marcia, 1966; Meeus, 
1996). Iemands standpunt over zichzelf kan verschillende mates van 
maturiteit hebben. In het geval van extreme immaturiteit ziet iemand 
uitsluitend de positieve kanten van zichzelf; in het geval van extreme 
maturiteit ziet iemand ook zijn negatieve kanten, maar heeft toch een 
overwegend positieve kijk op zichzelf (Harter, 1999). We bouwden een DS 
model om de verandering in de mate van maturiteit van iemands 
commitment ten aanzien van persoonlijke karakteristieken (‘zichzelf’) te 
beschrijven op basis van emoties gerelateerd aan vrienden, ouders, 
waargenomen competentie en incompetentie, en reflecties over zichzelf. De 
empirische data van onze longitudinale studie ondersteunden de 
plausabiliteit van dit model. 
 De bijdrage van deze dissertatie is tweeërlei (Hoofdstuk 6). Ten eerste 
toonden we aan dat het zich richten op het doelbewust beslissingen nemen 
(‘exploratie’) als het enige proces van identiteitsvorming- een dominante 
trend in het identiteitsonderzoek- een eenzijdige benadering van de 
identiteitsvorming inhoudt: er moet namelijk ook rekening gehouden worden 
met emoties. Deze conclusie brengt twee gekoppelde tekortkomingen in de 
theorie over commitments naar voren: deze baseert zich op exploratie als het 
enige proces van commitmentvorming met de nadruk op rationele cognitieve 
aspecten. En, indien emoties toch aandacht krijgen, worden ze uitsluitend 
gebruikt voor het signaleren van de verschillende fasen van het 
exploratieproces. Volgens de hier gepresenteerde resultaten zijn emoties 
belangrijk in de identiteitsvorming en zouden ze onafhankelijk van de 
exploratie moeten worden bestudeerd. 
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 Ten tweede hanteerden we literatuuronderzoek, “educated guessing,” 
en intuïtie om specifieke microprocessen voor te stellen en die te relateren aan 
emoties en identiteitscommitments. We vertaalden deze ideeën in DS 
mathematische modellen en toonden hun plausabiliteit aan aan de hand van 
data verzameld door middel van een niet-traditioneel methodologisch opzet: 
we volgden een klein aantal individuen waarbij we dagelijkse metingen van 
de doelvariabelen uitvoerden. We beschouwen deze aanpak als de enige 
juiste wijze om processen te onderzoeken. We hopen dat toekomstig 






A bunny rabbit is sitting in the woods, typing on his laptop. A fox comes 
along, and asks the bunny rabbit what he is doing. The rabbit replies: "I'm 
writing my PhD thesis on ‘Predation by Bunny Rabbits on Foxes and 
Wolves.’” “Rabbits preying on foxes and wolves? That’s counterintuitive!" 
exclaims the fox. "Perhaps," invites the rabbit, " you'd like to come into my 
burrow and see my data." The fox follows the rabbit down the rabbit hole; 
shortly later, the rabbit emerges brushing fox fur from his arm and picking 
bits of fox out of his teeth, and returns to his typing.  
A while later, a wolf comes along, and inquires what the rabbit is doing. 
"I'm writing my PhD thesis on 'Predation by Bunny Rabbits on Foxes and 
Wolves'." "But… That's counterintuitive!" exclaims the wolf. “Rabbits don't 
prey on foxes and wolves. " "Would you like to come down into my burrow 
and see my data?" invites the rabbit. The wolf follows the rabbit down the 
hole; shortly later, the rabbit emerges brushing wolf fur from his arm and 
picking bits of wolf out of his teeth, and returns to his typing. A few minutes 
later, a grizzly bear emerges from the rabbit hole, turns to the rabbit, and 
says: "The second chapter looks fine. I'll read the third one next week." 
And so, the moral of the story goes that it does not matter whether your 
research is counterintuitive as long as you have the right supervisor…  
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